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ABSTRACT
Once upon a time, and for a very short time, there was something that
people in authority, and those who manage collective memory,
considered a stable system of political and economic organization. It was
grounded on a complex division of authority between states, economic
entities, and social collectives. Contemporary economic globalization
has destabilized this traditional system. Corporations are no longer
completely controlled by the states that chartered them or within
complex enterprises, even by those in which they operate. Social
collectives now operate to change the political cultures that affect the
public policy of states and the economic behavior of companies. These
changes have produced a dynamic state in governance, one which has
been characterized as furthering misalignment among governance
regimes. These misalignments have the potential to detrimentally affect
the welfare of individuals and groups. Over the last decade a number of
efforts have been made to offer a new context for stability in the
relationships between the political, economic, and social orders at the
national and international levels. Among the most valuable proposals—
one most likely to contribute significantly to the new governance order—
has been an effort to elaborate a transnational regulatory framework for
transnational corporations and other business enterprises: the United
Nations’ “Protect, Respect, and remedy” Framework. This framework
system has been developed to reframe the way in which the political,
economic, and social governance orders work together. Now reduced to
a set of Guiding Principles, this framework seeks inter-systemic
harmonization that is socially sustainable, and thus stable. The
framework both recognizes and operationalizes emerging governance
regimes by combining the traditional focus on the legal systems of and
between states with the social systems of non-state actors and the
governance effects of policy. This paper critically analyzes the Guiding
Principles and its three key parts: the state duty to protect, the corporate
responsibility to respect, and the access to remedies. Part I provides a
71
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short introduction to the problems and issues that led to the development
of a framework for governance regimes for business and human rights.
Part II focuses on the development of the Guiding Principles from
conception to articulation. Part III examines the Guiding Principles in
detail. The examination begins with the report that introduced the
Guiding Principles, and then turns to a section-by-section analysis of the
Guiding Principles themselves. This examination serves as a basis for an
overall assessment of the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework as
a viable, coherent, and comprehensive effort to frame a governance
regime for business and human rights. The “Protect, Respect and
Remedy” Framework operationalized through the Guiding Principles
presents an innovative approach to governance. But its most forward
looking and valuable characteristics are also ones that make the project
vulnerable—for states, there is too great a recognition of the autonomy
and power of social-norm systems. The framework laid out in the
Guiding Principles represents a microcosm of the tectonic shifts in law
and governance systems and the organization of human collectives
confronting the consequences of globalization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Once upon a time, and for a very short time, there was something that people
in authority, and those who manage collective memory, considered a stable
1
system of political and economic organization. It was grounded on a complex
division of authority between states, economic entities, and social collectives.
2
States had a monopoly of political authority exercised through law. Economic
entities exercised their authority through contract and the web of relationships
3
with their stakeholders. Lastly, through social collectives, “civil society”
controlled the development of social norms that in turn impacted political choices
by the citizens of states and the consumers of and investors in economic
4
collectives.

1. FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: THE WESTERN STATE SYSTEM IN MIDCENTURY 56-57 (5th ed. 1953).
2. JAMES WILFORD GARNER, INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SCIENCE: A TREATISE ON THE ORIGIN,
NATURE, FUNCTIONS, AND ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE 316 (1910). For a classic description: “The original,
primary, and immediate end of the state is the maintenance of peace, order, security, and justice among the
individuals who compose it. This involves the establishment of a régime of law for the definition and protection
of individual rights and the creation of a domain of individual liberty, free from encroachment either by
individuals, or by associations, or by the government itself.” Id.
3. See generally, e.g., John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change:
Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT’L ORG. 379 (1982).
4. See, e.g., GIDEON BAKER, CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY: ALTERNATIVE VOICES 1-10
(2002); Muthiah Alagappa, Civil Society and Political Change: An Analytical Framework, in CIVIL SOCIETY
AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN ASIA: EXPANDING AND CONTRACTING DEMOCRATIC SPACE 25-57 (Muthiah
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Contemporary economic globalization has destabilized this traditional
system. In place of coherence, there appears to be a fragmentation of law at the
5
transnational level. Corporations are no longer completely controlled by the
6
states that chartered them. Within complex enterprises, the largest corporations
are not entirely controlled even by those states in which they operate. Social
collectives now operate to change the political cultures that affect the public
policy of states and the economic behavior of companies. These changes have
produced a dynamic state in governance, one that has been characterized as
7
furthering misalignment among governance regimes. These misalignments have
8
the potential to detrimentally affect the welfare of individuals and groups.
Over the last decade, a number of efforts have been made to offer a new
context for stability in the relationships between the political, economic, and
social orders at the national and international levels. At the national level, states
have responded by both expanding the nature and scope of their legislative
control and by changing the nature of their regulation based on changes in policy.
For example, efforts have been made to extend national law into extraterritorial
9
jurisdiction, to overhaul corporate law principles to extend to overseas
10
operations of domestic corporations, to make jurisdiction over foreign related
11
entities easier to attain, to widen the scope of disclosure with regard to overseas
12
13
impacts, and to impose some form of enterprise liability. At the same time,
significant changes in policy have been occurring. Corporate social responsibility
has moved from an elaboration of issues of corporate charity to policy concerns
Alagappa ed., 2004).
5. For a discussion, see, e.g., Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The
Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999 (2004).
6. See Larry Catá Backer, The Autonomous Global Corporation: On the Role of Organizational Law
Beyond Asset Partitioning and Legal Personality, 41 TULSA L. REV. 541, 543-44 (2006).
7
See, e.g., Vincent Cable, The Diminished Nation-State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power, 124
DAEDALUS 23, 37 (1995), available at http://relooney.fatcow.com/0_New_8849.pdf.
8. See, e.g., id.
9. See generally, e.g., Developments in the Law: Extraterritoriality, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1226 (2011). In
the context of business and human rights, see, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Extraterritoriality and Corporate Social
Responsibility: Governing Corporations, Governing Developing States, LCBACKER BLOG (Mar. 27, 2008,
11:47 PM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2008/03/extraterritoriality-and-corporate.html.
10. See, e.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1998) (amended 1988 and
1998).
11. For a discussion, see PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION
LAW: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY 197 (1993).
12. See, e.g., SEC Issues Interpretive Guidance on Disclosure Related to Business or Legal
Developments Regarding Climate Change, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Jan. 27, 2010), http://sec.gov/news/
press/2010/ 2010-15.htm. The SEC voted to provide companies with interpretive guidance on disclosure
requirements as they apply to business or legal developments relating to climate change. Id. With respect to
climate change issues triggering reporting, companies are to take into account the impact of international
accords. Id. “A company should consider, and disclose when material, the risks or effects on its business of
international accords and treaties relating to climate change.” Id.
13. Christopher D. Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90
YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1980).
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14

with the power to change the legal regulation of corporations. Disclosure
systems, once the sole province of state efforts to regulate transactions in
securities and grounded in the traditional view that corporations had a primary
15
obligation to maximize shareholder wealth, have begun to serve as a base for
16
broader systems of disclosure and reporting. Policy issues grounded in
17
sustainability, corporate citizenship, and similar approaches are increasingly
18
seen as a basis for regulation.
At the international level, a decades-long project of the United Nations
(“U.N.”) sought to draft a set of Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights
19
20
(“Norms”), which was eventually abandoned. In its place, international public
and non-governmental actors began refining and elaborating non-binding systems
of soft law that could be used by states and other actors as best practices or

14. The interest in corporate social responsibility, especially as it affects the obligations of multinational
corporations, has grown exponentially in the years since the fall of the Soviet Union system from 1989 to 1991.
For an early example, see JERRY W. ANDERSON, JR., CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: GUIDELINES FOR
TOP MANAGEMENT (1989). For an example of a contrasting current approach, see JOHN M. KLINE, ETHICS FOR
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: DECISION MAKING IN A GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 14 (2005). For good
descriptions of groups with an interest in corporate social responsibility, see, e.g. WILLIAM B. WERTHER, JR. &
DAVID CHANDLER, STRATEGIC CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: STAKEHOLDERS IN A GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENT 3 (2d ed. 2011).
15. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668. (Mich. 1919) (corporate board owes a duty to make
business decisions to profit shareholders, but the board of directors has broad discretion to determine the nature
and character of those actions).
16. See What is GRI?, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, https://www.globalreporting.org/information/
about-gri/what-is-GRI/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 26, 2011) (“Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is a
network-based organization that has pioneered the development of the world’s most widely used
sustainability reporting framework and is committed to its continuous improvement and application
worldwide.”).
17. See, e.g., Thomas Dyllick & Kai Hockerts, Beyond the Business Case for Corporate Sustainability,
11 BUS. STRATEGY & ENV’T 130, 130-31 (2002); Oliver Salzmann, Aileen Ionescu-Somers & Ulrich Steger,
The Business Case for Corporate Sustainability: Literature Review and Research Options, 23 EUR. MGMT. J.
27, 27 (2005).
18. See, e.g., Dirk Matten & Andrew Crane, Corporate Citizenship: Towards an Extended Theoretical
Conceptualization (Int’l Ctr. for Corporate Soc. Responsibility, Research Paper Ser. No. 04-2003, 2003);
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, GLOBAL CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP: THE LEADERSHIP CHALLENGE FOR CEOS AND
BOARDS (2002), available at https://members.weforum.org/pdf/GCCI/GCC_CEOstatement.pdf.
19. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights,
55th Sess., Aug. 7, 2003, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/L.8 (Aug. 7, 2003), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/
Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/6b10e6a7e6f3b747c1256d8100211a60?Opendocument (draft resolution prepared by
Alfonso Martínez et al.). This document was subsequently revised; see U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC],
Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, 55th Sess. Aug. 26, 2003, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/
12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/ 0/64155e7e8141b38cc12
56d63002c55e8?OpenDocument [hereinafter Norms] (revised edition). All references to the Norms are to the
revised Norms issued August 26, 2003.
20. For a history and discussion, see Larry Catá Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational
Law: The United Nations’ Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of
Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 331 (2006).
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21

standards for modeling behavior. These are understood as soft law in the sense
that they are neither the product of national legislatures nor do they form part of
22
the domestic legal orders of states. The Organization of Economic Cooperation
23
and Development (“OECD”), with its soft law Guidelines for Multinational
24
Enterprises, has been among the most influential of the systems offered through
international public law actors. Its influence has grown as it evolved from a
system of principles-based norms to a system that is beginning to take on the
25
characteristics of a substantially complete principles-based rule code. The U.N.
system itself has not abandoned the field, moving from the Norms to a
26
stakeholder-based, general principles-based “Global Compact.”
The OECD’s and U.N.’s principles-based approaches—organizing
regulatory frameworks without appearing to change their character or nature—
27
have served as the most successful models for advancing regulation. Among the
most creative recent proposals, one most likely to contribute significantly to the
new governance order has been efforts to elaborate a transnational regulatory
framework for transnational corporations and other business enterprises: the

21. Id. at 332-33.
22. But to call these “soft law” is to misunderstand their character and place within the constellation of
regulatory regimes. What makes them “soft” is their position within the ideology and rules of the law-state
system. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54
INT’L ORG. 421, 421-56 (2000). But outside of that system, for example, within the social-norm system of nonstate communities, they can assume a compelling character, binding on the members of regulatory communities
that accept their force and effect. For a discussion, see, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Governance Without
Government: An Overview and Application of Interactions Between Law-State and Governance-Corporate
Systems, (Pa. State Legal Studies Research, Paper No. 10-2010, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1568934&http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=
1&ved=0CCUQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fpapers.ssrn.com%2Fsol3%2FDelivery.cfm%3Fabstractid%3D15
68934&ei=ZC1lT8n_IO_aiQL4xo2jDw&usg=AFQjCNFT9gOe15ZPGHGEpqjTh7x2C3Y7cg ; see generally
Larry Catá Backer, Inter-Systemic Harmonisation and Its Challenges for the Legal State, in THE LAW OF THE
FUTURE AND THE FUTURE OF LAW 427, 427-37 (Sam Muller et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter BackerHarmonization].
23. See About the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2012).
24. See OECD, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2008), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf. For a discussion, see Jernej Letnar Černič, Corporate
Responsibility for Human Rights: A Critical Analysis of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 4
HANSE L. REV. 71 (2008).
25. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Rights And Accountability In Development (‘RAID’) v Das Air and
Global Witness v Afrimex: Small Steps Towards an Autonomous Transnational Legal System for the Regulation
of Multinational Corporations, 10 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 258, 260-61 (2009).
26. Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Issues/
human_rights/The_UN_SRSG_and_the_UN_Global_Compact.html (last updated Dec. 22, 2011). The Norms
have been disregarded by Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General Ruggie as unable to advance
the interests of business and human rights, and the introduction of the U.N. Global Compact, the voluntary
initiative, being followed more than other initiatives because it has gained a larger share of adherence by
international organizations. See UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ (last
visited Mar. 17, 2012) [hereinafter U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT 2012].
27. See U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT 2012, supra note 26.
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28

U.N.’s “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” Framework. The “Protect, Respect and
Remedy” Framework is organized as a set of three interlinked “pillars,” each of
which focuses on a particular aspect of the relationships between business, nongovernmental actors, international organizations, and the state. The first pillar,
“the state duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including
29
business,” is built on the idea that there are international standards for such
conduct which the state has a primary obligation to enforce. The second pillar,
30
“the corporate responsibility to respect human rights,” is grounded on the
principle that corporations also have a primary obligation to order their affairs to
conform to these international norms, both as a matter of conforming their
activities to law and because corporations have an independent responsibility to
conform. The third pillar, the remedial obligation, suggests the strong connection
between the duty of states, the responsibilities of corporations, and their mutual
obligation to make those obligations effective by providing “greater access for
31
victims to effective remedy, [both] judicial and non-judicial.”
Taken together, this framework system has been developed to reorient the
way in which the political, economic, and social governance orders work
together. Collectively, this human rights framework suggests an arrangement
whereby national legal orders incorporate and apply human rights norms while
enterprises implement autonomous global systems of institutionalized social
norms, with both providing mechanisms to remedy breaches of these governance
systems within their respective jurisdictions. The elaboration of a corporate
governance framework that is meant to apply concurrently with corporate
obligations under the laws of the jurisdiction in which they operate is one of the
greatest advancements of this framework. The framework is an attempt to build
simultaneous public and private governance systems as well as coordinate,
32
without integrating, their operations.
The framework was developed by John Ruggie as Special Representative of
the Secretary-General on the issue of Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprise (“SRSG”), who was appointed in
33
2005. The SRSG’s mandate began with a series of studies that were designed to

28. See Taking Responsibility, EUR. LAW., Feb. 2011, at 15, available at http://www.businesshumanrights.org/media/documents/european-lawyer-interview-with-professor-ruggie-feb-2011.pdf.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See infra Part II.
32. On polycentricity in governance, see Inger-Johanne Sand, Polycontextuality as an Alternative to
Constitutionalism, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 41 (Christian Joerges et al.
eds., 2004). This considerably advances the development of autonomous transnational regulatory bases for
corporate governance instead of suggesting further fragmentation of law at the transnational level. For a
discussion, see Fischer-Lescano &Teubner, supra note 5.
33. Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Appoints John Ruggie of United States Special
Representative on Issue of Human Rights, Transnational Corporations, Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Press
Release SG/A/934 (July 28, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sga934.doc.htm.
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34

elicit information from stakeholders including the corporate sector, along with a
35
set of fact-finding missions. Its progress was elaborated in a series of reports
36
from 2006 through 2011. In June 2008, the Human Rights Council unanimously
welcomed the framework and extended the SRSG’s mandate to provide practical
recommendations and concrete guidance; that is, to transpose the framework
37
from policy to system. With this encouragement and the support of key state
38
actors, Professor Reggie’s work ultimately resulted in the production of a set of
39
Guiding Principles. The initial effort, a set of draft Guiding Principles (“Draft
Principles”) was circulated in November 2010, and introduced by a short Report
40
(“2011 Report”). Thereafter, and incorporating the results of extensive
consultation held over the winter, the Special Representative circulated a set of
final Guiding Principles (“Guiding Principles”) in March 2011, preceded by a
41
short Introduction. The U.N. Human Rights Council (“HRC”) endorsed the
42
Guiding Principles in June 2011.
34. The SRSG planned to conduct surveys of business policies and practices with regard to human rights
to learn how businesses conceive of human rights, what standards they reference, and their use of impact
assessments. John G. Ruggie, Opening Remarks at Wilton Park Conference on Business & Human Rights 4
(Oct. 10-12, 2005), available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-Wilton-Park-Oct-2005.doc. Legal
teams were also contacted to determine how European and American courts understand the concepts of
complicity and sphere of influence in this context. Id.
35. Id. at 5.
36. The Human Rights Council is an inter-governmental body within the UN system made up
of 47 States responsible for strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights
around the globe. . . . The Council was created by the UN General Assembly on 15
March 2006 with the main purpose of addressing situations of human rights violations
and make recommendations on them.
United Nations Human Rights Council, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS., http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/
hrcouncil/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2012).
37. Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 8th sess., June 2-8, 2008, sec. 8/7, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/52
(Sept. 1, 2008) (prepared by Alejandro Artucio), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/
docs/8session/A.HRC.8.52.doc.
38. Some key state actors provided funding for portions of the work leading to the Guiding Principles.
See, e.g., John Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda, (John F. Kennedy Sch.
of Gov’t Faculty Research, Working Paper No. RWP07-029, 2007), available at http://web.hks.harvard.
edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id=262 (identifying the financial support of the governments of Canada,
Belgium, Norway, Sweden, and United Kingdom; the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, German Marshall Fund of the
United States; and United Nations Foundation).
39. See Taking Responsibility, supra note 28.
40. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Guiding Principles for the Implementation of the
United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, U.N. Draft (Nov. 2010), available at http://www.
reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-UN-draft-Guiding-Principles-22-Nov-2010.pdf (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter
2011 Report].
41. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar.
21, 2011), available at http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/ruggie-guidingprinciples-21-mar-2011.pdf (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter Guiding Principles].
42. Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, 17th Sess., July 6, 2011, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4 (July 6,
2011), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/G11/144/71/PDF/G1114471.pdf?
OpenElement. “In an unprecedented step, the United Nations Human Rights Council has endorsed a new set of
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During the transformation—from study, to normative framework, to Guiding
Principles—important international human rights actors have also endorsed the
43
44
approach. The European Union leadership has endorsed the framework. It is
being incorporated into other soft law systems as a basis for interpretation, from
45
that of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, to the corporate
social responsibility frameworks of the International Organization for
46
Standardization. Norway will “continue to support the Special Representative’s
47
work both politically and financially.” The SRSG has begun to compile a list of
Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights* designed to provide -for the first time- a global standard
for preventing and addressing the risk of adverse impacts on human rights linked to business activity.” New
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights Endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council, UNITED
NATIONS HUM. RTS. (June 16, 2011), http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/ruggieguiding-principles-endorsed-16-jun-2011.pdf.
43. Mary Robinson has noted that the “Protect, Respect, Remedy Framework has put in place the
foundation upon which to build principled, but pragmatic solutions to a range of challenges at the interface of
business and human rights.” Mary Robinson, Remarks at the Swedish EU Presidency Conference on Corporate
Social Responsibility (Nov. 10-11, 2009), available at http://www.realizingrights.org/pdf/Mary_RobinsonProtect_Respect_Remedy-Stockholm-Nov2009.pdf. Ms. Robinson was President of Ireland (1990-1997),
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (1997-2002), and is now a civil society actor on the
Board of Directors of Realizing Rights. See Our Board: Mary Robinson, REALIZING RTS., http://www.
realizingrights.org/ index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=75&Itemid=88 (last visited Mar. 20,
2012).
44. Protect, Respect, Remedy: Making the European Union Take a Lead in Promoting Corporate Social
Responsibility, ESILIGIEL FILES WORDPRESS 1 (2009), http://esiligiel.files.wordpress.com/2009/11/eupresidency-statement-on-protect-respect-remedy.pdf (“The United Nations’ Protect, Respect and Remedy
framework provides a key element for the global development of CSR practices. It constitutes a significant
input to the CSR work of the European Union.”).
45. See, e.g., Final Statement by the UK National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises: Complaint from Survival International Against Vedanta Resources plc, BUS. &
HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CENTRE (Sept. 25, 2009), http://www.business-humanrights.org/Links/Repository/
266990/jump [hereinafter Final Statement]. The National Contact Point explained:
Vedanta should consider implementing John Ruggie’s suggested key steps for a basic human rights
due diligence process:
• Adopting a human rights policy which is not simply aspirational but practically
implemented;
• Considering the human rights implications of projects before they begin and amend the
projects accordingly to minimise/eliminate this impact;
• Mainstreaming the human rights policy throughout the company, its subsidiaries and supply
chain;
• [and] Monitoring and auditing the implementation of the human rights policy and
company’s overall human rights performance.
Id. at sec. 78 (citations omitted).
46. See ISO 26000—Social Responsibility, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, http://www.iso.org/
iso/iso_catalogue/management_and_leadership_standards/social_responsibility/sr_discovering_iso26000.htm
(last visited Mar. 20, 2012); Sandra Atler, The Impact of the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special
Representative & the UN Framework on the Development of the Human Rights Components of ISO 26000
(John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Working Paper No. 64, 2011), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/mrcbg/CSRI/publications/workingpaper_64_atler_june%202011.pdf.
47. See, e.g., NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPORT NO. 10 TO THE STORTING:
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 78 (2009), available at http://www.regjeringen.
no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Propositions-and-reports/Reports-to-the-Storting/2008-2009/report-no-10-2008-2009-
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examples of influential people and organizations that have applied the “Protect,
48
Respect and Remedy” Framework. Now reduced to a set of Guiding Principles,
this framework seeks inter-systemic harmonization that is socially sustainable,
and thus stable. The framework both recognizes and operationalizes emerging
governance regimes by combining the traditional focus on the legal systems of
and between states with the social systems of non-state actors and the governance
effects of policy.
This paper critically analyzes the Guiding Principles and the three-pillar
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework on which it is based. This initial
section provides a short introduction to the problems and issues that led to the
movement toward the development of a framework for governance regimes for
business and human rights. Part II focuses on the development of the Guiding
Principles from conception to articulation. It provides a brief description and
analysis of the objectives, limitations, and context within which the “Protect,
Respect and Remedy” Framework was developed, out of which the Guiding
49
Principles were distilled. Parts III and IV then examine the Guiding Principles
in detail. Part III considers carefully the way in which the “Protect, Respect and
Remedy” Framework developed in the Special Representative’s reports from
2006 through 2010, and was transformed into principles that can be implemented
by states, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and
corporations. The examination starts from the 2011 Report introducing the Draft
Principles, and then turns to the distillation of the work of the Special
Representative in the Introduction to the final version of the Guiding Principles
submitted to the Human Rights Council. Part IV presents the heart of the
analysis, which is a critical section-by-section review of the Guiding Principles
themselves. Critical to that assessment is an evaluation of the changes between
Draft Principles and Guiding Principles as ultimately endorsed. This analysis
then serves as a basis for an overall assessment of the “Protect, Respect and
Remedy” Framework as a viable, coherent, and comprehensive effort to frame a
governance regime for business and human rights.
The journey from differentiation of the Ruggie project from the Norms in
2006, first to the development of the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework
in 2010, and then to the distillation of the framework in the form of
implementable principles in 2011, suggests both the narrowness of the
framework within which this project could be developed and the effects of the

to-the-storting.html?id=565907.
48. See Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Business & Human Rights,
Applications of the U.N. “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CENTRE,
http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/applications-of-framework-1-mar-2011.pdf (last
updated Mar. 1, 2011).
49. This analysis was developed more extensively in Larry Catá Backer, On the Evolution of the United
Nations’ “Protect-Respect-Remedy” Project: The State, the Corporation and Human Rights in a Global
Governance Context, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 37 (2011).
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limiting context in which these approaches can be effectuated. Principled
pragmatism, the hallmark of the Ruggie project, produced both great innovation
and vision in the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, and substantial
compromise, with the offer of more muted implementation of the framework’s
vision in the form of the Principles ultimately endorsed.
For all its compromises, the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework
operationalized through the Guiding Principles still presents an innovative
approach to governance. But the Guiding Principles represent innovation that is
subject to substantial pressure to conform to conventional understandings of the
arrangement of governance power within the state system that serves as the
50
foundation of the international political order. Indeed, the Guiding Principles’
most forward-looking and valuable characteristics are also ones that make the
project vulnerable. For states, there is too great a recognition of the autonomy
and power of social-norm systems. For corporations, there is too great a
recognition of the power of states beyond their own borders, of international
norms in mediating their obligations to states and to their stakeholders, and a
sense that the power of international norms is neither specific nor legitimate
enough. And for non-governmental communities, there is too little emphasis on
the forms and structures of law tied to states and on the subordination of nonstate actors in all cases to the state-based law-norm system. The former ought to
be obliged to incorporate international consensus within their domestic legal
orders, and the latter ought to be bound by this domesticated global law within
the legal systems of states. The Guiding Principles framework represents a
microcosm of the tectonic shifts in law and governance systems, and the
organization of human collectives confronts the consequences of globalization.
States, corporations, and non-governmental organizations content with the
current forms will try to bend the most innovative aspects of the Guiding
Principles to suit their sense of the past. Whether this can work—and if so,
how—will be the object of contention in theory and practice for the next decade.
II. FROM CONCEPTION TO ARTICULATION—THE GENESIS OF THE “PROTECT,
RESPECT AND REMEDY” FRAMEWORK
What was to become the General Principles developed in the course of the
51
work of the SRSG, as he sought to apply “principled pragmatism” as a basis for

50. Typical, perhaps, was the U.S. statement in support of the resolution endorsing the GP. See Daniel
Baer, Businesses and Transnational Corporations Have a Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: Guiding
Principles for Business and Human Rights, HUM. RTS. (June 16, 2011), http://www.humanrights.gov/2011/06/
16/businesses-and-transnational-corporations-have-a-responsibility-to-respect-human-rights/. “In highlighting
the importance of the Guiding Principles, we also want to take this opportunity to emphasize the essential
foundation of the human rights system that remains an important backdrop for the Special Representative’s
work, namely, State obligations under human rights law with respect to their own conduct.” Id.
51. The history of the development of the Protect, Respect and Remedy framework is discussed in
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thinking through the issue of governance across multiple state systems, an
52
emerging international governance framework, and systems of behavior
53
developed by business in its activities across the world. The SRSG’s mandate
began with a series of studies designed to elicit information from stakeholders,
54
55
including the corporate sector, along with a set of fact-finding missions. This
section provides a brief review of the development of the Guiding Principles
from initial conceptualization to its realization in late 2010 by considering the
evolution and refinement of the SRSG’s mandate through the reports produced
between 2006 and 2010.
56
The initial report produced by the SRSG in 2006 was based on his
57
preliminary research and conceptualization of the mandate. The initial object
was to distance the conceptual framework of the SRSG’s project from that which
58
produced the failed Norms. The 2006 Report reaffirmed the classical
organization of public power, within which the law-state system held a primary
59
position, and with respect to which law, including international law, served as
60
the most authoritative source of obligation. But the Report also recognized the
possibility of spaces for regulation under regimes other than law, where the state
greater detail in Backer, supra note 49.
52. The object was to identify “the directions in which achievable objectives may lie,” the legal focus of
which was to be on the identification and harmonization of legal standards, “achieving greater clarity of, and
possibly greater convergence among, emerging legal standards is a pressing need.” John Ruggie, Remarks at the
Business & Human Rights Seminar in Old Billingsgate, London (Dec. 8, 2005), available at http://www.
bhrseminar.org/John%20Ruggie%20Remarks.doc.
53. The starting point is “corporate liability for abuses that amount to violations of international criminal
or humanitarian law.” Id. The reason for starting at this point is that it is a critically important issue on its own,
where greater clarity is needed, while it may also shed light on the general strategy of legalizing corporate
human rights obligations. Id.
54. See Ruggie, supra note 34 and accompanying text.
55. Id. at 5.
56. Special Rep. of the Secretary-General, Interim Report of the Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G06/
110/27/PDF/G0611027.pdf?OpenElement (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter SRSG 2006 Report].
57. Id. at para. 3. Work on the mandate began by “conducting extensive consultations on the substance
of the mandate as well as alternative ways to pursue it—with states, non-governmental organizations,
international business associations and individual companies, international labor federations, U.N. and other
international agencies, and legal experts.” Id.
58. Id. at paras. 61-69. The SRSG devoted some attention to this aspect of the opening task of the
project. “My major concern was the legal and conceptual foundations of the Norms, especially as expressed in
the General Obligations section and the implications that flow from it. I judged them to be poorly conceived
and, therefore, highly problematic in their potential effects.” Opening Statement to United Nations Human
Rights Council, Professor John G. Ruggie, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Business and
Human Rights, Geneva (Sept. 25, 2006), available at http://198.170.85.29/Ruggie-statement-to-UN-HumanRights-Council-25-Sep-2006.pdf.
59. The “premise [is] that the objective of the mandate is to strengthen the promotion and protection of
human rights in relation to transnational corporations and other business enterprises, but that governments bear
principal responsibility for the vindication of those rights.” SRSG 2006 Report, supra note 56, at para. 7.
60. Id. at para. 61.
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61

and its domestic-international legal system were not directly involved. But that
62
space was not a public space; it was a space for private governance. The
possibility of bifurcating governance would permit the development of a further
possibility—one creating a governance regime in which the several components
of governance could be harnessed in a coordinated way. That possibility was to
be explored on the basis of a distinct approach that the SRSG described as
63
principled pragmatism. Principled pragmatism served not just as a conceptual
framework, but also as a methodological roadmap for the elaboration of a
framework amalgamating the legal systems of states, the governance systems of
64
international organizations, and the social norm systems of corporations. The
Report also set out the information gathering tasks that were to serve as the
65
foundation for the SRSG’s proposals.

61. “The role of social norms and expectations can be particularly important where the capacity or
willingness to enforce legal standards is lacking or absent altogether.” Id. at para. 75. But, as will become
evident, the relationship between social norm systems and law-state systems will remain the most difficult
framing issue of the SRSG project.
62. Early on the SRSG indicated a conceptual rejection of the notion of corporations as public actors.
In the best case scenario, these formulations would do little more than keep lawyers in gainful
employment for a generation to come. But in the worst case scenario, I fear, they would turn
transnational corporations into more benign twenty-first century versions of East India
companies, undermining the capacity of developing countries to generate independent and
democratically controlled institutions capable of acting in the public interest—which to my
mind is by far the most effective guarantor of human rights.
Opening Statement to United Nations Human Rights Council, supra note 58.
63. SRSG 2006 Report, supra note 56, at paras. 70-81.
64. The SRSG has described principled pragmatism:
The very first time I ever made any remarks on this mandate I was asked to describe my
approach to this, and I called it principled pragmatism. It is driven by principle, the principle
that we need to strengthen the human rights regime to better respond to corporate-related
human rights challenges and respond more effectively to the needs of victims. But it is utterly
pragmatic in how to get from here to there. The determinant for choosing alternative paths is
which ones provide the best mix of effectiveness and feasibility. That is what we have been
trying to do with this mandate since 2005.
John Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: Achievements and Prospects, POL’Y INNOVATIONS (Oct. 28, 2008),
http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/briefings/data/000089. On the understanding of the implementation of
SRSG’s principled pragmatism, see Principled Pragmatism—the Way Forward for Business and Human Rights,
UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. (June 7, 2010), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Principled
pragmatismBusinessHR.aspx. Principled pragmatism followed the framework through to the development of
the Guiding Principles.
Like the Framework, the Guiding Principles draw on extensive research and pilot projects carried
out in several industry sectors and countries, as well as several rounds of consultations with States,
businesses, investors, affected groups and other civil society stakeholders. All told, the mandate will
have conducted 47 international consultations from beginning to end.
Special Rep. of the Secretary-General, Guiding Principles for the Implementation of the United Nation’s
‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, para. 12, U.N. Doc. DRAFT (Nov. 2010), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/TransCorporations/GPs_Discussion_Draft_Final.pdf (by John Ruggie)
[hereinafter Draft Principles].
65. Regional multi-stakeholder consultation took place in Johannesburg, Bangkok, and Bogotá. The
workshops including legal experts took place in London, Oslo, Brussels, and New York. And the two Geneva-
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The 2007 Report addressed the principal elements of the initial mandate. Its
object was to provide a comprehensive mapping of customary practices by states,
67
international actors, and corporations to serve as a basis for extracting principle.
It elaborated a series of five clusters of standards, which were to serve as the
68
basis of the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework. The SRSG also began
to consider issues of implementation, focusing initially on accountability and
69
interpretive mechanisms. The importance of the 2007 Report lies not merely in
the mapping, but rather in the organization of that mapping. That organization
had strong substantive effects—creating the beginnings of a framework for
conceptualizing the structure of global governance of corporate actions with
human rights effects, and revealing the generally accepted content of this
framework through the aggregate behavior rules of states, international bodies,
and corporations.
The 2008 Report presented the first synthesis of the conceptualization and
70
data gathering projects of the 2006 and 2007 Reports. Its theme was the
construction of “a common framework of understanding, a foundation on which
71
thinking and action can build in a cumulative fashion.” It was the first real
attempt to sketch out a multi-governance framework which would organize
contributions by each of the major systemic stakeholders—states, businesses and
non-governmental stakeholders—into a system which coordinated and
harmonized the governance orders of each of the stakeholders’ polycentric
system of governance. Each system could then contribute to the objective of the
mandate—the protection of human rights in economic intercourse—through their
based consultations included work on the extractives and financial services industries. John G. Ruggie, Prepared
Remarks at Clifford Chance, London (Feb.19, 2007), available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggieremarks-Clifford-Chance-19-Feb-2007.pdf.
66. Special Rep. of the Secretary-General, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations on Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, para.
5, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/35 (Feb. 19, 2007), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/G07/108/85/PDF/G0710885.pdf?OpenElement (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter SRSG 2007 Report].
67. Id. at paras. 3, 5.
68. These clusters include: the state duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties,
potential corporate responsibility and accountability for international crimes, corporate responsibility for other
human rights violations under international law, soft law mechanisms, and self-regulation. John G. Ruggie,
Remarks at International Chamber of Commerce Commission on Business in Society, Paris 2-4 (Apr. 27, 2007),
available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-speech-to-ICC-27-Apr-2007.pdf.
69. Mr. Ruggie emphasized that there is commonly an underdeveloped accountability mechanism within
voluntary initiatives that affects the performance of the initiative in that companies cannot correct what they
don’t know is wrong. John Ruggie, Voluntary Principles on Security & Human Rights Remarks at Annual
Plenary, Washington, D.C. 5 (May 7, 2007), available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggieremarks-Voluntary-Principles-plenary-7-May-2007.pdf.
70. Special Rep. of the Secretary-General, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter SRSG 2008 Report].
71. John Ruggie, Special Rep. for Bus. & Human Rights, Next Steps in Business and Human Rights at
the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London 4 (May 22, 2008) available at
http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-speech-Chatham-House-22-May-2008.pdf.
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72

respective governance systems. The object of this approach was practical,
derived from the recognition emphasized in the fact-finding of the prior reports.
As a result, multiple governance organs contributed to the maintenance of human
73
rights. The failure to coordinate between them, and to systematize their
approach to human rights within each system, contributed significantly to the
74
governance gaps that were at the heart of human rights governance failures. The
three-pillar “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework was first introduced as a
75
response to this need.
The first three reports, then, can be understood as forming a single unit that
starts from a rejection of past efforts, and involves reframing, data gathering, and
reconceptualization grounded in that data and an openness to coordinating
polycentric systems within and beyond states and their legal orders. With the
76
renewal of the SRSG’s mandate by the HRC in 2008, the focus changed from
77
conception to operationalization. It stressed that “the obligation and the primary
responsibility to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms lie
78
79
with the State.” The 2009 Report provided a first attempt at conceptualizing
80
operationalization. The emphasis was on the principal measures through which
states and businesses operated as the starting point for framing issues of
implementation. States operated through law and policy, and so
operationalization required an emphasis on policy coordination and the
aggressive implementation of law and legal obligation that bound states.
Businesses operated through contract and the expectations of their principal
stakeholders, regularized through markets. Operationalization required an
emphasis on the mechanics through which these stakeholders could hold

72. SRSG 2008 Report, supra note 70.
73. Id. at paras. 6-8.
74. This gap is vast between “the scope and impact of economic forces and actors” on one side and “the
capacity of societies to manage their adverse consequences” on the other. Id. at para. 3.
75. Id.
76. Rep. of the Human Rights Council, supra note 37.
77. HRC directed the SRSG to operationalize the framework, by “providing ‘practical
recommendations’ and ‘concrete guidance’ to states, businesses and other social actors on its implementation.”
John G. Ruggie, U.N. Special Rep. for Bus. & Human Rights, Remarks for ICJ Access to Justice Workshop,
Johannesburg, South Africa 1 (Oct. 29-30, 2009), available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggieremarks-ICJ-Access-to-Justice-workshop-Johannesburg-29-30-Oct-2009.pdf.
78. Rep. of the Human Rights Council, supra note 37.
79. Special Rep. of the Secretary-General, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/11/13 (Apr. 22, 2009) (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter SRSG 2009 Report].
80. It is pointed out quite clearly from the fourteen consultations that “[e]very stakeholder group, despite
their other differences, has expressed the urgent need for a common conceptual and policy framework” of
understanding, “a foundation on which thinking and action can build.” SRSG 2008 Report, supra note 70, at
para. 8; Rep of the Human Rights Council, supra note 37. The Protect-Respect-Remedy framework resulted.
Ruggie, supra note 71.
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companies accountable. The form chosen was the disclosure regimes already
proven relatively effective in the regulation of securities markets on many states.
81
The 2010 Report refined and developed the ideas of the 2009 Report. It
considered the results of extensive consultations with governments, businesses,
and civil society actors and refined the framework in response. The legal basis of
the state’s duty was made a more central element of the “Protect, Respect and
Remedy” Framework. The emphasis on the corporate responsibility was more
discernibly articulated through its disclosure obligations. The Report emphasized
82
the state’s paramount role in dispute resolution. Corporate activity was
relegated to the realm of the grievance and the management of the exotic. The
remedial framework emphasized the importance of the formal judicial
mechanism, and its more informal mediation variant, though the latter was meant
83
to be administered through the court system.
The 2009 and 2010 Reports, then, also can be understood as a single unit.
With the 2010 Report, the structuring of the operationalization of the “Protect,
Respect and Remedy” Framework is substantially elaborated. If the emphasis of
the first three reports was on the principle part of principled pragmatism, the
focus of the last two was on the practical aspects. For that purpose, the SRSG
considered the practical element of each of the framework’s pillars. The state
duty to respect was practically conceived as centering on the issue of legal
system coherence. States act through law/regulation, and that law/regulation
system could only advance human rights objectives if it was internally coherent.
Coherence also required an element of external coherence. External coherence is
necessary to bind the distinct stakeholder systems together (state, international,
84
and corporate). The corporate responsibility was practically conceived through
the device of human rights due diligence. This focus suggested both the
governance character of the device—human rights due diligence was the
expression of the “law” of corporate behavior within its operational framework—
and the means through which it could enforce its norms and connect them to the
governance systems of states and international actors. However, the SRSG
appeared to increasingly focus on the third pillar of the framework—access to
justice—as the place where the concepts of the framework could be practically
realized on the ground. But that reduction of the access to remedy pillar also
tended to reframe it as a consequential element of the state duty to protect and the
corporate responsibility to respect human rights.

81. Special Rep. of the Secretary-General, Report of the Special Rep. of the Secretary-General on the
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, A/HRC/14/27 (Apr. 9,
2010), available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-report-2010.pdf (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter
SRSG 2010 Report].
82. See id. at para. 96.
83. See id. at paras. 103, 113.
84. Id. at para. 52.
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The “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, then, is not just a reaction
to the failed Norms project. Careful review of the SRSG’s reports suggests its
character and nature are that of an institutionalized multi-level governance
framework that the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework represents. But
there is a potentially wide gulf between conceptualization and operationalization.
The “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework as developed through the
SRSG’s 2006 through 2010 reports builds a framework grounded in the actual
practices of state and non-state actors, gathering together the aggregate of
practices and governance presumptions that together effectively regulate the
behavior of states and corporations in matters relating to human rights. That
exercise suggested both the important role of the state and the emerging role of
corporations as governance centers. Though corporations are neither states nor
public actors, and thus can neither exercise the privileges of states nor be
burdened by state obligations, they emerge as autonomous actors, even in more
modest form. The recognition of polycentric centers of governance—one law and
state based and the other norm and non-state based—marks the principle
innovative insight of the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework project. It
would find its expression in the elaboration of governance-tinged principles
structuring a system that operationalizes these frameworks.
But that move from insight to a governance system required the approval of a
state system based international body. In the march from framework to
operational principles, one can discern a substantive movement away from the
broadest possibilities of the framework to something perhaps more modest. This
85
is reflected in the SRSG’s last, 2011 Report. It served as an introduction to the
Draft Principles themselves, along with an Official Commentary. Its principal
objective was to describe the transformation of “Protect, Respect and Remedy”
from framework—an articulation of theory—to principle—a workable set of
guiding norms that might be applied by states, corporations, and other
86
stakeholders to implement the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework.
Refined and finalized, the Guiding Principles were submitted with a short
summary that was still the work of the SRSG from 2005. But in that process of
transforming framework to principle, the substance of the project was also
changed. In particular, the move toward greater horizontal parity between the
state duty and the corporate responsibility to respect human rights was recast as a
more conventionally hierarchical ordering in which state duty structures the
human rights enterprise itself. Yet, the Guiding Principles mean to leave enough
of an opening for the maintenance of a governance space in which corporate
enterprises can develop and manage cultures of governance beyond the more
narrowly tailored state and law-based structures of human rights norms. It is to

85. See Draft Principles, supra note 64.
86. 2011 Report, supra note 40, at paras. 12-15.
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that movement, from principle to pragmatism, and its effects that this Article
turns to next.
III. THE SYSTEM UNVEILED: THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND
COMMENTARY ANALYZED.
The Guiding Principles were unveiled in two stages, separated by about half
87
a year. The Draft Principles were circulated in November 2010. They were
introduced by the final report of the SRSG, summarizing the SRSG’s work from
2005 to 2011, and presenting Guiding Principles for consideration by the Human
88
Rights Council. The SRSG circulated the final version of the Guiding Principles
89
in March 2011. The Guiding Principles represent a new approach to the framing
of governance for multinational corporations within a complex system that,
though grounded in the rules of the domestic legal orders of states, seeks to go
beyond that to international and private governance regimes. True to the SRSG’s
90
intent to construct a framework grounded in principled pragmatism, the Guiding
Principles appear to be developed to strike balances among the multiple
competing ideologies, governance approaches and stakeholders that have made
the process from Norms to “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, and
ultimately to the Guiding Principles so complex. That balance posits a framework
91
of inter-systemic harmonization of a governance regime to which three
autonomous but deeply related systems contribute—the law-state system, the
international system and the social-norm system. That framework of intersystemic harmonization is then itself implemented through an integrated but
functionally divided system of dispute resolution that both reflects the autonomy
of the governance systems that make up the regime, and the need for
harmonization and connection of method. As such, the Guiding Principles are
groundbreaking for reasons much greater than their utility in clarifying the
92
private sector’s responsibility for human rights. The complexity of the
movement to the Guiding Principles requires a close reading not merely of the
Guiding Principles themselves, but also of the introductory statements through
which the SRSG thought to set the stage for the understanding of and to provide
an interpretive basis for the principles that follow. A close analysis of these
introductory statements, as both theory and praxis, reveals both the nature and

87. Special Rep. of the Secretary-General for Bus. & Human Rights, SRSG Submits Final Draft of
Guiding Principles on Business & Human Rights, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CENTRE (Mar. 7, 2011),
http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/announcement-of-final-draft-guiding-principlessubmitted-ruggie-7-mar-2011.pdf.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See discussion supra Part II; SRSG 2006 Report, supra note 56.
91. On inter-systemic harmonization, see Backer-Harmonization, supra note 22, at 427-37.
92. NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 47, at para. 7.1.1.
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complexity of the breakthrough that the Guidelines represent and set the stage for
the detailed analysis of the Guiding Principles themselves that follow.
A.

The 2011 Report: The Maturation of Principled Pragmatism

The Draft Principles are introduced by the short 2011 Report that is meant to
93
set the stage for the principles and commentary that follow. It represents the
distillation of the SRSG’s project, the evolution of which was chronicled in detail
94
in the Reports from 2006 through 2010. It also suggests the theoretical policy
foundations of the principles that follow, and its implementation. This section
examines that 2011 Report and suggests the way in which it provides an
important window to the Draft Principles, their character, and limitations.
The focus of the Report is business—not a particular form that business can
take, such as a corporation, partnership, conglomerate, joint venture, value or
supply chain, or the like—but business understood as a complex nexus of
95
economics, law and politics. That nexus is posited as having been at some sort
of reasonable equilibrium in which the roles of the state and of non-state actors
were aligned. But the last several decades have “witnessed growing institutional
misalignments, from local levels to the global, between the scope and impact of
economic forces and actors, and the capacity of societies to manage their adverse
96
consequences.” At the heart of this misalignment is the corporation, which has
evolved to embody “complex forms that challenge conventional understanding
97
and policy designs.” These changes have affected all regions and states; they
98
have effectively shattered the old status quo. Change is not merely expedient;
change is necessary to restore the alignment between the economic, policy,
political, and social forces represented by business and those represented by the
state.

93. See 2011 Report, supra note 40.
94. See discussion infra Part II. For a more detailed examination, see supra note 49.
95. “Business is the major source of investment and job creation, and markets can be highly efficient
means for allocating scarce resources, capable of generating economic growth, reducing poverty, and increasing
demand for the rule of law, thereby contributing to the realization of a broad spectrum of human rights. “ 2011
Report, supra note 40, at para. 1.
96. Id.
97. Id. The state, of course, also had evolved in an extraordinary way, becoming less stridently
autonomous and more enmeshed in a growing web of supra national relationships and international consensus
norms (both embodied in international hard and soft law) that have challenged the conventional notion of the
state, sovereignty, democratic accountability, and law. See, e.g., R.J. BARRY JONES, GLOBALISATION AND
INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: RHETORIC AND REALITY 47-54 (1995);
Oscar Schachter, The Decline of the Nation-State and Its Implications for International Law, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 7 (1997); José E. Alvarez, Why Nations Behave, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 303 (1998); Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy Through Government Networks, in THE GLOBAL
TRANSFORMATIONS READER: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION DEBATE 189 (David Held &
Anthony McGrew eds., 2nd ed. 2000).
98. 2011 Report, supra note 40, at para. 1.
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This opening paragraph nicely sets the stage for the elaboration of both the
theory and praxis that is to follow. Its purpose is specific—to focus on the
problem of the governance of private aggregations of economic power. The logic
of this construct is straightforward. Economic, political, and communal spheres
operate best when they exist in a stable system in which each contributes to the
social fabric and each is bound by a set of obligations that ensure the stability of
the system and the likelihood that it will work towards maximizing the ability of
this construct to contribute to the welfare of people and the stability of the state.
99
But the logic of globalization has changed the traditional alignment of these
three communities. Though the SRSG focuses on the misalignment caused by the
100
evolution of corporate power, misalignment also has roots in the evolution of
state and communal power. For example, regimes of free movements of capital,
goods, and services has substantially altered the relationship between states and
corporations, but has also changed the relationship of states with their
populations and with other states as well. The burgeoning network of agreements
among states has substantially altered the relationship between states and greatly
augmented the institutional character and regulatory power of the community of
states through increasingly effective international organizations, both public and
private in character. The decentralization of power has substantially increased the
101
number and character of stakeholders in global society.
But the SRSG does not mean to set the world right. His object is more
102
modest in scope, though not in aim. The sort of “epochal changes” suggested
by the description of changes in the global order is well represented in the
microcosm of the transformation of the framework governance regimes for
103
business and human rights. The microcosm of business and human rights, as
exemplary of the misalignments in governance regimes, proved irresistible—it
provided a contained space within which new approaches could be developed

99. On globalization, see generally, e.g., MANFRED B. STEGER, GLOBALISM: THE NEW MARKET
IDEOLOGY (2002); the classic rendering is THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE (2000);
and the classic critique is JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002).
100 . 2011 Report, supra note 40, at para. 1.
101. “We are beginning to abandon the hierarchies that worked well in the centralized, industrial era. In
their place, we are substituting the network model of organization and communication, which has its roots in the
natural, egalitarian, and spontaneous formation of groups among like-minded people.” JOHN NAISBITT,
MEGATRENDS: TEN NEW DIRECTIONS TRANSFORMING OUR LIVES 281 (1982).
102. 2011 Report, supra note 40, at para. 1
103. Id. at para. 2. The SRSG explains:
Institutional misalignments create the permissive environment within which blameworthy acts
by business enterprises may occur, inadvertently or intentionally, without adequate sanctioning
or reparation. The worst corporate-related human rights abuses, including acts that amount to
international crimes, take place in areas affected by conflict, or where governments otherwise
lack the capacity or will to govern in the public interest. But companies can impact adversely
just about all internationally recognized human rights, and in virtually all types of operational
contexts.
Id.
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and implemented “to map the challenges and recommend effective means to
104
address them.”
105
However, something as simple in theory as human rights proved more
difficult in practice, where the aim was to “shift from institutional misalignments
106
onto a socially sustainable path.” The SRSG thus moves from the description of
the problem—misalignment—to the consequences of its resolution, requiring
“operational and cultural changes in and among governments as well as business
enterprises—to create more effective combinations of existing competencies as
107
well as devising new ones.” Thus, the SRSG moves from the singular focus on
business, where he started the report, to the implication of that focus: the need for
governments as well as businesses to change their behavior.
In recognizing the need to implement socially sustainable governance, the
SRSG also acknowledges that the international community must play a key
108
role. Additionally, business and human rights is acknowledged as new a policy
domain as the international community is at the early stages of the journey to
109
sustainable governance. Business and human rights involve “all rights that
110
111
enterprises can affect,” include all rights holders, and can invoke a broader
range of regulatory tools than traditional state or international institutional
112
actors.
International institutional involvement is necessary because the traditional
balance between business and state actors cannot be brought back into balance
without its intervention. Moreover, because multiple regulatory systems are
involved, the scope of the problem of business and human rights is considerably
broader than the problems usually subject to the regulatory frameworks of the
law-state. Globalization has produced something of a parity of power between
113
companies and some states. The result is that the issue of business and human
rights is bound up with the issue of states and human rights—companies may be
complicit in the legal system based human rights violations of states, and states
114
may be involved in the human rights violations of companies. The two distinct

104. Id.
105. “The idea of human rights is as simple as it is powerful: treating people with dignity.” Id. at para. 3.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at para. 4.
109. Id.
110. Id. It is thus distinguished from traditional human rights agendas at the international organization
level, where organizes its regulatory agendas around a fixed set of particular rights.
111. Id. It is thus distinguished from states that can recognize the rights of particular groups.
112. Id. It is thus distinguished from regulatory regimes that focus solely on state-based human rights
violations that are restricted to the methodologies of the law-state; it can invoke the regulatory methods of
private actors as well.
113. Id. at para. 5.
114. The interrelationship has been made explicit in the ethics based determinations of the Ethics
Council of the Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Part I: Developing a Coherent
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governance areas are thus intimately connected, yet each is also subject to
115
governance regimes that, though overlapping, are not the same. In addition,
both law-state and corporate social-norm systems are intertwined with networks
of regulation at the international level. Finally, the human rights obligations of
states, corporations and international organizations are bound up in larger webs
116
of legal and social norm constraints.
For the SRSG, then, the problem of misalignment is the expression of a
macro issue that is supported in some measure by the underlying structural
incapacities of states: “State practices exhibit substantial legal and policy
117
incoherence and gaps.” Policy incoherence is the outward expression of
118
At the
institutional incapacity in the face of changing circumstances.
international level, incoherence is evidenced by the disordered state of territorial
119
limits of state action. Extraterritoriality is at once valued both for its ordering
effect on behavior across borders, and encouraged as a means of controlling the
120
activity of business. But it is also reviled as a means of projecting power from
121
dominating to subordinated states. The SRSG suggests a very narrow form of
extraterritoriality—the power of the home state to assert regulatory authority over
Transnational Jurisprudence of Ethical Investing: The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund Ethics Council
Model, LCBACKER BLOG (Feb. 1, 2011), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2011/02/this-blog-essay-sitedevotes-every.html.
115. The 2011 Report explains:
States are under competing pressures when it comes to business, not only because of corporate
influence but also because so many other legitimate policy demands come into play, including
the need for investment, jobs, as well as access to markets, technology and skills. In addition,
in the area of business and human rights States are simultaneously subject to several other
bodies of international law, such as investment law and trade law. . . . At the same time,
business conduct is shaped directly by laws, policies and sources of influence other than human
rights law: for example, corporate law, securities regulation, forms of public support such as
export credit and investment insurance, pressure from investors, and broader social action.
2011 Report, supra note 40, at para. 5.
116. Id.
117. Id. at para. 6.
118. The most prevalent cause of legal and policy incoherence is that the units of
Governments that directly shape business practices—in such areas as corporate law and
securities regulation, investment promotion and protection, and commercial policy—
typically operate in isolation from, are uninformed by, and at times undermine the
effectiveness of their Government’s own human rights obligations and agencies.
Id.
119. Id. at para. 7. “States have chosen to act only in exceptional cases, and unevenly. This is in contrast
to the approaches adopted in other areas related to business, such as anti-corruption, money-laundering, some
environmental regimes, and child sex tourism, many of which are today the subject of multilateral agreements.”
Id.
120. “This enables a ‘home’ State to avoid being associated with possible overseas corporate abuse. It
can also provide much-needed support to ‘host’ States that may lack the capacity to implement fully effective
regulatory regimes on their own.” Id. at para. 8.
121. For a discussion on extraterritoriality and neo-colonialism, see, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE
CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?: THE EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 6-7 (2009);
RICHARD FALK, PREDATORY GLOBALIZATION: A CRITIQUE 35-47 (1999).
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122

its citizens or the entities it has chartered. The SRSG avoids the more
aggressive versions of extraterritoriality and suggests, a superior alternative
model: the substitution of inter-state consensus standards for projections of state
123
power abroad.
And indeed, one can understand both the need for
extraterritoriality as a tool and its solution, as there exists powerful evidence of
the consequences of misalignment and the way it produces incentives to extend
the subordination of smaller states by larger ones in the form of
extraterritoriality. Misalignment is also the expression of a macro issue that is
supported, in some measure, by the underlying structural incapacities of
124
companies.
Thus, misalignment and incoherence involve not merely
adjustments between public and private governance, but also among states and
within the legal ordering of the community of states.
Having identified the scope and character of the problem, the SRSG
theorizes a solution and posits a suggested approach to implementation.
One major reason that past public and private approaches have fallen
short of the mark has been the lack of an authoritative focal point around
which the expectations and actions of relevant stakeholders could
converge. Therefore, when the Special Representative was asked to
submit recommendations to the Human Rights Council in 2008 he made
only one: that the Council endorse the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’
Framework he had proposed, following three years of extensive research
125
and inclusive consultations on every continent.
126

The “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework is then described. The
relationship of the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework with the problem
of misalignment and the context of multiple autonomous governance regimes is
127
128
examined. The breadth of its influence also suggests its utility, even before it
129
has been operationalized.

122. Special Rep. of the United Nations Secretary-General for Bus. & Human Rights, Online Forum,
cmt. John H. Knox 9 (Jan. 17, 2011), http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/onlineforum-re-guiding-principles-nov-2010-to-jan-2011.pdf (Draft Guiding Principles (GPs) for Implementation of
the U.N. "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework Online Consultation.).
123. See 2011 Report, supra note 40, at paras. 10-11.
124. Business consultancies and corporate law firms are establishing practices to advise
clients on the requirements not only of their legal, but also their social, license to
operate, which may be as significant to an enterprise’s success. However, these
developments have not acquired sufficient scale to reach a tipping point of truly shifting
markets.
Id. at para. 9.
125. Id. at para. 10.
126. Id. at para. 11; see also discussion supra Part II.
127. The SRSG explained:
Each pillar is an essential component in supporting what is intended to be a dynamic system of
preventative and remedial measures: the State duty to protect because it lies at the very core of
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If the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework provides the theoretical
“authoritative focal point around which the expectations and actions of relevant
130
stakeholders could converge”
then the Guiding Principles provide the
operational focal point for the project. “The Guiding Principles that follow
constitute the next step, providing the ‘concrete and practical recommendations’
131
for the Framework’s implementation requested by the Council.” The nature of
the Guiding Principles’ contribution to the resolution of the problem that gave
rise to the SRSG’s project is complex and subtle. The Guiding Principles
contribute to the “operational and cultural changes in and among governments as
well as business enterprises—to create more effective combinations of existing
132
competencies as well as devising new ones” not by changing contemporary
legal and social norm structures, but by providing a new organization for them.
That organization is grounded in elaboration of existing practices and standards,
their integration within a single framework, and the identification of areas that
133
require further development. But at the same time, the operationalization
proposed (in the form of the Guiding Principles) is not meant to be what the
SRSG described as a mere “tool kit, simply to be taken off the shelf and plugged
134
in.”
And so the 2011 Report ends where it started—mindful of the difficulties of
theorizing and implementing a single coherent and comprehensive framework
that “will reflect the fact that we live in a world of 192 United Nations Member
States, 80,000 transnational enterprises, ten times as many subsidiaries and
countless millions of national firms, most of which are small and medium-sized
135
enterprises.”
The Draft Principles reflect these points of convergence,
the international human rights regime; an independent corporate responsibility to respect
because it is the basic expectation society has of business in relation to human rights; and
access to remedy because even the most concerted efforts cannot prevent all abuse.
2011 Report, supra note 40, at para. 11.
128. The Framework has “become a common foundation on which thinking and action by stakeholders
can build over time. Thus, the Framework has already influenced policy development by Governments and
international institutions, business policies and practices, as well as the analytical and advocacy work of trade
unions and civil society organizations.” Id. at para. 12.
129. “In resolution 8/7 (June 2008), the Council was unanimous in welcoming this policy Framework,
and in extending the Special Representative’s mandate to 2011 in order for him to ‘operationalize’ and
‘promote’ it.” Id.
130. Id. at para. 10.
131. Id. at para. 12.
132. Id. at para. 3.
133. Id. at para. 13. In the words of the SRSG:
The Guiding Principles’ normative contribution lies not in the creation of new international law
obligations but in elaborating the implications of existing standards and practices for States and
businesses; integrating them within a single, coherent and comprehensive template; and
identifying where the current regime falls short and how it should be improved.\
Id.
134. Id. at para. 14.
135. Id.
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autonomy, polycentricity, and flexibility both within the governance frameworks
of each of the components of the system articulated, and within the proposed
framework itself.
In the next section, we turn to an examination of the final version of the
Guiding Principles themselves. First considered is the elaboration of the
framework within which the Guiding Principles were meant to be read. The
section then turns to a section-by-section analysis of the Guiding Principles.
Critical to this analysis is a consideration of both the Guiding Principles
themselves, and the changes that occurred from the Draft Principles to the
Guiding Principles. Lastly, these analytical threads are woven together to
consider the extent to which the Guiding Principles help “to secure the
development of universally applicable and yet practical Guiding Principles in
order to achieve the more effective prevention of and remedy for corporate136
related human rights harm.”
B. The Principles Unveiled in Final Form: “Introduction to the Guiding
Principles”
While the 2011 Report was written to serve both descriptive and advocacy
objectives, the Introduction to the final form of the Guiding Principles was The
137
Introduction to the Guiding Principles, which serves an almost purely framing
objective. Divided into sixteen paragraphs, it succinctly summarizes the
framework and framing presumptions of the Guiding Principles. As such, it
provides the most well developed synthesis and exposition of the business and
138
human rights project begun by the Special Representative in 2005. The first
three paragraphs of the Introduction set the stage by suggesting the historical
inevitability of the Guiding Principles. Paragraph 1 suggests the inevitability of
the project, arising from a fundamental evolution of global society within which
the “issue of business and human rights became permanently implanted on the
global policy agenda in the 1990s, reflecting the dramatic worldwide expansion
of the private sector at the time, coupled with a corresponding rise in
139
transnational economic activity.” Paragraphs 2-3 are particularly important for
distinguishing the Guiding Principles project from more aggressive earlier
140
efforts, and to confine them to a governance space that would not threaten any

136. Id. at para. 15.
137. Guiding Principles, supra note 41.
138. Id. at para. 3.
139. Id.
140. “One early United Nations-based initiative was called the Norms on Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises. . . . Essentially, this sought to impose on companies, directly under
international law, the same range of human rights duties that States have accepted for themselves under treaties
they have ratified. . . .” Id. at para. 2.
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141

of the principal stakeholders, particularly states. This is important for setting
the political context in which the Guiding Principles are framed—that they do not
extend law or impose additional obligations on states or recognize a new status
142
for non-state actors. The Special Representative stresses this point. The
Introduction itself is then presented as the final product of the alternative process
143
initiated on the failure of the approach represented by the Norms.
The next set of paragraphs then recount the process from concept to
principle. Paragraphs 4 and 5 provide a distilled summary of the first two phases
144
of the process that produced, and by the method of its production, legitimated,
the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework on which the Guiding Principles
145
are based. Paragraph 4 is also important for its suggestion of the necessity of
institutionalization of the Guiding Principles project—the informational (and
legitimating) basis of the project is founded on knowledge of existing standards
146
and practices “that has continued to the present.” The fruits of the second phase
of the Project—“that the Council support the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’
Framework [the Special Representative] had developed following three years of
147
148
research and consultations” —was described in Paragraph 6. Paragraph 6
sketches the three pillar framework in broad strokes. It provides a very
generalized sense of the fundamental characteristics of the three pillar

141. “This proposal triggered a deeply divisive debate between the business community and human
rights advocacy groups while evoking little support from Governments.” Id. at para. 3.
142. The Guiding Principles’ normative contribution lies not in the creation of new
international law obligations but in elaborating the implications of existing standards
and practices for States and businesses; integrating them within a single, logically
coherent and comprehensive template; and identifying where the current regime falls
short and how it should be improved.
Id. at para. 14.
143. “This is the final report of the Special Representative.” Id. at para. 3.
144. The Special Representative outlined the three phases of work that led to the framework and the
Guiding Principles. The first was an “identify and clarify” phase that was meant to distinguish the Special
Representative’s project from that which animated the Norms, and to reframe the project. The second phase is
described in Paragraph 5—acceptance of the Human Rights Council’s 2007 invitation to submit
recommendations on the basis of the first phase standards and practices review. Id. at paras. 4-5.
145. “It has provided a broader and more solid factual basis for the ongoing business and human rights
discourse, and is reflected in the Guiding Principles annexed to this report.” Id. at para. 4.
146. Id. The information universe critical to the Guiding Principles enterprise includes:
mapping patterns of alleged human rights abuses by business enterprises; evolving standards of
international human rights law and international criminal law; emerging practices by States and
companies; commentaries of United Nations treaty bodies on State obligations concerning
business-related human rights abuses; the impact of investment agreements and corporate law
and securities regulation on both States’ and enterprises’ human rights policies; and related
subjects.
Id.
147. Id. at para. 5. “The Council did so, unanimously ‘welcoming’ the Framework in its resolution 8/7
and providing, thereby, the authoritative focal point that had been missing.” Id.
148. Id. at para. 6.
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framework—grounded in two distinct but interlinked sources of obligation that
149
are tied by the joint obligation to remedy breaches of obligation.
Paragraph 7 returns to the issue of legitimization. It describes the breadth of
formal acceptance of the framework by critical stakeholders in the public, non150
governmental, and business sectors. It suggests functional acceptance by
international organizations that have drawn on the “Protect, Respect and
Remedy” Framework “in developing their own initiatives in the business and
151
human rights domain.” Paragraph 8 expands on the legitimization theme by
cataloguing “the large number and inclusive character of stakeholder
consultations convened by and for the mandate [that] no doubt have contributed
152
to its widespread positive reception.” The object, of course, is to emphasize
both substantive legitimacy—grounded in facts—and process legitimacy, derived
from the adherence to generally accepted methods of stakeholder consultation as
153
a substitute for the conventional processes of democratic governance in states.
Stakeholding legitimates action the way mass popular movements legitimate
changes in government sometimes, in their active and representative capacities,
who come “to constitute a global movement of sorts in support of a successful
154
mandate.”
This legitimating acceptance led to phase three of the project—
operationalizing the three pillar framework, “to provide concrete and practical
155
recommendations for its implementation.” Those concrete and practical
156
recommendations were to take the form of guiding principles. These Guiding
Principles were reinforced by (and reinforced) the approach taken to produce the
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework upon which the Guiding Principles
157
are based. As such, the Guiding Principles are grounded in the same sort of

149. The Special Representative put it this way:
Each pillar is an essential component in an inter-related and dynamic system of preventative
and remedial measures: the State duty to protect because it lies at the very core of the
international human rights regime; the corporate responsibility to respect because it is the basic
expectation society has of business in relation to human rights; and access to remedy because
even the most concerted efforts cannot prevent all abuse.
Id.
150. Id. at para. 7.
151. Id.
152. Id. at para. 8.
153. See, e.g., Caroline Bradley, Consultation and Legitimacy in Transnational Standard-Setting, 20
MINN. J. INT’L L. 480 (2011).
154. Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at para. 16.
155. Id. at para. 9.
156. “During the interactive dialogue at the Council’s June 2010 session, delegations agreed that the
recommendations should take the form of ‘Guiding Principles’; these are annexed to this report.” Id.
157.
Thus, the Guiding Principles are informed by extensive discussions with all
stakeholder groups, including Governments, business enterprises and associations,
individuals and communities directly affected by the activities of enterprises in various
parts of the world, civil society, and experts in the many areas of law and policy that
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principled pragmatism that marked the development of the three-pillar
158
framework, including the “road testing” of particular guidelines and extensive
159
consultations on the wording of the text. “In short, the Guiding Principles aim
not only to provide guidance that is practical, but also guidance informed by
160
actual practice.”
And what result? The Special Representative suggested the principal
objective of these efforts: to establish “a common global platform for action, on
which cumulative progress can be built, step-by-step, without foreclosing any
161
other promising longer-term developments.” The Introduction ends with a
description of the Guiding Principles defining its scope and purpose by what the
Guiding Principles are not, focusing on two characteristics in particular. The first
has already been mentioned—the Guiding Principles are not a normatively
positive project; their object is merely to integrate or to repackage the cluster of
legal and social norms that already binds states and corporations (at least as these
touch on issues of human rights), “within a single, logically coherent and
comprehensive template; and identifying where the current regime falls short and
162
how it should be improved.” Second, the fact that the Guiding Principles do not
mean to create new legal obligations does not mean that it is no more than a more
efficient codex; “the Guiding Principles are not intended as a tool kit, simply to
163
be taken off the shelf and plugged in.” There is a certain amount of art involved
in the application of the Guiding Principles, precisely because it involves the
interactions of legal and social norms, of states and corporations, of national and
international norms, and of rights and remedies within and beyond the law of
164
states. Neither normative system nor mere toolbox, then, the Guiding Principles
are offered as “universally applicable and yet practical. . . [doctrines] on the
165
effective prevention of, and remedy for, business-related human rights harm.”
Whether, and to what extent, the Guiding Principles live up to their billing is the
subject considered next. What emerge in the form of the General Principles are
the beginnings of an articulation of the concepts first developed in the Special
Representatives Reports from 2006 through 2011. These beginnings fall far short
the Guiding Principles touch upon.
Id. at para. 10.
158. Id. at para. 11.
159. Id. at para. 12.
160. Id. at para. 11.
161. Id. at para. 13.
162. Id. at para. 14.
163. Id. at para. 15.
164. While the Principles themselves are universally applicable, the means by which they are
realized will reflect the fact that we live in a world of 192 United Nations Member
States, 80,000 transnational enterprises, 10 times as many subsidiaries and countless
millions of national firms, most of which are small and medium-sized enterprises.
Id.
165. Id. at para. 16.
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of the promise of the framework as conceptualized, but as accepted by the state
actors who populate the U.N. institutional edifice, the Guiding Principles are a
remarkable movement toward the conceptual framework developed by the
Special Representative and articulated in the “Protect, Respect and Remedy”
Framework.
The work on the Guiding Principles, and its application within the United
Nations System is not yet done. At the time the UNHRC endorsed the Guiding
Principles, it also created “a Working Group on the issue of human rights and
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, consisting of five
independent experts, of balanced geographical representation, for a period of
three years, to be appointed by the Human Rights Council at its eighteenth
166
session, and requests the Working Group.” This Working Group is charged
with a broad mandate. These include the “effective and comprehensive
dissemination and implementation” of the Guiding Principles, the identification,
promotion and implementation of “good practices,” capacity building, and a role
167
in the development of additional approaches to remedies. The Working Group
has now organized itself and is likely to produce additional commentary on the
168
Guiding Principles in the next several years.
In addition, "The Council also decided to establish a Forum on business and
human rights under the guidance of the Working Group to discuss trends and
challenges in the implementation of the Guiding Principles and promote dialogue
and cooperation on issues linked to business and human rights, including
challenges faced in particular sectors, operational environments or in relation to
169
specific rights or groups, as well as identifying good practices." The Working
Group was tasked to guide the work of a Forum on Business and Human
170
Rights, which is “to discuss trends and challenges in the implementation of the
Guiding Principles and promote dialogue and cooperation on issues linked to
business and human rights, including challenges faced in particular sectors,
operational environments or in relation to specific rights or groups, as well as
171
identifying good practices.”

166. Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4 (July 6, 2011), para. 6, available at
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G11/144/71/PDF/G1114471.pdf?OpenElement.
167. Id. at paras. 6(a-c), (e).
168. Working Group: Methods of Work, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR
HUM. RTS., http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2012).
The Working Group will submit its first annual report to the Human Rights Council in June 2012, and expects
to submit an annual report to the UN General Assembly in October 2012.
169. Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., http://www.ohchr.org/
EN/Issues/Business/Pages/WGHRandtransnationalcorporationsandotherbusiness.aspx (last visited Apr. 20,
2012).
170. Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4 (July 6, 2011), supra, at para. 6(i).
171. Id. at para. 12.
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A section-by-section review of the Guiding Principles as it moved from draft
to final version reveals both the extent of the retreat from the broadest readings of
the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, and the extent that the advances
of that framework are still preserved in the final document. It also suggests the
drafting context within which the work of the Working Group and others will
likely frame issues, where points of tension exist, and the likely places where
modification may be attempted. This work has also already begun. In November,
2011, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights distributed “The
172
Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: An Interpretative Guide,”
an early effort to begin to produce authoritative glosses of the Guiding Principles.
The SRSG himself, along with several members of his team has also continued to
work on the Guiding Principles and its operationalization, helping to organize
Shift, shortly after the HRC endorsed the Guiding Principles, as “an independent,
173
non-profit center for business and human rights practice.” The move might be
understood as establishing a non-state center of authoritative interpretation of the
174
Guiding Principles alongside the public institutional efforts of the HRC.
IV. THE SYSTEM REVEALED: THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND ITS
COMMENTARY ANALYZED.
I have suggested that a substantial amount of principled pragmatism stands
between the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework and the final version of
the Guiding Principles. The Guiding Principles, as finally endorsed, represent a
substantial aggregation of compromises and choices made to avoid the fate of the
Norms in 2005. The Guiding Principles do not fully implement a broad reading
of the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, but does it preserve the
essence of that framework? The answer emerges from a consideration of the
movement from draft to final version of the Guiding Principles, and what
emerges is a qualified yes. The Guiding Principles preserve the essence of the
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, but at a price—shifting the center of
gravity to the state duty to protect and recasting remedies as a consequential
aspect of the state duty to protect. In the process, both the corporate
responsibility to respect and the remedial pillar become more peripheral aspects.
Thus the qualification: what remains preserves the structure of the “Protect,

172. Office of the High Commiss’r for Human Rights, The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human
Rights: An Interpretive Guide,” Advanced Unedited Edition U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31(Nov. 2011), available at
http:// www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/.../RtRInterpretativeGuide.pdf (hereafter “Interpretive Guide”).
173. “Who We Are,” SHIFT, http://www.shiftproject.org/page/who-we-are (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
“We help governments, businesses and their stakeholders put the UN Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights into practice. We share our learning by developing public guidance materials that help build the
field globally.”
174. Id. “Our team was centrally involved in shaping and writing the UN Guiding Principles, and Prof.
Ruggie is Chair of our Board of Trustees.”
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Respect and Remedy” Framework. It leaves an opening, smaller than that
suggested by the framework, but clear enough, from out of which corporations
and other non-state stakeholders might rework the Guiding Principles to more
closely mirror the framework. This section considers the provisions of the
Guiding Principles in the form endorsed by the HRC in detail. Subsection A
examines the definitions created under the Draft Principles and abandoned in the
Guiding Principles, along with the capstone principles that inform interpretation
of the Guiding Principles as a whole. Subsection B then considers the Guiding
Principles elaborating the state duty to protect human rights. Subsection C
analyzes the Guiding Principles touching on the corporate responsibility to
respect human rights, and subsection D considers the Guiding Principles
touching on the remedial obligations of states and business entities.
A. The Devil Is in the Detail—Section By Section Analysis—From Draft to Final
Principles: Overall Structure and Capstone Principles.
1. Overall Structure of the Guiding Principles
The Draft Principles originally divided the Principles into two parts. The
twenty-nine Principles themselves were placed in Part A; Part B provided a very
175
short section of definitions. Part A was divided into four parts, an Introduction
and then a section devoted to each of the pillars of the framework: “The State
176
Duty to Protect Human Rights,” “The Corporate Responsibility to Respect
177
178
Human Rights,” and “Access to Remedy.” The working language of the
Guiding Principles, at least in draft form, was English. That has caused some
179
concern among non-English speakers, both for reasons of access and for fear
that the failure to translate the draft into the official languages of the U.N. would
substantially affect the meaning of terms that might acquire legal or otherwise
180
binding normative effect.
175. Draft Principles, supra note 64.
176. Id. at princ. 1-11.
177. Id. at princ. 12-22.
178. Id. at princ. 23-29.
179. “This forum is a consultation of the global North, mainly. Most peoples in the global South are
excluded from this forum and have no access to the Draft, because they do not speak English.” Special Rep. of
the United Nations Secretary-General for Bus. & Human Rights, Online Forum, cmt. Robert Grabosch (Jan. 28,
2011), http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/online-forum-re-guiding-principles-nov2010-to-jan-2011.pdf (Draft Guiding Principles (GPs) for Implementation of the U.N. "Protect, Respect and
Remedy" Framework Online Consultation.).
180. This point was made forcefully by the French Human Rights Commission:
The problem we note is the fact that the English text of the Guiding Principles has not been
translated into the other official languages of the United Nations, notably French, despite the
fact that French is one of the UN’s working languages. In addition to being a matter of
principle which applies to all reports presented to the Human Rights Council, this problem is
exacerbated by the fact that the document uses some ambiguous terms, meaning that ‘official’
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The Guiding Principles abandoned this structure in favor of a simpler one. It
eliminates the Definition section and increases the number of Principles to thirty181
one. The Introduction is renamed “General Principles.” But appearing to
182
borrow from the toolbox of the German Pandectists and German legal science,
it continues to serve, now more explicitly, as the general principles of the
Guiding Principles—that is, these now provide the interpretive framework for the
thirty-one principles that follow. The remainder is devoted to each of the pillars
183
of the framework: “The State Duty to Protect Human Rights,” “The Corporate
184
185
Responsibility to Respect Human Rights,” and “Access to Remedy.” Each is
divided between foundational and organization principles. The idea appears to be
to create an internally cohesive interpretive structure within the Principles. The
Principles of the broadest general applicability are contained in the opening
186
section, “General Principles.” The Operational Principles in each section are to
be interpreted first in light of these “General Principles” and then, more
specifically, in light of the “Foundational Principles” of each section. The
Foundational Principles of each section, in turn, are to be interpreted in light of
the “General Principles.” This system, familiar to civil lawyers in the
interpretation of unified codes, will likely be less comprehensible to lawyers and
policymakers from Common Law states.

translation is vital in order to fully grasp their legal implications. In the first instance, the fact
that the English is the only version restricts the degree to which other legal systems are taken
into consideration, as well as imposing a dominant viewpoint, even though globalisation is in
crisis. It also restricts the scope of the consultations, especially within the Frenchspeaking
world, thus working against the document’s own stated aim. In the second instance, this adds
to the uncertainty over the fundamental legal concepts relating to ‘international responsibility’.
Special Rep. of the United Nations Secretary-General for Bus. & Human Rights, Online Forum, cmt. French
Human Rights Commission (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/
ruggie/online-forum-re-guiding-principles-nov-2010-to-jan-2011.pdf [herein after French Human Rights
Commission Comments] (Draft Guiding Principles (GPs) for Implementation of the U.N. "Protect, Respect and
Remedy" Framework Online Consultation.).
181. Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 6-26.
182. See, e.g., KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 105, 14456 (Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998). See generally Mathias Reimann, Nineteenth-Century German Legal
Science, 31 B.C. L. REV. 837 (1990).
183. Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 1-10. Principles 1-2 are grouped under the subsection
“Foundational Principles”; Principles 3-10 are grouped under the subsection “Operational Principles.”
184. Id. at princ. 11-24. Like the Principles describing the State duty to protect, the principles covering
the corporate responsibility are grouped under the subsections “Foundational Principles” (Principles 11-15) and
“Operational Principles” (Principles 16-24).
185. Id. at princ. 25-31. Like the Principles describing the State duty to protect and the corporate
responsibility to respect, the principles covering the remedial obligation are grouped under the subsections
“Foundational Principles” (Principle 25) and “Operational Principles” (Principles 26-31).
186. Id.
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2. Definitions
187

The Draft Principles provided definitions of only six terms. The Draft
Principles attempted to avoid highly technical and precise definitional issues.
188
This suggests a fundamentally different approach from prior efforts. Indeed, the
definitions tended to stress the non-technical nature of the terms, rather than the
use of the definitions section to provide technical precision. Thus, for example,
the Draft Principles stressed that the key term, “corporate,” was “used in the nontechnical sense, interchangeably with ‘business enterprises,’ regardless of the
189
entity’s form.” “Business Enterprise” was also given a broad but general
definition, consisting of “all companies, both transnational and others, regardless
of sector or country of domicile or operation, of any size, ownership form or
190
191
structure.” This has been criticized on a number of grounds.
Likewise, “human rights” was defined as the “potential adverse impacts on
human rights through a business enterprise’s activities or relationships.
Identifying human rights risks is comprised of an assessment both of impacts
192
and—where they have not occurred—of their likelihood.” On the other hand,
193
“internationally recognized human rights” was more specifically defined.
The last set of definitions concerned grievance and grievance mechanisms.
Again, the focus is on the general. “Grievance” is triggered by a “perceived
194
injustice evoking an individual’s or a group’s sense of entitlement. . . .” The
intention was to avoid a definition that cabined grievance to either legal rights or
the procedures of grievance resolution overseen by the state. Thus, entitlement to
redress of injustice “may be based on law, explicit or implicit promises,
195
customary practice, or general notions of fairness of aggrieved communities.”
187. In practical terms, only three terms are defined, the first dealing with what constitutes an
Enterprise, the second concerning the meaning of human rights, and the third defining grievance and grievance
mechanisms. See Draft Principles, supra note 64, at 27.
188. On the use of definitions in the Norms, see generally, Larry Catá Backer, Multinational
Corporations, Transnational Law: The United Nation’s Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility as International Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 287 (2006).
189. Draft Principles, supra note 64, at 27.
190. Id.
191. French Human Rights Commission Comments, supra note 180.
192. Draft Principles, supra note 64, at 27.
193. The term specifically
refers at a minimum to the principles contained in the International Bill of Human Rights
(consisting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the main instruments through
which it has been codified: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights), coupled with the eight ILO
core conventions that form the basis of the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights
at Work.
Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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The broadness is necessary because the governance regime of the Draft
Principles touched on both legal rights and the conduct obligations of socialnorms among communities of stakeholders. This balancing of multiple sources of
196
obligations also affects the definition of grievance mechanism.
197
The Guiding Principles eliminated the definition section. This is perhaps a
198
result of the criticisms received that the terms chosen to be defined were both
over- and under-inclusive. Moreover, substantial objections were made to some
199
of the definitions themselves. Those criticisms reflected unease both about the
definitions themselves, their interpretive consequences, and fundamental
differences in the knowledge bases and perspectives of laws and non-lawyer
policymakers. By eliminating the definitions, the Guiding Principles now provide
a larger breadth of possible interpretation of key terms in the Guiding Principles.
On the other hand, broader interpretive possibility also permits both deviation
among those subject to the principles and implementation incoherence. This is
particularly the case with respect to the definition of applicable human rights
norms, which now find themselves described in Guiding Principle 12, but are
200
nowhere defined for purposes of the state duty to protect human rights. The
response, of course, is found in Guiding Principle 1—that states have no
obligation to protect human rights other than those to which they have bound
201
themselves as a matter of law —but that is disingenuous, given the important
policy role played by key human rights instruments that are technically nonbinding.
3. Introduction to the Draft Principles and General Principles of the
Guiding Principles
In the Draft Principles, the Introduction provided a framing element to the
substantive principles that follow. The Introduction has two principal purposes.
The first is to set out the nature and character of the three fundamental
substantive parts of the Guiding Principles and the relationship between them.
The second is to elaborate a set of interpretive principles that are meant to guide
individuals and entities that will apply the Guiding Principles as regulators or
202
participants.

196. “The term grievance mechanism is used to indicate any routinized, state-based or non-state-based,
judicial or non-judicial process through which grievances related to business abuse of human rights can be
raised and remedy can be sought.” Id.
197. See Guiding Principles, supra note 41.
198. See generally French Human Rights Commission Comments, supra note 180.
199. Id.
200. See Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 12.
201. Id.
202. Draft Principles, supra note 64, at 5.
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The Introduction to the Draft Principles described the ordering relationships
among the three systems that constitute the governance regime of human rights
applied to business. It suggests the autonomy of the law-state system and the
203
social-norm system, but also suggested an unequal relationship between them.
The Guiding Principles are founded on the recognition of the “States’ primary
role in promoting and protecting all human rights and fundamental freedoms,
204
including with regard to the operations of business enterprises.” It also
specified that the principles be interpreted in light of the fundamental dual “role
of business enterprises as specialized organs of society performing specialized
205
functions.” In this dual role, business enterprises are understood to be “required
to comply with all applicable laws and meet the societal expectation to not
206
infringe on the human rights of others.” It also suggests the intimate connection
between rights systems and remedies, as well as the central role of remedies in
connecting the state duty to protect and the corporate responsibility to respect
207
human rights. Lastly, it suggested an unequal engagement in the development
of the norm systems under which states and corporations operate. With respect to
states, “[n]othing in these Guiding Principles limits or undermines any legal
obligations a State may have undertaken or be subject to under international law
208
with regard to human rights.” With respect to the state duty to protect human
rights, the Guiding Principles were understood as a framework or a set of
organizing principles, but not as the development of law, understood in the
traditional sense of either domestic or international law. But with respect to the
social norm system under which corporations operate, that is, with respect to the
corporate responsibility to respect human rights, there is no corresponding
explicit limitation. This follows from the dual obligation of corporations—to

203. “While companies may take on additional responsibilities voluntarily, and operational conditions
may dictate them in specific circumstances, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights is the baseline
responsibility of all companies in all situations. It exists independently of States’ duties or capacity.” SpecialRepresentative, Mandate on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT (May 2010), http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues
_doc/human_rights/Resources/UNGC_SRSGBHR_Note.pdf. See generally Human Rights, supra note 26.
Recall also the discussion of the autonomy of the law-state system and the social norm system developed by the
SRSG in his reports. See Backer, supra note 22; see also Gunther Teubner, The Corporate Codes of
Multinationals Company Constitutions Beyond Corporate Governance and Co-Determination, in CONFLICT OF
LAWS AND LAWS OF CONFLICT IN EUROPE AND BEYOND: PATTERNS OF SUPRANATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL
JURIDIFICATION (Rainer Nickel ed., 2009). But see Peter Goodrich, Anti-Teubner: Autopoiesis, Paradox, and
the Theory of Law, 13 SOC. EPISTEMOLOGY no. 2, 1999, at 197-214.
204. Draft Principles, supra note 64, at intro. (a).
205. Id. at intro. (b).
206. Id.
207. The Introduction refers to the “reality that rights and obligations have little meaning unless they are
matched to appropriate and effective remedies when breached.” Id. at intro. (c).
208. Id. at 5.
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follow applicable law and to meet their obligations under the social-norm system
209
to which they are bound.
The interpretive principles described in the Introduction were to provide the
roadmap for moving from theory to practice; to manage the operationalization of
the Guiding Principles while setting out the borders within which the Guiding
Principles system is meant to work. To understand and apply these interpretive
principles is to recognize both the form and function of the system the SRSG is
putting into place. First, the Guiding Principles introduce a unity principle as the
foundational presumption of the Guiding Principles. Though divided into twentynine principles in three sections in draft form, the Guiding Principles are to be
210
“understood as a coherent whole.” It also introduces two principles of
construction. The first introduces a textual interpretive principle: the Guiding
Principles “should be read, individually and collectively, in terms of their
objective of enhancing standards and practices with regard to business and
human rights so as to achieve tangible results for affected individuals and
211
communities.” This is an inward looking interpretive principle that seeks to
manage the meaning of the principles as a comprehensive and coherent body of
212
self-referential standards, substantially complete in themselves. The second
introduces an effects-based interpretive principle: the Guiding Principles should
be read “to support the social sustainability of business enterprises and
213
markets.” This is a functionalist interpretive principle, one that looks out from
the principles as a coherent body to their effects on those they are meant to affect.
It is augmented by another functional interpretive principle: that the Guiding
Principles “should be implemented in a non-discriminatory manner, with

209. The SRSG has emphasized the contextual and operational conditions that may affect both the
extent and character of the baseline obligation of corporations under the social norm system to which they are
bound. See Draft Principles, supra note 64, at 14. But the absence of limits does not suggest an open-ended
substantive effect of the Draft Principles on corporate responsibility. The corporate responsibility is, to some
extent, also bounded by the growing network of norms that reflect an emerging global consensus about
corporate behavior with respect to human rights. The SRSG has noted the strong connection between the
substance of the corporate responsibility to respect and the UN Global Compact. “In this regard, the UN Protect,
Respect and Remedy framework provides further operational clarity for the two human rights principles
championed by the Global Compact. Principle 1 calls upon companies to respect and support the protection of
internationally proclaimed human rights; and Principle 2 calls upon them to ensure that they are not complicit in
human rights abuses.” Special-Representative, Mandate on the Issues of Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, supra note 194. (“Other guidance materials that can help with
implementation of the responsibility to respect (and the voluntary commitment to support) human rights can be
found at:
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Issues/human_rights/Tools_and_Guidance_Materials.html”).
210. Draft Principles, supra note 64, at 5.
211. Id.
212. See generally AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY (Gunther Teubner ed.,
1988).
213. Draft Principles, supra note 64, at 5.
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particular attention to the rights and needs of, and challenges faced by, vulnerable
214
and marginalized groups, and with due regard to gender considerations.”
The final version keeps the form and general objectives of the Draft
Principles’ Introduction, but in its final form was substantially reoriented to
emphasize the primacy of the state role in human rights and a substantial
215
reduction on the scope of that obligation. Moreover, it now recasts the
corporate social norm systems as autonomous bases of governance norms in a
more marginal role. First, the state no longer has a role in promoting and
respecting all human rights; instead its role is reduced to obligation. Specifically,
the Guiding Principles now recognize merely the “States’ existing obligations to
216
respect, protect and fulfill human rights and fundamental freedoms.” The
political scientist or sociologist might say that the formal changes in language do
not necessarily affect the scope and character of the state’s obligations in effect.
The lawyer might suggest that the changes indicate a positive intention to reduce
the scope of state obligation—not all human rights and fundamental freedoms,
217
but only “existing obligations to respect, protect and fulfill human rights.”
Second, the obligations of business enterprises were changed in one quite
significant respect—no longer required to “meet the societal expectations not to
218
infringe on the human rights of others,” such enterprises are required now only
219
to “comply with all applicable laws.” The General Principles of the Guiding
Principles, then, effectively seek to eliminate reference to the great innovative
aspect of the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework—the autonomous
obligations of business organizations to comply with global social norms in the
220
business. The tag reference to the additional obligation to “respect human
rights” is likely meant to preserve a wisp of the polycentric principle in the
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework. But that is an interpretive stretch at
best. Moreover, the General Principles retain a potentially important lacuna—the
omission of non-state actors that are organized but not in business. Still, with the
definition section omitted, it might be possible to extend the definition of
business enterprise to include businesses that are not profit making organizations,
like Amnesty International, to the extent that they operate like businesses by
hiring employees, owning property, and engaging in transactions.
As thus reduced in scope, the General Principles of the Guiding Principles
articulate the assumption that had been written into the Special Representative’s
Reports since 2008—that the Guiding Principles apply to all states and all
business enterprises. The Principles of Coherence and Sustainability remain
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
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Id.
See Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at 6.
Id.
Id.
Draft Principles, supra note 64, at 5; Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at 6.
Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at 6.
See, e.g., SRSG 2008 Report, supra note 70, at 51.
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221

substantially unchanged in the final version of the Guiding Principles.
However, in line with the substantial change to the description of the
fundamental character of the State duty to protect human rights, the final version
substantially extends the limitations on the effects of the Guiding Principles, both
at the time of enactment and, importantly, as an ongoing enterprise. The Guiding
Principles broaden the Draft Principles such that the Guiding Principles would
not be read to limit or undermine the legal obligations of states under
international law and substitute a much broader limitation: “Nothing in these
Guiding Principles should be read as creating new international law obligations,
or as limiting or undermining any legal obligations a State may have undertaken
222
or be subject to under international law with regard to human rights.” The
Guiding Principles, then, must be read within the nexus of state obligation in the
context in which human rights activity occurs. It may not serve as a basis for
223
moving customary practice along. It becomes invisible.
The interpretive stage is now set for the thirty-one principles of the Guiding
Principles. First, the Guiding Principles are to be read in light of the existing
obligations of states, as they might vary from state to state. Second, the
subsidiary position of business enterprises within states is affirmed as
224
“specialized organs of society performing specialized functions” whose
principal obligation is derivative. The Guiding Principles are to be interpreted
through the foundational principle that business enterprises must obey the law of
the state that applies to them. Third, rights and obligations are to be matched with
“appropriate and effective” remedies, but oddly, to be triggered “when
225
breached.” Fourth, the Guiding Principles “apply to all states and to all
226
business enterprises.” Fifth, interpretation of the Guiding Principles is to be
guided by the overarching principles of coherence, tangibility, and sustainability.
Sixth, the Guiding Principles cannot be read either as the creation of new

221. Draft Principles, supra note 64, at 5; Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at 6.
222. Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at 6.
223. The “no creation” principle can be understood narrowly as stating the obvious—the Guiding
Principles are not law binding on states, but it can be understood as soft law with a potential effect on behavior
leading to changes in international conventional or customary law. On the other hand, it can be read broadly to
suggest that actions under the Guiding Principles cannot be applied to effectively create international law or
custom.
224. Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at 6. Here the original broad understanding could easily be
turned on its head—now as specialized social organs with specialized functions, the General Principles can as
easily lend themselves to affirm the subordinate place of business enterprises within states as they can lend
themselves to the affirmation of business enterprises as social organs that exist within and outside of states, a
position suggested in the SRSG’s 2008 and 2009 Reports at 6.
225. Id. It is not clear what this means. It can as easily suggest ex post as ex ante triggers for the
remedial right. If the former, that would substantially decrease the scope of the Principles in framing
preventative measures. With respect to the state duty, of course, that might be appropriate; with respect to the
corporate obligation, that would seem at odds with the focus of human rights due diligence. On the other hand,
this turn of phrase might also suggest a separation between the remedial function and the preventative one.
226. Id.
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international law, nor, potentially, as the place from which such international law
might arise; nor may they limit or undermine the legal obligations of states, even
where these obligations are incompatible with human rights obligations. And
seventh, the Guiding Principles impose a principle of non-discrimination, not to
227
be applied for the benefit of states but rather for the benefit of individuals.
B. The State Duty to Protect Principles
1. The State Duty to Protect Human Rights: Foundational Principles
The ten Guiding Principles touching on the state duty to protect human rights
228
is divided into two sections, “Foundational Principles,” and “Operational
229
Principles.” The latter is subdivided into “General State regulatory and policy
230
231
functions,” “The State-business nexus,” “Supporting business respect for
232
233
human rights in conflict-affected areas,” and “ensuring policy coherence.”
These rearrange and modify the organization of the Guiding Principles in the
234
Draft Principles, principally by reinforcing the distinction between general
principals, which must be applied in the interpretation of the operational
principles that follow (and both, of course, to be interpreted in light of the
“General Principles” section applicable to all of the Guiding Principles).
The state duty to protect human rights, the first pillar of the “Protect, Respect
and Remedy” framework, is distilled in Guiding Principles 1 and 2. Guiding
235
Principle 1 describes the state duty to protect human rights. But Guiding
Principle 1 appears to reflect a duty that is secondary rather than primary: states
do not have a duty to protect against human rights abuses, including their own
abuses. Instead, they merely have an obligation to protect against human rights
236
abuses within their territories by third parties. The Commentary, however,
237
suggests a broader application than the black letter of the principle suggests.

227. Id.
228. Id. at 1-2.
229. Id. at princ. 3-10.
230. Id. at princ. 3.
231. Id. at princ. 4-6.
232. Id. at princ. 7.
233. Id. at princ. 8-10.
234. The rearranging reflects both the shift in emphasis of the General Principles reflected in the first
section, discussed above, and drafting refinement.
235. Id. at princ. 1.
236. “States must protect against human rights abuse within their territory and/or jurisdiction by third
parties, including business enterprises. This requires taking appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and
redress such abuse through effective policies, legislation, regulations and adjudication.” Id.
237. “States’ international human rights law obligations require that they respect, protect and fulfill the
human rights of individuals within their territory and/or jurisdiction. This includes the duty to protect against
human rights abuse by third parties, including business enterprises.” Id. at cmt. princ. It is not clear how the
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The Commentary suggests that the duty to protect is a standard of conduct; that
States are not responsible for the abuses of private parties; and that states do
become liable as principles where the abuses can be attributed to them or where
they fail to enforce against third party abuse in accordance with the standards of
238
Guiding Principle 1. Inexplicably, the Commentary also reads into the black
239
letter of the principle a state duty to “protect and promote the rule of law.”
Guiding Principle 2 then describes the means by which states comply with
their duty in their regulation of business enterprises within their territory or
240
jurisdiction. It represents a combination of the extraterritoriality provision of
the original Draft Principles with the “clear expectations” principle of the first
241
part of Draft Principle 5. The strategic reasons for the move remain unclear—
perhaps it was a means of softening the focus on extraterritoriality, a position that
remained contested.
The principle focus of Guiding Principle 2, though, is extraterritoriality. The
Commentary to Guiding Principle 2 makes clear that the principle is meant as a
242
rather lukewarm endorsement of extraterritoriality. This is a substantial retreat
243
from both the language in the SRSG Reports and the Draft Principles. The
244
Commentary then suggests the policy reasons favoring Guiding Principle 2 and
the approaches states have employed to implement the principle, including the
use of extraterritorial principles, a backhanded approach to the endorsement of
245
extraterritoriality nowhere explicit in the Principle itself. Gone are references to
the supply chain relationships and controlled entity concepts that were included
246
in the Draft Principles and that strengthened the case for extraterritoriality.

Commentary can be reconciled with the narrower language of the principle itself.
238. See id.
239. Id. at princ. 1 cmt. While these principles could be read into the “Protect, Respect and Remedy”
Framework, it is hard to extract such a duty from the language of Principle 1. In any case, this obligation is
understood to include a principle of equality before the law, fairness in application of law, and accountability,
legal certainty and procedural and legal transparency. Id.
240. “States should set out clearly the expectation that all business enterprises domiciled in their
territory and/or jurisdiction respect human rights throughout their operations.” Id. at princ. 2.
241. See discussion below. The rationale for the clear expectations part of Guiding Principle 2 remain
unchanged from the draft—“ensuring predictability for business enterprises by providing coherent and
consistent messages, and preserving the State’s own reputation.” Id.
242. “At present States are not generally required under international human rights law to regulate the
extraterritorial activities of businesses domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction. Nor are they generally
prohibited from doing so, provided there is a recognized jurisdictional basis. Within these parameters some
human rights treaty bodies recommend that home States take steps to prevent abuse abroad by business
enterprises within their jurisdiction.” Id.
243. See discussion infra Part IV.
244. The Commentary highlights predictability for business (and thus the preservation of a favorable
business climate) and the reputational benefits to states. Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 2 cmt.
245. Id. Indeed, the Commentary in its third paragraph appears to upend the implications of the first
paragraph of the Commentary by seeking to make the case for aggressive use of extraterritorial regulation in the
guise of speaking to approaches that might be used to clarify the expectations of business behavior.
246. See discussion infra Part IV.
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The Draft Principles reflected a somewhat different perspective in the
elaboration of the fundamental provisions of the state duty to protect human
rights. It is in those differences that one can discern the spaces between “Protect,
Respect and Remedy” as a framework, the narrowing approach of the Draft
Principles, and the final product. Together they provide a more principled basis
for reading the Guiding Principles as ultimately endorsed. The foundational
principles set the scope and nature of the state duty to protect human rights.
Principle 1 is directed toward the state, rather than, as in the final version, the
247
state’s duty as against third parties. It describes the state’s obligations with
respect to its incorporation of international human rights standards into its
domestic legal order and to enforce that legal order. The obligations of Principle
1 are mandatory. Principle 2 is directed outward. It describes the fundamental
relationship between the state, its legal system, and the businesses under its
control. The obligations of Principle 2 are permissive—states are encouraged, but
not required, to assert authority over businesses to the extent described in
Principle 2. The remainder of the Draft Principles focused on the state duty to
protect human rights then elaborated the two foundational principles, building on
the mandatory principle of Draft Principle 1 and the permissive principle of Draft
Principle 2 to frame the extent of the state duty to protect human rights at home
and outside of its own territory.
Draft Principle 1 can be understood as made up of two parts. The first part
sets out the extent of the duty: “States must protect against business-related
248
human rights abuse within their territory and/or jurisdiction.” The second part
describes the methodology that is to be used to comply with this obligation:
states are required to take “appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and
249
redress such abuse through effective policies, regulation, and adjudication.”
The focus of Principle 1 is on the state’s duty to prevent abuses of human rights
250
by business. The Commentary narrows the scope of the state duty described in
Draft Principle 1 by distinguishing the duty to protect from “other State duties
251
usually associated with human rights, such as the duties to promote and fulfill.”
The duty to protect is understood as grounded in law and policy. The legal basis
252
of the duty arises from the international law obligations of states, and to some
247. Compare Draft Principles, supra note 64, at princ. 1 (“States must protect against business-related
human rights abuse within their territory and/or jurisdiction by taking appropriate steps to prevent, investigate,
punish and redress such abuse through effective policies, regulation, and adjudication.”) with Guiding
Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 1 (“States must protect against human rights abuses within their territory
and/or jurisdiction by third parties, including business enterprises. This requires taking appropriate steps to
prevent, investigate, punish and redress such abuse through effective policies, legislation, regulations and
adjudication.”)
248. Draft Principles, supra note 64, at 5.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 5-6.
251. Id. at 6.
252. Id. at 5-6. “The legal foundation of the State duty to protect against business-related human rights
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extent from the imperatives of their domestic constitutional orders. The
Commentary suggests that the international law obligations of states can be
understood as requiring states to control their own behavior and also the behavior
253
of persons or entities over which they might have control. However, while
states might have an obligation to control the conduct of others within their
territory with respect to compliance with applicable human rights norms, the
Commentary suggests that states will not be directly liable for the consequences
254
of human rights abuses by others (within their control). Lastly, the framework
structure of the Draft Principles does imply a substantial amount of potential
legislative and policy obligations on the part of states. These are framed as
housekeeping obligations—the need to ensure legal and policy coherence by
255
conforming law and policymaking to the obligations the state has undertaken.
If Draft Principle 1 is directed inward—focusing on the legal obligations of
states with respect to their domestic legal orders—Draft Principle 2 is directed
outward—toward the policy obligations of states that flow from their legal
obligation to protect human rights, and attach to persons or entities wherever they
256
operate. The Commentary notes that issues of extraterritoriality are complex
257
and sensitive, though it does not elaborate on either. Though the Commentary
appears to take a cautious approach to the encouragement of assertions of
extraterritorial jurisdiction, the approach is ambiguous enough to provide a cover
258
for fairly aggressive interventions abroad. That permission to project legislative
power abroad, of course, is a function of the extent of a state’s control over
domestically chartered business operating abroad. The effect, then, is to provide a
policy cover for the continued use of the power by developed states to project
abuse is grounded in international human rights law.” Id.
253. Id. at 6 (“The specific language in the main United Nations human rights treaties varies, but all
include two sets of obligations for States Parties: first, to refrain, themselves, from violating the enumerated
rights of persons within their territory and/or jurisdiction, generally known as the State duty to respect human
rights; second, to ‘ensure’ (or some functionally equivalent verb) the enjoyment or realization of those rights.”).
254. States, however, might be liable for breach of their obligations under international law where their
failure to ensure compliance by others within their control is itself a breach of the relevant treaty. Id.
255. See id. at 9-11; see also discussion infra Part IV.
256. Id. at 6. “States should encourage business enterprises domiciled in their territory and/or
jurisdiction to respect human rights throughout their global operations, including those conducted by their
subsidiaries and other related legal entities.” Id.
257. The issue, however, was thoroughly vetted in the years leading to the production of the Draft
Principles. Id.; see, e.g., Jennifer A. Zerk, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Lessons for the Business and Human
Rights Sphere from Six Regulatory Areas (Harvard Corporate Soc. Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No.
59, 2010), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/workingpaper_59_zerk.pdf.
258. The Commentary is a study in ambiguity:
States are not at present generally required under international human rights law to regulate the
extraterritorial activities of businesses domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction, nor are they
generally prohibited from doing so provided there is a recognized jurisdictional basis, and that the
exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. Various factors may contribute to perceived and actual
reasonableness of States’ actions, including whether they are grounded in multilateral agreement.
Draft Principles, supra note 64, at 6.
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their legislative agendas in less developed states, which tend to serve as host
states for foreign business operations. More importantly, the Commentary
suggests a connection between the permissive actions of Draft Principle 2 with
the mandatory provisions of Draft Principle 1, where the state is acting both as a
regulator (Draft Principle 1) and a participant (Draft Principle 2) in activities
259
beyond its borders.
260
Still, the Commentary seeks to soften the effects. It is also possible to argue
that, within the context of Draft Principles, extraterritoriality should have no
functional effect on the internal operations of the host state’s legal system. In
effect, extraterritoriality is merely a transitory step toward the necessary
harmonization of law and policy inherent in the International Bill of Rights,
which should produce a functionally equivalent global set of domestic legal
orders. But that conclusion is founded on a number of assumptions with respect
to which there might not yet be consensus in either theory or action. First, all
states have an obligation in equal measure to incorporate international law within
their domestic legal orders. Second, that bundle of international obligations is
identical among all states. Third, all states understand the bundle of transposable
obligations identically. Fourth, none of the obligations raise issues within the
constitutional order of any state. Fifth, the bundle of international human rights
obligations is consistent with all other international obligations of states (in
effect, there exists a sufficiently well developed policy coherence at the
international law level). Sixth, the process of incorporating these obligations will
produce differences in form and process, but no substantial differences in
function or effect on application in individual cases. And seventh, states will
enforce these obligations subject to the peculiarities of their domestic legal order,
in a substantially harmonized (though not uniform) manner, as a matter of law
(binding obligation) and policy (comity).
The difficulty with the extraterritoriality provisions of the Principles, whether
in draft or final form, of course, is that each of these assumptions remains highly
contested, and states continue to “game” the system to their own advantage.
States may not have the same set of legal obligations under international law and
261
may not interpret their obligations under that law in the same way. With respect
to conventional law, not all states have acceded to every convention—many
states have treaty relationships with other states, and states may have included
259. Id. (“Indeed, strong policy reasons exist for home States to encourage businesses domiciled in their
territory and/or jurisdiction to respect human rights abroad, especially if the State is involved in the business
venture.”).
260. Id. (“Furthermore, the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction is not a binary matter but comprises a
range of measures, not all equally controversial under all circumstances. The permissible options which may be
available range from domestic measures with extraterritorial implications, such as requirements on “parent”
companies to report on their operations at home and abroad, to direct extraterritorial jurisdiction such as
criminal regimes which rely on the nationality of the perpetrator no matter where the offense occurs.”).
261. See cf. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9, 2004).
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substantial reservations. States have very different understandings of the scope,
applicability, and the nature of obligations under customary international law.
Moreover, beyond issues of legal effect, the legal effect of non-binding
international norms remains highly contested—as a matter of international law
262
and in its effect on the domestic legal order of a state. Indeed, as recent cases
from the United States have shown, the relationship between international legal
or normative obligation and the strictures of a constitutionally derived domestic
legal obligation work against the incorporation of international law or norms in a
263
uniform or harmonized way, if it is incorporated at all. Other states take a
264
different approach. The potential for law and policy incoherence grows. More
importantly, it is clear that, even within the assumption of the Guiding Principles
framework, extraterritoriality can have a significant effect, especially for the
transposition of developed state law through the instrumentalities of their
chartered corporations operating in less developed host states.
2. The State Duty to Protect Human Rights: Operational Principles—
General State and Regulatory Policy Functions
The Operational Principles comprise the bulk of the Guiding Principles
touching on the state duty to protect. Principle 3 (Draft Principle 5) considers the
general regulatory and policy functions of states. It lists four categories of actions
to be undertaken by states that mean to honor their obligations under Principle 1.
265
Two involve the construction and enforcement of law, one defines the guidance
266
obligations of states (that slips in an extraterritorial element), and the last
267
frames the construction of corporate disclosure obligations. The structure is
meant to describe a universe of obligation that includes not merely legal
obligations but policy commitments as well. Most interesting is the principle, set
out in Guiding Principle 3(a), that states have a due diligence obligation with

262. Cf. Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (Sept. 17, 2003).
263. Cf. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 503-04 (2008).
264. See State v. Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) at paras. 34-37 (S. Afr.).
265. States should “[e]nforce laws that are aimed at, or have the effect of, requiring business enterprises
to respect human rights, and periodically to assess the adequacy of such laws and address any gaps.” Guiding
Principles, supra note 41, at 8. In addition, states should ensure that the other parts of its domestic legal order,
and especially its corporate law, do not constrain business respect for human rights. Id.
266. States should provide effective guidance to businesses on how to respect human rights “throughout
their operations.” Id. at 8. This is in addition to Guiding Principle 2’s requirement that states set out clear
expectations about respecting human rights. The reference to operations seems to focus interest on the supply
chain operations of a business, but the Commentary fails to take this up, focusing instead on the effects of
supply chain operations rather than identify them directly. Id. at 7.
267. States should encourage and might compel businesses to communicate how they address human
rights impacts. Id. at 8.

113

[6] BACKER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

9/10/2012 2:58 PM

2012 / From Institutional Misalignments to Socially Sustainable Governance
respect to the adequacy of their domestic legal orders in complying with the law
268
enforcement obligations of Guiding Principles 2 and 3(a).
The Commentary urges states to avoid being passive in fostering business
respect for human rights, and counsels better enforcement of existing law,
269
arguing that the failure to enforce has the effect of a legislative gap. Most
importantly, the Commentary takes direct aim at the conventional construction of
corporate law—the shareholder welfare maximization basis of which may be
inconsistent with the human rights privileging objectives of the Guiding
270
Principles. The Commentary also suggests a number of soft law techniques for
271
state guidance of business enterprises to respect human rights, invites states to
make better use of their national human rights institutions to meet their duty to
272
273
protect, and suggests the contours of appropriate outcomes and best practices.
Lastly, the Commentary suggests changes in national and international
274
accounting principles. The Commentary does not focus attention on the
principle’s invitation for home states to regulate corporate conduct down the
supply chain, but it does suggest the nature of such regulation through the
275
corporate obligation to undertake human rights due diligence. Taken as a
whole, these suggestions are, at best, tall orders, and will require the concurrence
of a number of stakeholders, many of which were not parties to the Guiding
Principles process, and whose interests may be adverse to the objectives of the
Guiding Principles.

268. This is described as an obligation to “periodically . . . assess the adequacy of such laws and address
any gaps.” Id.
269. Id.
270. The Commentary strengthens the suggestion made in the Draft Principles Commentary that there is
a certain amount of flexibility, perhaps more than is warranted by the history of the application of law in many
states, in the construction and interpretation of the shareholder welfare maximization principles of corporate
law. See Larry Catá Backer, Using Corporate Law to Encourage Respect for Human Rights in Economic
Transactions: Considering the November 2009 Summary Report on Corporate Law and Human Rights Under
the UN SRSG Mandate, LCBACKER BLOG (Jan. 14, 2010, 9:23 PM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/
2010/01/using-corporate-law-to-encourage.html.
271. States “should consider a smart mix of measures – national and international, mandatory and
voluntary – to foster business respect for human rights.” Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at 8.
272. “National human rights institutions that comply with the Paris Principles have an important role to
play in helping States identify whether relevant laws are aligned with their human rights obligations and are
being effectively enforced, and in providing guidance on human rights also to business enterprises and other
non-State actors.” Id. at 8-9.
273. “[S]hould consider a smart mix of measures—national and international, mandatory and
voluntary—to foster business respect for human rights.” Id. at 8.
274. “Financial reporting requirements should clarify that human rights impacts in some instances may
be ‘material’ or ‘significant’ to the economic performance of the business enterprise.” Id.
275. “It should advise on appropriate methods, including human rights due diligence, and how to
consider effectively issues of gender, vulnerability and/or marginalization, recognizing the specific challenges
that may be faced by indigenous peoples, women, national or ethnic minorities, religious and linguistic
minorities, children, persons with disabilities, and migrant workers and their families.” Id. In the Draft
Principles supply chain issues are discussed elsewhere.
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The Draft Principles took a similar path, though it also included discussion of
policy coherence, which was eventually moved to Guiding Principle 2. Draft
Principle 5 sets out in more detail the methodologies of regulating business
within the context of the duty to protect against human rights abuses. The basic
principle is straightforward and applicable to national regulation domestically
276
and extraterritorially. The requirements of Draft Principle 5 can be divided into
two distinct parts. The first is the requirement that states should set out their
expectations. The second part requires states to take the necessary measures to
277
“support, encourage, and . . . require” compliance with these expectations. Four
methods are identified as appropriate to meet these objectives. These methods
reflect the fundamental division of the state duty to protect between law and
policy that serves as the basic ordering framework of Draft Principle 1. Lawbased methods include enforcing the law and ensuring that relevant law does not
278
impede corporate respect for human rights. Policy-based methods include
providing guidance on how to respect human rights and how to communicate
279
corporate human rights performance.
These methodologies are grounded on a principle of state action (one
consistent with Draft Principle 1, a focus now substantially lacking in the final
version of Guiding Principle 1) that “States should not assume that businesses
280
invariably prefer, or benefit from, State inaction.” With respect to enforcement
of law and direction of policy, the Commentary suggests the need to harmonize
laws relating to business with the overarching principles of human rights law.
This derives both from the SRSG’s emphasis on the need for policy and legal
coherence, and on the recognition that the current model of business regulation—
grounded in shareholder or enterprise welfare maximization—might frustrate the
enterprise of transposing human rights norms into the law and policy systems of
281
states. The SRSG, at the same time, stresses the importance of practical
guidance for businesses on respecting human rights, by providing that it “should
indicate expected outcomes; advise on appropriate methods, including human
282
rights due diligence; and help share best practices.” The point of guidance, as
part of the state duty to protect, then, is closely tied to the responsibility of

276. Draft Principles, supra note 64, at 7. (“States should set out clearly their expectation for all
business enterprises operating or domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction to respect human rights, and
take the necessary steps to support, encourage and where appropriate require them to do so.”).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 7, princ. 5(a), (b).
279. Id. at 7, princ. 5(c), (d).
280. Id. at 7-8. True to the fundamental embrace of multiple sources of governance regimes, the
Commentary suggests a “smart mix of measures.” Id. These are founded on national law, the legal and policy
transposition of international law, and the advancement of voluntary measures, this last a nod in the direction of
non-state social norm governance systems. Id.
281. For a critical discussion of these efforts and assumptions, see Backer, supra note 270.
282. Draft Principles, supra note 64, at 7-8.
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283

business to respect human rights. But more than that, it suggests an institutional
hierarchy, in which the state retains some authority, or at least obligation, to help
shape and manage the social norm system of corporate governance regimes. This
form of connection between the state duty and corporate responsibility is made
clear in the context of the obligation to encourage corporate communication on
284
corporate human rights performance.
3. The State Duty to Protect Human Rights: Operational Principles—The
State-Business Nexus
The connections between the core duty of states to protect human rights, the
corporate responsibility to respect human rights, and the role of international
public and private actors, are developed in Guiding Principles 4 through 6.
Guiding Principle 4 amalgamates the related Draft Principles 6 and 8 without
substantive change. Guiding Principle 4 focuses on enterprises that are either
owned or controlled by a state, or that are the recipients of substantial state aid
285
(whether or not state-owned). In both cases, the state “should take additional
286
steps to protect against human rights abuses. . .” These steps might include
287
“requiring human rights due diligence” —steps that would otherwise have a
288
more compelling character in cases where enterprises are not state-owned.
The Commentary, though modified from its draft form in some respects, does
not change the focus of discussion. The Commentary is careful, again, to assuage
the sensibilities of states as occupying the top of the governance hierarchy in this
289
system. But state-owned enterprises represent a nexus point for the state duty to
protect and the corporate responsibility to respect human rights. Yet, given the
change in Guiding Principle 1 from its draft version, it is easier to reconcile the
two when incarnated in a state-owned to state-aided enterprise. Guiding Principle
1 reduces the state duty to one of protecting against human rights abuses

283. Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at 13-20.
284. Draft Principles, supra note 64, at 8.
285. Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at 9-10.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.; see also id. at 13 discussed infra.
289. Indeed, the Commentary does a nice job of suggesting the hierarchical ordering of governance roles
between states and business enterprises in the context of the Guiding Principle normative framework.
States individually are the primary duty-bearers under international human rights law, and
collectively they are the trustees of the international human rights regime. Where a business
enterprise is controlled by the State or where its acts can be attributed otherwise to the State, an
abuse of human rights by the business enterprise may entail a violation of the State’s own
international law obligations. Moreover, the closer a business enterprise is to the State, or the
more it relies on statutory authority or taxpayer support, the stronger the State’s policy
rationale becomes for ensuring that the enterprise respects human rights.
Id. at 9-10.
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committed by others. The corporate responsibility to respect applies only to the
corporate entity and not necessarily to its owners, especially where the owners
are states. As such, it makes perfect sense within this structure for states to
require nothing more than a reminder to enforce their laws, even against entities
in which they have an ownership or control interest, or those which they
subsidize. The Commentary then appears to state the obvious—the state
obligation to enforce its law (Guiding Principle 1) is made easier because
290
managers of state-owned companies may have to report to state officials.
On the other hand, the Commentary draws a stronger connection between the
direct obligations of states, under legal and policy rationales, where the state
subsidizes business enterprises.
Where these agencies do not explicitly consider the actual and potential
adverse impacts on human rights of beneficiary enterprises, they put
themselves at risk—in reputational, financial, political and potentially
legal terms—for supporting any such harm, and they may add to the
291
human rights challenges faced by the recipient State.
It is in this context that the Commentary suggests that “human rights due
diligence is most likely to be appropriate where the nature of business operations
292
or operating contexts pose significant risk to human rights.”
Guiding Principle 5 (Draft Principle 7) focuses on obligations of states with
293
respect to business enterprises performing services that they outsource. The
294
consequences of failure to comply are identified as both reputational and legal.
Guiding Principle 6 (Draft Principle 9) focuses on respect for human rights by
295
business enterprises when states engage in commercial transactions with them.
290. The Commentary puts it this way:
Where States own or control business enterprises, they have greatest means within their powers
to ensure that relevant policies, legislation and regulations regarding respect for human rights
are implemented. Senior management typically reports to State agencies, and associated
government departments have greater scope for scrutiny and oversight, including ensuring that
effective human rights due diligence is implemented.
Id. at 9.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 10 provides: “States should exercise adequate oversight in order to meet their international
human rights obligations when they contract with, or legislate for, business enterprises to provide services that
may impact upon the enjoyment of human rights.”
294. Id. at 10. The means to avoid these consequences are to give effect to guiding Principle 2. “As a
necessary step, the relevant service contracts or enabling legislation should clarify the State’s expectations that
these enterprises respect human rights. States should ensure that they can effectively oversee the enterprises’
activities, including through the provision of adequate independent monitoring and accountability mechanisms.”
Id.
295. “States should promote respect for human rights by business enterprises with which they conduct
commercial transactions.” Id. at 10. This obligation is described as a set of “unique opportunities to promote
awareness of and respect for human rights by those enterprises” with which the state engages in transactions. Id.
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The only change from the Draft Principles was the inclusion, in the Commentary,
of a limiting provision of the state’s obligation—based on the particular
296
obligation of a state under national and international law.
4. The State Duty to Protect Human Rights: Operational Principles—
Supporting Business Respect for Human Rights in Conflict Affected
Areas
Guiding Principle 7 (Draft Principle 10 with minor revisions) relates to the
state duty to protect human rights in conflict zones. After its justificatory
297
introduction, Guiding Principle 7 provides that states should ensure that
businesses operating in conflict zones avoid involvement with human rights
298
abuses. It then offers four methods for achieving this result. These include early
engagement with home-state businesses to manage their operations in the conflict
zone, assistance to business in identifying and assessing the form of heightened
risks of human rights abuse, denying public support and services to
uncooperative home-state enterprises, and adjusting public policies and formal
governance tools to enforce home-state business compliance with conduct
299
interdictions abroad. “All these measures are in addition to States’ obligations
under international humanitarian law in situations of armed conflict, and under
300
international criminal law.”
This principle marks one of the conceptual outer edges of the state duty and
corporate responsibility pillars of the “Protect, Respect and Remedy”
Framework, at least as it touches on the current and conventional international
system. Guiding Principle 7 concedes the supremacy of the state as the great
active agent of enforcing collective norms. It also presumes the authority of the
state to project its power through the business enterprises it controls. But it is not
necessarily national power that is projected, but instead the projection of national
power enforcing international norms. In essence, Guiding Principle 7 concedes
the need for unilateral action by the dominant states, and their authority to
provide governance in the absence of an indigenous government. In effect, the
underlying principle of Guiding Principle 7 assumes the need for there to be a
proper state for every territory in a world organized on the basis of states.
Guiding Principle 7 provides a specific application of the extraterritorial principle
of Guiding Principle 2. The state duty to protect assumes a state assigned to
296. Id. The result, of course, is the potential loss of policy coherence, as the legal obligations of states
under national and international law vary widely, and vary more widely still in their interpretations of even
similar legal obligations.
297. “Because the risk of gross human rights abuses is heightened in conflict-affected areas . . .” Id. at
10-11.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 10-11, princ. 7(a)-(d).
300. Id. at 11, princ. 7 cmt.
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every territory. That implicates a related issue: which state ought to step in to
supply law when a territory lacks a sufficient quantum of state power? The
answer, of course, is implicit in Guiding Principle 2’s extraterritoriality principle.
Thus, Guiding Principle 7 effectively vests the state duty to protect authority to
302
the state that controls businesses operating in conflict or weak state zones.
The Commentary makes clear that the Guiding Principles framework and the
web of international norms it represents provides an exception to the principle of
internal sovereignty of states where there is no strong or stable government
303
apparatus. It then suggests the contours of the obligations of states to project
their power through the private market activities of corporations domiciled in
304
their territories. That state power can be projected through the parent of such
corporations where local activity is carried on by a subsidiary or the obligation
can be applied as well to all supply chain downstream entities, combining this
305
Guiding Principle 7 with the insights of Guiding Principle 3(c)). Such
assistance can come with a sting: the Commentary suggests that states “attach
appropriate consequences to any failure by enterprises to cooperate in these
contexts, including by denying or withdrawing existing public support or
306
services, or where that is not possible, denying their future provision.” The
conflict zone principle also serves another important purpose—the management
301. This, of course, is the basic assumption of the state system on which national and international
public law regimes are currently based. See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY
(1999); Thomas C. Heller & Abraham D. Sofaer, Sovereignty: The Practitioners’ Perspective, in PROBLEMATIC
SOVEREIGNTY: CONTESTED RULES AND POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES 24, 26-27 (Stephen Krasner ed., 2001). For a
critique in the African context, see, e.g., Makau Wa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal
Inquiry, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1113, 1134 (1995).
302. “Responsible businesses increasingly seek guidance from States about how to avoid contributing to
human rights harm in these difficult contexts.” Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at 10-11, princ. 7 cmt.
303. “Some of the worst human rights abuses involving business occur amid conflict over the control of
territory, resources or a Government itself—where the human rights regime cannot be expected to function as
intended.” Id.
304. In conflict-affected areas, the “host” State may be unable to protect human rights
adequately due to a lack of effective control. Where transnational corporations are
involved, their “home” States therefore have roles to play in assisting both those
corporations and host States to ensure that businesses are not involved with human
rights abuse, while neighboring States can provide important additional support.
Id.
305. Where they identify gaps, States should take appropriate steps to address them. This
may include exploring civil, administrative or criminal liability for enterprises
domiciled or operating in their territory and/or jurisdiction that commit or contribute to
gross human rights abuses. Moreover, States should consider multilateral approaches to
prevent and address such acts, as well as support effective collective initiatives.
Id.; see also id. at 8, princ. 3(c).
306. Id. The Commentary also amplifies the obligations of states in the management of their home state
corporations abroad. “States should warn business enterprises of the heightened risk of being involved with
gross abuses of human rights in conflict-affected areas. They should review whether their policies, legislation,
regulations and enforcement measures effectively address this heightened risk, including through provisions for
human rights due diligence by business.” Id. Thus there is a strong legislative component as well here, one that
mirrors the legislative obligations of states under id. at 8, princ. 3(b).
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of the state’s efforts to achieve internal and external policy coherence in line with
the requirements of international human rights norms, an issue taken up explicitly
307
in Guiding Principles 8-10. The obligation to interpose itself in the territories of
weak governance or conflict zones, then, is reconstituted as a part of the state
duty to protect human rights. There is irony here, in deepening and extending the
power of the state to protect human rights wherever there is a need. The Guiding
Principles contribute to a vertically-ordered integration of states within a system
in which intervention in the internal affairs of states is managed in those contexts,
but it cannot or will not meet its international obligations. But those interventions
are themselves bound not by the individual interests of the intervening state, but
rather by the norms of international human rights. Extraterritoriality, then, as
expressed in Guiding Principles 2 and 7, appears to strengthen states, but they
actually serve to limit state authority to those norms having international
308
authority.
5. The State Duty to Protect Human Rights: Operational Principles—
Ensuring Policy Coherence
Policy coherence was an important element of the “Protect, Respect and
309
Remedy” Framework. The Guiding Principles fully devote three principles to
this issue. Together, they are meant to provide a structure for the development of
internal state policy (Guiding Principle 8); of external policy in the development
of bi-lateral relationships between states and other actors (Guiding Principle 9);
and in the multilateral relations of states (Guiding Principle 10).
Guiding Principle 8 (Draft Principle 3) looks to internal or horizontal policy
coherence: “States should ensure that governmental departments, agencies and
other State-based institutions that shape business practices are aware of and
observe the State’s human rights obligations when fulfilling their respective
310
mandates.” This obligation can be effectuated in part by providing relevant
307. See also id. at 11-12, princ. 8-10. For example, the Commentary suggests “To achieve greater
policy coherence and assist business enterprises adequately in such situations, home States should foster closer
cooperation among their development assistance agencies, foreign and trade ministries, and export finance
institutions in their capitals and within their embassies, as well as between these agencies and host Government
actors.” Id.
308. Id. at 7, princ. 2. “States should consider multilateral approaches to prevent and address such acts,
as well as support effective collective initiatives,” Id. at 10-11, princ. 7 cmt.
309. See, e.g., Backer, supra note 49, at 65.
310. Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at 11, princ. 8. The Commentary defines policy coherence in
terms of the obligations of states:
Horizontal policy coherence means supporting and equipping departments and agencies, at
both the national and sub-national levels, that shape business practices—including those
responsible for corporate law and securities regulation, investment, export credit and insurance,
trade and labour—to be informed of and act in a manner compatible with the Governments’
human rights obligations.
Id. at 11, princ. 8 cmt.
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governmental authorities with “relevant information, training and support.” The
Commentary elaborates, condensing the discussion of vertical and horizontal
coherence developed in the SRSG’s Reports. In the process, the Commentary
suggests both the realities of domestic law incoherence as a fundamental drag on
the ability of a state to comply with even its indirect duty specified in Guiding
312
Principle 1 and the failures of states to align their internal legal systems to their
313
international legal obligations.
There are several aspects to these principles that are worth highlighting. First,
Guiding Principle 8 looks inward to the relationship of the state to its governance
organs in a way that suggests a hierarchy of policy that places human rights at or
314
near the top of a state’s policy obligations. Second, it reaches state practice at
all levels of operation, irrespective of the division of power within a state.
Guiding Principle 8 thus cuts across organizational structures from the division
of authority between states and a federal government, to the powers reserved to
315
regions under various incarnations of autonomy regimes. Third, it also reaches,
on the same principle, into the territory and law structures of semi-sovereigns,
316
like indigenous peoples. Fourth, all of these subordinate or related governance
units are understood in the context of the overall obligations of Guiding Principle
1, the policy choices of which must be coordinated and subject to the hierarchy
of values that privilege human rights.
Guiding Principle 9 (Draft Principle 4 without substantive change) focuses
on the relationship of states with others in the context of implementing coherent
policies. Guiding Principle 9 suggests that the coherence principles of Guiding
Principle 8 extend externally—to the relationships between the state and other
states or businesses. The Commentary describes that these “[e]conomic
agreements concluded by States, either with other States or with business
enterprises—such as bilateral investment treaties, free-trade agreements or

311. Id.
312. “There is no inevitable tension between States’ human rights obligations and the laws and policies
they put in place that shape business practices. However, at times, States have to make difficult balancing
decisions to reconcile different societal needs.” Id.
313. “Vertical policy coherence entails States having the necessary policies, laws and processes to
implement their international human rights law obligations.” Id.
314. That hardwiring of policy balancing in favor of a state’s human rights obligations is implicit
through the application of Guiding Principle 1. In many cases, it is also a necessary consequence of the
application of the policy ordering implicit in the constitutional systems of the state. This might be the case, for
example, in Germany, with its emphasis on human dignity. See GRUNDGEZETZ FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK
DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGEZETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 1, May 23, 1949, BGBI. I (Ger.).
315. The Commentary speaks to the obligations of coherence as extending to “both the national and subnational levels.” Guiding Principle, supra note 41, at 11, princ. 8 cmt. It is also understood as an element of
vertical coherence. Though its focus is on the coherence of policy between the state and international
community, it reaches downward as well. “Vertical policy coherence entails States having the necessary
policies, laws and processes to implement their international human rights law obligations.” Id.
316. This requires combining the breadth of Guiding Principle 8 within the overall framework principles
discussed above.
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contracts for investment projects—create economic opportunities for States. But
317
they can also affect the domestic policy space of governments,” a policy space
that has been complicated by the recognition of the need to protect investor
318
rights.
Lastly, the capstone provision of the Principles framing the state duty to
protect human rights is elaborated in Guiding Principle 10. This principle looks
toward the enlargement and deepening of international legal regimes founded on
the dense network of international organizations managing the growing body of
collective state law (that is, of international conventional and customary law) as
an alternative, and perhaps as the more legitimate substitute, for the unilateralist
319
extraterritoriality of Guiding Principles 2 and 7. But Guiding Principle 10
serves to remind that, while unilateral action is permitted, collective action has
greater legitimacy. The superiority of collective state action to the unilateral
action of any single state (or group of powerful states) ought to be regarded as
the better alternative, both for policing weak governance zones and for
developing the set of duties to which states ought to be bound.
The effect might be to cabin the extraterritoriality impulse in Guiding
Principles 2 and 10. The extraterritorial insight—that extraterritoriality bounded
by international principles will tend to constrain rather than expand state
discretionary authority—is made clear in Guiding Principle 10. But that impulse
is also substantially constrained by the language of the Principle itself. First, the
vertical ordering itself is understood in the “passive voice”—it is both weak and
consequential. The Principle applies only where states are acting as members of
multilateral institutions that deal with business related issues. It neither compels
states to enter into such arrangements nor does it limit or order the importance of
policy and legal obligations that may be derived from the actions of these
institutions. To the extent that this is implied, it is buried in the Commentary of
320
other principles. Second, it treats these multilateral organizations as lacking an
autonomous mission beyond the desires of the states that contribute to their
321
organization. And third, it assumes a coercively organized state system in
317. Guiding Principle, supra note 41, at 12, princ. 9 cmt. (“Therefore, States should ensure that they
retain adequate policy and regulatory ability to protect human rights under the terms of such agreements, while
providing the necessary investor protection.”)
318. The Commentary for Guiding Principle 9 differs from its draft form in one important respect—it
includes an obligation to balance the human rights effects of policy and law against the need to protect
investors. That has wider implications, of course, including those that touch on a state’s duty to revise its
corporate laws to attain policy convergence in the context of human rights. See id. at 8, princ. 3(b) discussed
supra.
319. Id. at princ. 2, 7, 10.
320. See, e.g., id. at 10, princ. 7 cmt. (a broader interpretation of which is discussed above).
321. “States retain their international human rights law obligations when they participate in such
institutions.” Id. at 12, princ. 10 cmt. The flow-through nature of these organizations is emphasized further in
the Commentary. “Capacity-building and awareness-raising through such institutions can play a vital role in
helping all States to fulfil their duty to protect, including by enabling the sharing of information about
challenges and best practices, thus promoting more consistent approaches.” Id.
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which international organizations are used instrumentally to coerce vertical
322
Multilateralism is
harmonization at the insistence of dominant states.
privileged—but it is guided by advanced states and, impliedly, coercively
enforced against others. Guiding Principle 10 also implies that there is a need for
the most “advanced” states to lead the others to a more developed internalization
of norms that have been embraced by the leading states.
This Principle is meant to create a particularly focused set of incentives for
the folding of the project of human rights back to the international level through
the contributions of states—as members of the community of nations—to the
development of an international legal framework, which each state is then bound
to incorporate into their domestic legal orders. But the Principle does this in a
way that would avoid offending states. It provides a three-part structure for
multilateral efforts. The first part preserves upward vertical policy coherence by
governing the international institutions through which the norms constituting the
323
substantive obligations of the state duty to protect are developed. The second
part ensures downward vertical policy coherence by ensuring that international
institutions promote the work of states in guarding against business related abuse
(though not, it seems, of state-related abuse, except perhaps when undertaken
324
through enterprises of some sort). The third part is the “Protect, Respect and
325
Remedy” Framework that serves as the basis of substantive innovation. The
Guiding Principles themselves, then, serve their highest purpose as the nexus
326
point for horizontal and vertical coherence of law and policy.

322. “Collective action through multilateral institutions can help States level the playing field with
regard to business respect for human rights, but it should do so by raising the performance of laggards.
Cooperation between States, multilateral institutions and other stakeholders can also play an important role.” Id.
323. Id. at 12, princ. 10(a) provides that states should “Seek to ensure that those institutions neither
restrain the ability of their member States to meet their duty to protect nor hinder business enterprises from
respecting human rights . . .”
324. Id. at 12, princ.10(b) provides that states should “Encourage those institutions, within their
respective mandates and capacities, to promote business respect for human rights and, where requested, to help
States meet their duty to protect against human rights abuse by business enterprises, including through technical
assistance, capacity-building and awareness-raising.” Id.
325. Id. at princ.10(c) (“Draw on these Guiding Principles to promote shared understanding and advance
international cooperation in the management of business and human rights challenges”).
326. The Commentary makes this point explicit. “These Guiding Principles provide a common reference
point in this regard, and could serve as a useful basis for building a cumulative positive effect that takes into
account the respective roles and responsibilities of all relevant stakeholders.” Id. at princ. 10 cmt.
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C. The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Principles.
1. The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: Foundational
Principles
If the first ten Guiding Principles touching on the state duty to protect are
grounded in the language of regulatory and political primacy and broadly
sketched role in the domestication of collective, the next five Guiding Principles
concerning the responsibilities of business entities take an altogether different
tone. Rather than the primacy within interlocking systems of state, international,
and private power that mark the Guiding Principles for the state duty to protect,
Principles 11 through 15 acknowledge a subordinated regulatory role for the
corporation in which the obligations of the corporation are much more
specifically detailed. The General Principles move here from the language of
political discourse and governance, to the social norm discourse of surveillance,
327
monitoring, disclosure and mediation—all under the eye of the state. The state
duty is couched in the language of law and policy. The corporate responsibility to
328
respect is grounded in the language of due diligence.
Yet, over the course of several years’ reports, the SRSG developed the quite
innovative insight that corporations operate autonomously from states, that such
operation is subject to a well-developed governance system rooted in global
social norms, and that such behavior norms are enforceable by the community of
actors through which social norms are expressed. The Corporate responsibility
Guiding Principles, however, muffle that insight in the service of states and their
legal orders. Because the responsibility of corporations to respect human rights
does not flow entirely from states, the legal arrangements enacted by states do
not serve to shield corporations from their autonomous obligations, yet the extent
of that obligation is bound by the law through which the state duty to protect is
itself framed. The corporate responsibility to respect human rights suggests a
potent innovation in governance, yet takes only a few steps toward an innovative
institutionalization within the framework of international law. The Guiding
Principles retain, importantly, a nod to the significance of an autonomous basis
for human rights enforcement, but are careful to retain the primacy of at least the
formal ties of corporate entities to the state and its remedial mechanics.
The foundational principles were originally organized in two principles,
Draft Principles 12 and 13. These were divided and broadened into five
principles in the final version (Guiding Principles 11 through 15). Guiding
Principle 11 articulates the basic standard: “Business enterprises should respect
329
human rights.” The standard is then defined: “This means that they should
327. See id. at princ. 11-15.
328. See id. at princ. 11-15 cmt.
329. Id. at princ. 11.
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avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should address adverse human
330
The definition of the
rights impacts with which they are involved.”
“responsibility to respect” standard of Guiding Principle 12 is particularly
important in a number of respects. First, the standard is constructed in a way that
emphasizes the autonomy of the rule standards for corporate responsibility,
especially from the law-based system of states. The corporate responsibility
consists of its own normative system, one that may interact and overlap with the
legal system of states (and the international system), but one that remains
separate from them as to sources of rules, the community that makes up the
governance regimes subject to this autonomous responsibility, and the
implementation of those governance norms. This is expressed in a number of
ways. First, the Commentary stresses the autonomy of corporate social norm
systems. “It exists independently of States’ abilities and/or willingness to fulfill
331
their own human rights obligations, and does not diminish those obligations.”
Second, the corporate responsibility grounded in these social norm principles is
not measured by the forms of responses required under the domestic law of
332
states. Third, the human rights social norm system, which is the object of the
Guiding Principles, is only a part of the social norm system applicable to entities,
333
which the Guiding Principles is not meant to constrain. Lastly, responsibility
carries with it the corollary that social norms should not undermine law-based
human rights obligations of states, though the suggestion, by implication, is that
corporations may undermine domestic governance that is not consonant with a
334
state’s duty to respect human rights.
Guiding Principle 12 (Draft Principle 12(a) substantially unchanged)
provides a definition of the scope of the responsibility to respect human rights. It
is meant to refer to all human rights, but at a minimum to the International Bill of
335
Human Rights and the eight ILO core conventions. The specificity accorded to

330. Id.
331. Id. at princ.11 cmt. (“And it exists over and above compliance with national laws and regulations
protecting human rights.”).
332. Id. (“Addressing adverse human rights impacts requires taking adequate measures for their
prevention, mitigation and, where appropriate, remediation.”).
333. Id. (“Business enterprises may undertake other commitments or activities to support and promote
human rights, which may contribute to the enjoyment of rights. But this does not offset a failure to respect
human rights throughout their operations.”).
334. Id. (“Business enterprises should not undermine States’ abilities to meet their own human rights
obligations, including by actions that might weaken the integrity of judicial processes.”)
335. Id. at princ. 12. The Commentary elaborates:
An authoritative list of the core internationally recognized human rights is contained in the
International Bill of Human Rights (consisting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the main instruments through which it has been codified: the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights), coupled with the principles concerning fundamental rights in the eight ILO core
conventions as set out in the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.
Id.
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the definition of internationally recognized human rights, applicable to both
states and corporations in the draft version, is now confined to corporations under
the responsibility to respect principles. A justification is possible: states are
bound only to those international human rights to which they have acceded or to
the small group of additional standards that are accorded universal applicability.
Beyond that, states may have policy reasons for incorporating human rights
standards, but no legal obligations, either applicable internally or enforceable by
the community of nations. The Commentary also suggests that its definition is
336
merely a minimum default rule: some circumstances may warrant expansion of
337
the definition, other circumstances may require corporations to “respect the
human rights of individuals belonging to specific groups or populations that
require particular attention, where they may have adverse human rights impacts
338
on them.”
Guiding Principle 13 (Draft Principles 12(b) and 13, modified in part),
further refines the nature of the responsibility to respect human rights by
describing the relationship between the scope of the responsibility and the way in
which business enterprises ought to behave in relation that that standard. Guiding
Principle 13 specifies negative impacts and action. First, the corporation should
“[a]void causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through their
339
own activities, and address such impacts when they occur.” Second, the
corporation should “[s]eek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts
that are directly linked to their operations, products or services by their business
340
relationships, even if they have not contributed to those impacts.” The
Commentary makes clear that the intent of this principle is to gather several
concepts together and frame their relationships. Its primary objective is to
address the scope of business activities within the scope of the corporate
responsibility to respect human rights. The Principle suggests a broad scope,
covering not merely the direct actions of the entity, but also the activities that
produce adverse human rights impacts “as a result of their business relationships
341
with other parties.” This both softens and changes the scope of the language in

336. Id. (“Because business enterprises can have an impact on virtually the entire spectrum of
internationally recognized human rights, their responsibility to respect applies to all such rights.”).
337. Id. (“In practice, some human rights may be at greater risk than others in particular industries or
contexts, and therefore will be the focus of heightened attention. However, situations may change, so all human
rights should be the subject of periodic review.” This is particularly true when corporations operate in conflict
zones and may acquire obligations of a public character. “Moreover, in situations of armed conflict enterprises
should respect the standards of international humanitarian law.”).
338. Id. (“In this connection, United Nations instruments have elaborated further on the rights of
indigenous peoples; women; national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities; children; persons with
disabilities; and migrant workers and their families.”).
339. Id. at princ. 13(a).
340. Id. at princ. 13(b).
341. Id. at princ. 13 cmt.
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the draft, Draft Principle 12(b). Rather than focusing on either “supply chain”
343
or “value chain” concepts, the final version of Guiding Principle 13 focuses on
the consequences of activities and its relationship with the corporation by
344
focusing generally on activities, and on the construction of a structure for
determining mitigation obligations set forth in Guiding Principle 19.
Guiding Principle 14 (Draft Principles 12(c), 13, and 15, modified in part)
345
introduces a principle of proportionality to the calculus of responsibility. A
significant factor in addressing proportionality is the degree of connection
between the entity and the effect. That was the subject of Guiding Principle 13.
Guiding Principle 14 identifies two other factors. First, proportionality is based
partly on corporate capacity, which, in turn, is based on the usual indicators—
346
size, management structures, resources and the like. But there are limits;
balanced against capacity are considerations of the severity of the adverse human
rights impacts of corporate activity. The “severity” constraints then bring the
calculus back, in part, to the issue of connection. Yet, Guiding Principle 14 adds
a layer of understanding to the basic insight of Guiding Principle 13, embracing
the notion that legal relationships will not affect the determination of either
capacity or severity, applying to “all enterprises regardless of their size, sector,
347
operational context, ownership and structure.”
The Principle importantly, then, embraces a functionalist approach,
eschewing any effort to adhere strictly to the law or legal consequences of
corporate or enterprise organization at the heart of the domestic legal orders of
states that have chartered these enterprises. The corporate responsibility applies
“to all enterprises regardless of their size, sector, operational context, ownership
348
and structure.” The state’s duty, of course, is limited by the requirements of its
342. Draft Principle 12(b) provided that business responsibility to respect human rights: “[a]pplies
across a business enterprise’s activities and through its relationships with third parties associated with those
activities.” Id. The Commentary suggested the scope of the obligation was as broad as the corporate “value
chain.” Draft Principles, supra note 64, at princ. 12 cmt.
343. These ideas, however, do make their appearance elsewhere in the Commentary. See, e.g., Guiding
Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 17 cmt., discussed infra. The relationship between these concepts is difficult
to discern.
344. For the purpose of these Guiding Principles a business enterprise’s “activities” are
understood to include both actions and omissions; and its “business relationships” are
understood to include relationships with business partners, entities in its value chain,
and any other non-State or State entity directly linked to its business operations,
products or services.
Id. at princ.13 cmt.
345. Id. at princ. 14 cmt. (“The means through which a business enterprise meets its responsibility to
respect human rights will be proportional to, among other factors, its size.”).
346. Id. (“Small and medium-sized enterprises may have less capacity as well as more informal
processes and management structures than larger companies, so their respective policies and processes will take
on different forms.”).
347. Id. at princ. 14. These notions were originally in Draft Principle 15 but moved here. Draft
Principles, supra note 64, at 15.
348. Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 14.
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349

legal obligations, though it has an obligation toward legal coherence in light of
350
its legal obligations with respect to human rights. The provisions are thus in
tension unless one understands that the responsibility to respect operates
polycentrically. To the extent of the relationship between corporation and state,
the corporation is bound by and its responsibilities for human rights limited by
351
the legal framework within which it operates in any territory. However, as to
the extent of the responsibility among corporations and non-state parties in their
own governance communities, the legal framework of states is no longer a
constraint under the framework principles of Guiding Principle 11.
The coherence notions explicit in the relationships between a state and its
legal obligations are also suggested by this construct in the relationships between
legal systems and social norm systems. There is an element of direct interaction
between international norms and the identification of the social norm rules
applicable to corporations. This suggests an assumption in the Guiding Principles
of an implicit acceptance of international political consensus, reflected in
international norms, and accurately reflected in the norm framework for
corporate behavior. More importantly, it also assumes that international norms
(whether or not considered “law” within or by states) stand at the head of a
hierarchy of norm creation applicable to corporations. While the community of
corporate actors and their stakeholders may also develop social norms that
control or affect their behavior, the articulation of those norms by public
international actors tends to be presumed the most authoritative expression of
those norms. Thus, while the normative rule universe of corporate responsibility
is autonomous of state legal systems, it is assumed to interact directly with
international actors for the production (or at least the articulation) of the norms
making up the responsibility to respect. And third, there is an explicit
understanding that the standards applicable to conduct under legal governance
regimes may be different from those under the social norm regimes of corporate
responsibility. This is particularly apparent in the context of complicity. Here,
norm rule autonomy is emphasized by a recognition that complicity may be
triggered both under the legal standard developing under domestic and
international law regimes, and otherwise under notions of corporate social norm
352
frameworks.

349.
350.
351.
352.

Id.
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Id. at princ. 1(a).
Id. at princ. 3(b).
See id. at princ. 2.
Id. at princ. 17 cmt. It explains:
Questions of complicity may arise when a business enterprise contributes to, or is seen as
contributing to, adverse human rights impacts caused by other parties. Complicity has both
non-legal and legal meanings. As a non-legal matter, business enterprises may be perceived as
being “complicit” in the acts of another party where, for example, they are seen to benefit from
an abuse committed by that party.
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Guiding Principle 15 rounds out the opening set of fundamental principles
that define the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, moving the focus
from the standard itself to its expression. If states manifest their policies and
behavioral expectations through law and regulation, businesses express theirs
353
through rules, policies, and contract. Guiding Principle 15 addresses the
enterprise’s human rights responsibilities in the elaboration of its internal
governance system: “In order to meet their responsibility to respect human rights,
business enterprises should have in place policies and processes appropriate to
354
their size and circumstances.” Guiding Principle 15 then specifies three areas of
policy that require highlighting: an articulation of a policy commitment to human
rights (presumably both in its legal and social norm aspects, though that is not
355
clear from the principle itself), the self-imposition of a human rights due
diligence framework that is elaborated in some detail in Guiding Principles 16356
357
24), and the establishment of remediation processes.
2. The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: Operational
Principles, Policy Commitment
The Foundational Principles of the corporate responsibility to respect human
rights commit business entities to the development of a regulatory framework
that operationalizes the respect commitment. Guiding Principle 16 (Draft
Principle 14 substantially unmodified) focuses on the specifics of
implementation. It specifies the so-called policy commitments of corporations,
understood as built on the development of a policy statement with a fixed form
358
and content. It describes the five key elements of a corporate policy that
359
embodies the responsibility to respect human rights. These include policy
approval at the most senior level of the business enterprise; consultation with
relevant internal and external experts; a clear expression of the enterprise’s
expectations of personnel and business partners; effective communication of the
policy internally and externally to all personnel, business partners, and relevant
stakeholders; and incorporation within appropriate operational policies and

353. See id. at princ. 15 cmt.
354. Id.
355. Id. at princ. 15(a) (“A policy commitment to meet their responsibility to respect human rights.”).
356. Id. at princ. 15(b) (“A human rights due-diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate and account
for how they address their impacts on human rights.”); id. at princ. 15 cmt. (makes this clear: “Business
enterprises need to know and show that they respect human rights. They cannot do so unless they have certain
policies and processes in place. Principles 16 to 24 elaborate further on these.”).
357. Id. at princ. 15(c) (“Processes to enable the remediation of any adverse human rights impacts they
cause or to which they contribute.”).
358. Id. at princ. 16 (“As the basis for embedding their responsibility to respect human rights, business
enterprises should express their commitment . . . through a statement of policy.”).
359. Id. at princ. 16(a)-(e).
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360

procedures to embed it throughout the business enterprise. These are not
unusual and reflect an emerging set of practices already well incorporated in the
361
global operation of the largest enterprises. They are meant to embody, within
the context of the corporate responsibility to protect, the principles of policy
362
363
coherence and disclosure that also form part of the state duty to protect
human rights.
Like legislation, policy pronouncements “should be publicly available. It
should be communicated actively to entities with which the enterprise has
contractual relationships; others directly linked to its operations, which may
include State security forces; investors; and, in the case of operations with
364
significant human rights risks, to the potentially affected stakeholders.” The
365
Principle also suggests a proportionality standard. Lastly, like states, the policy
366
should reach from the lowest levels of operation to the highest.
3. The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: Operational
Principles, Human Rights Due Diligence
The articulation of the governance framework provides the structure for the
elaboration of the operational heart of the principles developing the corporate
responsibility in Guiding Principles 17 through 21.
A corporation’s commitment to human rights, grounded in the Guiding
Principles framework, is evidenced by and measured against a set of
367
requirements identified as human rights due diligence. These detail the
obligation of corporate human rights due diligence as the central operational
feature of the corporate responsibility to respect. Human rights due diligence has
four broad objectives: “to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they
368
address their adverse human rights impacts . . . .” Human rights due diligence
360. Id.
361. For a discussion in the context of the operations of Wal-Mart, see, Larry Catá Backer, Economic
Globalization and the Rise of Efficient Systems of Global Private Law Making: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator,
39 U. CONN. L. REV. 1739 (2007).
362. Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 16 cmt. (“Just as States should work towards policy
coherence, so business enterprises need to strive for coherence between their responsibility to respect human
rights and policies and procedures that govern their wider business activities and relationships.”).
363. Id. (“The term ‘statement’ is used generically, to describe whatever means an enterprise employs to
set out publicly its responsibilities, commitments, and expectations.”).
364. Id.
365. Id. (“The level of expertise required to ensure that the policy statement is adequately informed will
vary according to the complexity of the business enterprise’s operations.”).
366. Id. This imports the notion of embedding from the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework.
“Through these and any other appropriate means, the policy statement should be embedded from the top of the
business enterprise through all its functions, which otherwise may act without awareness or regard for human
rights.” Id.
367. Id. at princ. 17.
368. Id.
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must be directed to four principle functions: “assessing actual and potential
human rights impacts, integrating and acting upon the findings, tracking
369
responses, and communicating how impacts are addressed.” These objectives
of human rights due diligence may be incorporated in other corporate monitoring
370
and reporting systems, as long as they do not lose their distinctive character.
371
The diligence aspects should be ongoing and oriented ex ante.
The extent of human rights due diligence is grounded in the fundamental
scope rules of corporate responsibility as a whole. These limitations touch on
372
three issues. First is the issue of coverage. Second is a focus on issues of
373
complexity and context of operations. Third is the issue of time horizons in
374
human rights due diligence. It is in the context of coverage that the issue of
supply and value chain liability resurfaces, mitigating liability where the
connection between the corporation and the entity directly responsible are either
375
too remote or where a control or influence relationship is unreasonable. It also
serves to develop a principle of corporate complicity for the adverse human
376
rights impacts of others—including states. The Commentary emphasizes the
effects of polycentricity in the context of corporate liability. With respect to
complicity, corporations must be aware of the distinct bases for complicity
377
378
liability under legal regimes and under social norm regimes. There is irony

369. Id.
370. “Human rights due diligence can be included within broader enterprise risk-management systems,
provided that it goes beyond simply identifying and managing material risks to the company itself, to include
risks to rights-holders.” Id. at princ. 17 cmt.
371. Thus, the Commentary suggests that “due diligence should be initiated as early as possible in the
development of a new activity or relationship, given that human rights risks can be increased or mitigated
already at the stage of structuring contracts or other agreements, and may be inherited through mergers or
acquisitions.” Id.
372. Human Rights due diligence “[s]hould cover adverse human rights impacts that the business
enterprise may cause or contribute to through its own activities, or which may be directly linked to its
operations, products or services by its business relationships.” Id. at princ. 17(a).
373. Human rights due diligence “[w]ill vary in complexity with the size of the business enterprise, the
risk of severe human rights impacts, and the nature and context of its operations.” Id. at princ. 17(b).
374. Human rights due diligence “[s]hould be ongoing, recognizing that the human rights risks may
change over time as the business enterprise’s operations and operating context evolve.” Id. at princ. 17(c).
375. “Where business enterprises have large numbers of entities in their value chains it may be
unreasonably difficult to conduct due diligence for adverse human rights impacts across them all.” Id. at princ.
17 cmt. In those cases, corporations are advised to focus on issues with greatest human rights impacts effects,
including: “general areas where the risk of adverse human rights impacts is most significant, whether due to
certain suppliers’ or clients’ operating context, the particular operations, products or services involved, or other
relevant considerations, and prioritize these for human rights due diligence.” Id.
376. “Questions of complicity may arise when a business enterprise contributes to, or is seen as
contributing to, adverse human rights impacts caused by other parties.” Id. at princ. 17 cmt.
377. The Commentary states:
As a legal matter, most national jurisdictions prohibit complicity in the commission of a crime,
and a number allow for criminal liability of business enterprises in such cases. Typically, civil
actions can also be based on an enterprise’s alleged contribution to a harm, although these may
not be framed in human rights terms.
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here because the complicity relationship appears to proceed only in one
379
direction. Moreover, states’ retention of control over the application of their
legal obligations, including those relating to issues of complicity, can
substantially affect the success of efforts to harmonize approaches. In the absence
of harmonization of complicity principles among states, non-state actors can act
strategically to minimize the impact of these principles on their operations. The
connection between legal and social norm governance produces a tension for the
380
human rights due diligence project that is recognized but not resolved. This
tension is common to supra-national soft law systems with a polycentric element,
absent substantial harmonization between the legal regimes applied in a specific
state and the global social norms applied under soft law regimes. This was
381
382
recently illustrated in the context of both procedural and substantive rules
383
under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporations.
The specific contents of human rights due diligence are then elaborated in
Guiding Principles 18 through 21. These Principles are meant to provide more
concrete guidance to enterprises that wish to undertake human rights due
diligence within the Guiding Principles framework. Guiding Principle 18 (Draft
Principle 16 substantively unmodified in significant respect) specifies the outputs
of human rights due diligence by elaborating on issues of identification and
384
assessment in human rights due diligence programs. Following the guidance of
Guiding Principle 17, Guiding Principle 18 specifies that assessment: (1) be
undertaken in advance of action that might have a negative impact on human
rights; (2) should identify those potentially affected and the issues the proposed

Id. at princ. 17 cmt. The Commentary suggests a movement toward a consensus on “aiding and abetting”
standards for civil liability. Id.
378. “As a non-legal matter, business enterprises may be perceived as being ‘complicit’ in the acts of
another party where, for example, they are seen to benefit from an abuse committed by that party.” Id.
379. See discussion supra of Guiding Principles 4-6.
380. The Commentary explains:
Conducting appropriate human rights due diligence should help business enterprises address
the risk of legal claims against them by showing that they took every reasonable step to avoid
involvement with an alleged human rights abuse. However, business enterprises conducting
such due diligence should not assume that, by itself, this will automatically and fully absolve
them from liability for causing or contributing to human rights abuses.
Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 17 cmt.
381. See Larry Catá Backer, Part I: The OECD, Vedanta, and the Supreme Court of India—
Polycentricity in Transnational Governance—The Issue of Standing, LCBACKER BLOG (Nov. 1, 2009, 5:05
PM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2009/11/part-i-oecd-vedanta-and-supreme-court.html.
382. See Larry Catá Backer, Part II: The OECD, Vedanta, and the Indian Supreme Court—
Polycentricity in Transnational Corporate Governance and John Ruggie’s Protect/Respect Framework,
LCBACKER BLOG (Nov. 3, 2009, 2:54 PM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2009/11/part-ii-oecd-vedantaindian-supreme.html.
383. See OECD, supra note 24, at pt. I, ch. IV.
384. “In order to gauge human rights risks, business enterprises should identify and assess any actual or
potential adverse human rights impacts with which they may be involved either through their own activities or
as a result of their business relationships.” Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 18.
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action raises; (3) should identify the relevant substantive standards that might be
applied; and (4) undertake to understand the specific nature of the adverse human
385
rights impact. The Guiding Principles explain that such systems should utilize
internal or external human rights experts and other resources. Systems should
also seek to engage “with potentially affected groups and other relevant
386
stakeholders,” the latter with an explicit proportionality principle. Assessment
387
is required periodically and when there is a material change in operations. This
policy is similar to those triggering disclosure under the U.S. federal securities
388
laws. The stakeholder engagement provision in Guiding Principle 18 is broadly
written to permit the use of civil society actors as legitimate intermediaries where
direct engagement is not possible. But it leaves unresolved the issue of third party
representative legitimacy or liability by civil society for misrepresenting either
their authority to represent or their fidelity to the interests of those they
389
represent.
“The assessment of human rights impacts informs subsequent steps in the
390
human rights due diligence process.” Guiding Principles 19 through 21 then
move the process forward. Guiding Principle 19 (Draft Principle 17) shifts
attention from outputs to action, identifying the two things a corporation must
391
undertake in the face of an adverse human rights impact of its activities. First, a
392
corporation must assess the impact of the action, and it must then take
393
appropriate action on the basis of the assessment. The objective is to prevent
and mitigate potential adverse human rights effects of corporate activity by

385. Id. “In this process, business enterprises should pay special attention to any particular human rights
impacts on individuals from groups or populations that may be at heightened risk of vulnerability or
marginalization, and bear in mind the different risks that may be faced by women and men.” Id.
386. Id. at princ. 18(a)-(b).
387. The Commentary explains:
Because human rights situations are dynamic, assessments of human rights impacts should be
undertaken at regular intervals: prior to a new activity or relationship; prior to major decisions
or changes in the operation (e.g. market entry, product launch, policy change, or wider changes
to the business); in response to or anticipation of changes in the operating environment (e.g.
rising social tensions); and periodically throughout the life of an activity or relationship.
Id. at princ. 18 cmt.
388. The Guiding Principle disclosure requirements are less formal than those outlined in the United
States’ Securities Exchange Act of 1934 but follow the same periodic reporting rationale. United States
corporations report annually (Form 10-K), quarterly (Form 10-Q), and as needed if material events of
importance to investors and security holders warrant. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78M, O(d) (2006).
389. “In situations where such consultation is not possible, business enterprises should consider
reasonable alternatives such as consulting credible, independent expert resources, including human rights
defenders and others from civil society.” Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 18 cmt.
390. Id.
391. “In order to prevent and mitigate adverse human rights impacts, business enterprises should
integrate the findings from their impact assessments across relevant internal functions and processes, and take
appropriate action.” Id. at princ. 19.
392. Id. at princ. 19(a).
393. Id. at princ. 19(b).
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394

creating a structure by which assessments can be given effect. The Principle
makes a distinction between impacts to which the company (or its supply chain)
have directly contributed and those where the connection is more indirect.
395
Remediation (or prevention) is required for the former, but a more nuanced
396
approach is permitted for the latter. The Commentary suggests that the
corporation ought to rely on outsiders where the factors to be balanced in its risk,
397
impact, and action assessments are complex. A hierarchy of responsive action
in the face of assessment suggests adverse human rights impacts of corporate
398
activity proposed or undertaken.
Guiding Principle 20 (Draft Principle 18 modified in part) adds a verification
399
requirement. The specified method of verification is tracking, which is required
to exhibit two characteristics. First, it ought to “[b]e based on appropriate
400
qualitative and quantitative indicators.” Second, it should “[d]raw on feedback
401
from both internal and external sources, including affected stakeholders.”
Principle 20 dropped an additional requirement that appeared in the draft
402
version—that it “[i]nform and support continuous improvement processes.”
The Principles understand verification as serving an important surveillance
394. The Commentary states:
The horizontal integration across the business enterprise of specific findings from assessing
human rights impacts can only be effective if its human rights policy commitment has been
embedded into all relevant business functions. This is required to ensure that the assessment
findings are properly understood, given due weight, and acted upon.
Id. at princ. 19 cmt.
395. “Where a business enterprise contributes or may contribute to an adverse human rights impact, it
should take the necessary steps to cease or prevent its contribution and use its leverage to mitigate any
remaining impact to the greatest extent possible.” Id. at princ. 19 cmt.
396. The Commentary suggests a more complex calculus, grounded by balancing “the enterprise’s
leverage over the entity concerned, how crucial the relationship is to the enterprise, the severity of the abuse,
and whether terminating the relationship with the entity itself would have adverse human rights consequences.”
Id. at princ. 19 cmt. The standard does not require legal precision because no legal standard is invoked. Thus,
concepts of “leverage” play into the calculus in ways that might not have been appropriate, either under the first
pillar state duty to protect or with respect to the extent of the corporate responsibility beyond the corporation
itself. Id. (“Leverage is considered to exist where the enterprise has the ability to effect change in the wrongful
practices of an entity that causes a harm.”).
397. “The more complex the situation and its implications for human rights, the stronger is the case for
the enterprise to draw on independent expert advice in deciding how to respond.” Id.
398. The Commentary speaks of these as involving the use of leverage—in an effort to contrast,
perhaps, the law based discourse of ameliorative measured imposed on, by, and through states. It is a curious
framework all the same. Irrespective of its value as a framing device, the hierarchy consists of prevention first,
then mitigation (which might be augmented by obligations to capacity building among stakeholders), followed
by terminating the relationship or activity causing the adverse human rights impact, “taking into account
credible assessments of potential adverse human rights impacts of doing so.” Id. Relationships crucial to the
enterprise are subject to a different set of factor balancing, focused on the severity of the abuse. See id.
399. “In order to verify whether adverse human rights impacts are being addressed, business enterprises
should track the effectiveness of their response.” Id. at princ. 20.
400. Id. at princ. 20(a).
401. Id. at princ. 20(b).
402. Draft Principles, supra note 64, at princ. 18(c).
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403

function—tracking and analysis. There is an expectation that data will be
harvested from all phases of the human rights due diligence process and all
404
contacts with affected stakeholders. The Commentary urges integration into
relevant reporting processes with a cross-reference to the corporation’s
405
remediation obligations.
The surveillance obligations of human rights due diligence elaborated in
Guiding Principle 20 lead to the disclosure and transparency requirements set
forth in Guiding Principle 21 (modifying Draft Principle 19). This provision
406
focuses on accountability through communication. That communication is
initially directed toward external, informal, and episodic communication when
triggered by stakeholder concerns, but is also understood to include a formal
reporting component for business enterprises “whose operations or operating
407
contexts pose risks of severe human rights impacts . . . .”
The final version of Principle 21 dropped an earlier suggestion that reporting
408
409
should be regular, substituting a more flexible, context-based requirement.
The frequency and form of disclosure is a function of the severity of the human
410
rights impacts. The object is not general transparency, but rather merely “a

403. “Tracking is necessary in order for a business enterprise to know if its human rights policies are
being implemented optimally, whether it has responded effectively to the identified human rights impacts, and
to drive continuous improvement.” Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 20 cmt. The tracking element is
particularly important with respect to groups most likely to suffer adverse human rights impacts from corporate
activity. “Business enterprises should make particular efforts to track the effectiveness of their responses to
impacts on individuals from groups or populations that may be at heightened risk of vulnerability or
marginalization.” Id. at princ. 18 cmt.
404. The Commentary explains:
Business enterprises might employ tools they already use in relation to other issues. This could
include performance contracts and reviews as well as surveys and audits, using gender
disaggregated data where relevant. Operational-level grievance mechanisms can also provide
important feedback on the effectiveness of the business enterprise’s human rights due diligence
from those directly affected.
Id. at princ. 20 cmt.
405. Id. This suggestion, of course, must be read together with the earlier caution in the Guiding
Principles about subsuming human rights due diligence within the risk management protocols of a business
entity. See, e.g., id. at princ. 17 cmt.
406. “Communication can take a variety of forms, including in-person meetings, online dialogues,
consultation with affected stakeholders, and formal public reports. Formal reporting is itself evolving, from
traditional annual reports and corporate responsibility/sustainability reports, to include on-line updates and
integrated financial and non-financial reports.” Id. at princ. 21 cmt.
407. Id. at princ. 21.
408. “Periodic public reporting is expected of those business enterprises whose activities pose
significant risks to human rights . . . .” Draft Principles, supra note 64, at princ. 19 cmt.
409. Reporting should “[b]e of a form and frequency that reflect an enterprise’s human rights impacts
and that are accessible to its intended audiences.” Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 21(a).
410. “Formal reporting by enterprises is expected where risks of severe human rights impacts exist,
whether this is due to the nature of the business operations or operating contexts.” Id. at princ. 21 cmt.
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measure of transparency and accountability to individuals or groups who may be
411
impacted and to other relevant stakeholders, including investors.”
4. The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: Operational
Principles, Remediation
The single principle that comprises this section considers the situation where
assessment and ex ante action is insufficient. Guiding Principle 22 (Draft
Principle 20 substantially unmodified) provides: “Where business enterprises
identify that they have caused or contributed to adverse impacts, they should
412
provide for or cooperate in their remediation through legitimate processes.”
This Principle articulates a simple liability standard for failures to respect
human rights. The obligation to remediate is tied to the principal human rights
413
due diligence obligation, though not limited by it. In the draft version of this
provision, the liability standard was not grounded in the law of any state. Nor
was it dependent on the operation of a particular domestic legal order, either to
414
determine liability or to calculate the measure of damages. As a functional part
of the autonomous responsibility to respect, these obligations flow directly from
the autonomous imposition of responsibility of the second pillar. Yet, the
processes of remediation are substantially meant to be tethered to the state
415
apparatus, at least when injury is substantial. The reason for this was simple
and directly stated—a fear that in the absence of “vouching” by the organs of the
416
state, the processes for remediation would be illegitimate.
The final version of Principle 22 appears to be less autonomous. The
Commentary describes the standard as “active engagement,” which might be
understood as something less than the “help ensure” standard in the draft
Commentary. The reference to resort to operational level grievances remains the
417
same.

411. Id.
412. Id. at princ. 22. “Some situations, in particular where crimes are alleged, typically will require
cooperation with judicial mechanisms.” Id. at princ. 22 cmt.
413. “Where a business enterprise identifies such a situation, whether through its human rights due
diligence process or other means, its responsibility to respect human rights requires active engagement in
remediation, by itself or in cooperation with other actors.” Id.
414. See Draft Principles, supra note 64, at princ. 20 cmt.
415. “Business enterprises should have procedures in place to respond to such situations directly, where
appropriate, and where possible should address problems before they escalate.” Id.
416. That vouching is effected through the third pillar principles covering the remedial right to be
treated below. “Operational-level grievance mechanisms for those potentially impacted by the business
enterprise’s activities can be an effective means of providing for such procedures when they meet certain core
criteria, as set out in Principle 29.” Id.
417. “Operational-level grievance mechanisms for those potentially impacted by the business
enterprise’s activities can be one effective means of enabling remediation when they meet certain core criteria,
as set out in Principle 31.” Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 22 cmt.
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Yet,
[w]here adverse impacts have occurred that the business enterprise has
not caused or contributed to, but which are directly linked to its
operations, products or services by a business relationship, the
responsibility to respect human rights does not require that the enterprise
418
itself provide for remediation, though it may take a role in doing so.
This values (or supply chain remediation amelioration) provision would have
been hard to reconcile with the Draft Principles’ emphasis on supply chain
responsibility. But having moved supply and value chain responsibility into the
operational provisions and having strengthened and broadened the application of
the proportionality rules, it is now more likely that a larger set of human rights
impacts may not be subject to a remediation requirement in the ultimate parent
corporation.
5. The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: Operational
Principles, Issues of Context
The last two principles that make up the corporate responsibility to respect
human rights target issues of context. Guiding Principle 23 (modifying Draft
Principle 23) speaks to the legal obligations of the corporation within a
polycentric context in which the governance norms applicable to it may not
harmonize. It first recognizes the primacy of the state and domestic law over
international law where a corporation is faced with conflicting issues of
419
compliance. It then suggests that, having honored the primacy of domestic law,
corporations have a responsibility to honor—even if not obligated to comply
420
with—internationally recognized human rights. The standard tracks the
concepts and principles approach of the OECD’s Guidelines for Multinationals
421
that was constructed to the same effect. And lastly, corporations must treat all
risk of gross human rights abuses, whether arising from legal or social norm
422
standards, as a legal issue throughout their operations.

418. Id.
419. Business entities should “[c]omply with all applicable laws and respect internationally recognized
human rights, wherever they operate.” Id. at princ. 23(a).
420. The language is curious; business enterprises should “seek ways to honour the principles of
internationally recognized human rights when faced with conflicting requirements.” Id. at princ. 23(b).
421. See OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011), Concepts and Principles, para. 2. This
provisions starts, like the GP, with an overarching obligation to obey the state of the state in which the entity is
operating. “However, in countries where domestic laws and regulations conflict with the principles and
standards of the Guidelines, enterprises should seek ways to honour such principles and standards to the fullest
extent which does not place them in violation of domestic law.” Id.
422. Business enterprises should “[t]reat the risk of causing or contributing to gross human rights abuses
as a legal compliance issue wherever they operate.” Id. at princ. 23(c).
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The Commentary emphasizes several points. First, all business enterprises
have the same responsibility to respect human rights, though application will
vary widely in context. All businesses first have a duty to comply with domestic
law that is applicable. That leaves open and unresolved the equally compelling
obligation to comply with the extraterritorially applicable laws of home state
regulators. The Commentary is silent on conflicts between the two. In the case of
conflict between domestic and international law, business enterprises must
comply with domestic law and find a way to honor the principles of international
law, especially “the principles of internationally recognized human rights to the
greatest extent possible in the circumstances, and to be able to demonstrate their
423
efforts in this regard.” The Commentary supports the proposition that business
enterprises treat human rights impacts as legal issues, “given the expanding web
of potential corporate legal liability arising from extraterritorial civil claims, and
from the incorporation of the provisions of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court in jurisdictions that provide for corporate criminal
424
responsibility.” Yet this also complicates the simple hierarchy posed between
domestic and international law set out in Guiding Principle 23(a), suggesting
situations where compliance with domestic law might constitute a violation of
international law that is subordinated to domestic law in the territory where it is
enforced, but where that hierarchy is reversed elsewhere. In this case,
polycentricity presents a potential trap. Special considerations apply in conflict
zones—where the corporation may be called on to exercise augmented
425
obligations and thus face potentially augmented liability regimes. Finally, the
utility of reliance on experts, emphasized in other corporate responsibility
426
principles, is extended to issues of legal compliance.
In draft form, this principle spoke to issues of operationalization standards
for the human rights due diligence framework grounded in two action vectors—
427
first the size of the enterprise, and second, the severity of human rights impacts.
These identify baseline rules for the implementation of context-specific action
principles. The baseline includes four factors. The first touches on the heightened
obligation to substitute for the host state with respect to the observation of

423. Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 23 cmt.
424. Id. “In addition, corporate directors, officers and employees may be subject to individual liability
for acts that amount to gross human rights abuses.” Id.
425. “Some operating environments, such as conflict-affected areas, may increase the risks of
enterprises being complicit in gross human rights abuses committed by other actors (security forces, for
example).” Id.
426. “In assessing how best to respond, they will often be well advised to draw on not only expertise and
cross-functional consultation within the enterprise, but also to consult externally with credible, independent
experts, including from governments, civil society, national human rights institutions and relevant multistakeholder initiatives.” Id.
427. “[T]he scale and complexity of policies and processes for ensuring that business enterprises respect
human rights will vary according to the enterprises’ size and the severity of their human rights impacts . . . .”
Draft Principles, supra note 64, at princ. 21.
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internationally recognized human rights in weak states. This parallels the state
429
duty to project government into weak states or conflict zones. The second
obligates companies to “honor” human rights principles “where domestic legal
430
compliance may undermine their responsibility to respect.” The third reminds
431
entities that the responsibility applies in conflict zones. And the fourth suggests
that issues of human rights compliance are transformed into more conventional
issues of legal compliance (under international law or the law of the relevant
domestic legal order) where the conduct risks, causes, or contributes to
432
international crimes.
Finally, Guiding Principle 24 (Draft Principle 22) provides basic rules of
prioritization. Where priority is necessary, the “business enterprises should first
seek to prevent and mitigate those that are most severe or where delayed
433
response would make them irremediable.” The context for prioritization is
434
simultaneity, but it applies only where specific legal guidance is unavailable, or
435
better perhaps, unavailing. And context is privileged; the severity of human
436
rights is not measured against absolute values.
Taken together, the corporate responsibility to respect principles drafts a
more complex and dynamic governance framework that accepts a subordination
to the law-state system described in the first ten principles, but which also

428. Id. at princ. 21(a). “Observe internationally recognized human rights also where national law is
weak, absent or not enforced.” Id.
429. See Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 10; see also discussion supra Part III.B.
430. Draft Principles, supra note 64, at princ. 21(b). The Commentary notes: “Where legal compliance
with domestic law puts the business enterprise in the position of potentially being involved in gross abuses such
as international crimes, it should consider whether or how it can continue to operate with integrity in such
circumstances.” Id. at princ. 21 cmt.
431. Id. at para. 21(c). The Commentary reminds entities of their potential exposure to action under
international criminal law in such situations where they are not careful.
Some operating environments, such as conflict affected areas, may increase the risks of
enterprises contributing to, or being complicit in, international crimes committed by other
actors (for example, war crimes by security forces). Prudence suggests that companies should
treat this risk as a legal compliance issue, given the expanding web of potential corporate legal
liability arising from extraterritorial civil claims, and in the criminal sphere from the
incorporation of the provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in
jurisdictions that provide for corporate criminal responsibility.
Id. at princ. 21 cmt.
432. Id. at princ. 21(d). The Commentary suggests consultation with experts, and defines them broadly
to include civil society actors. Id. at princ. 21 cmt.
433. Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 24.
434. “While business enterprises should address all their adverse human rights impacts, it may not
always be possible to address them simultaneously.” Id. at princ. 24 cmt.
435. “In the absence of specific legal guidance, if prioritization is necessary business enterprises should
begin with those human rights impacts that would be most severe, recognizing that a delayed response may
affect remediability.” Id. The Draft version included impacts “where the risk of irremediable impact is high.”
Draft Principles, supra note 64, at princ. 22 cmt.
436. “Severity is not an absolute concept in this context, but is relative to the other human rights impacts
the business enterprise has identified.” Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 24 cmt.
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suggests the outline of an autonomous governance framework beyond that, tied
to the development of international (rather than national) norms. But such a
framework requires structure, and the corporate responsibility to respect
principles seeks to sketch one out—based on governance through the
construction of policy systems and implementation through the human rights due
diligence device. Nonetheless, both the state duty and the corporate responsibility
require systems of resolving disputes and remediating adverse human rights
effects for which they are responsible. It is to the construction of these systems
that the final provisions of the Guiding Principles turn.
D. Access to Remedy Principles
1. Access to Remedy: Foundational Principles
The Guiding Principles describing the remedial obligations of states and
437
corporations present the most potentially dynamic element of the Guiding
Principles framework. Yet, one must look carefully to extract that dynamic
element from within the formal framing of remedial principles within the state
and its dispute resolution apparatus. Reflecting the fundamental postulate of the
primacy of states within the construct, the remedial prong of the “Protect,
Respect and Remedy” Framework tends to filter substantially all remedial
mechanics through the state, relegating alternative disputes mechanics to a
subsidiary or residual space. Though corporations are accorded a limited role for
438
remedial programs, the subordination of those programs to the remedial power
of states remains quite evident. Under this framework, states remain the
paramount legitimating source and force for resolving disputes, settling claims
and determining rights. Corporations may mediate harm, and may anticipate and
remediate problems before they rise to the level of justiciable injury, but their
role is clearly secondary. The effect on the ability of corporations, along with
other non-state actors, to develop social norm-based remediation structures is
thereby marginalized and diminished. So, perhaps, is the structural integrity of
the remedial pillar as an autonomous foundation for the governance of the
adverse human rights effects of state or corporate action.
The hierarchy producing tone of the remedial pillar is set quite clearly in
Guiding Principle 25 (Draft Principle 23 substantively unmodified). States (but
not corporations or other entities with duties or responsibilities under the Guiding
Principles) are charged with the obligation to “take appropriate steps” to ensure

437. See id. at princ. 25-31; see also Draft Principles, supra note 64, at princ. 23-29.
438. See Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 28-30; see also Draft Principles, supra note 64, at
princ. 26-28. All of which are closely tied to the foundational principle embracing the idea of the supremacy of
the state and its domestic legal orders as the primary site of dispute resolution for human rights claims. See
Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 25; see also Draft Principles, supra note 64, at princ. 20.
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access to effective remedy by those affected by business related human rights
439
abuses. The obligation to take such steps is triggered when abuses occur within
their territories or—in a nod to the extraterritoriality provisions that occur
440
throughout the Guiding Principles—within their jurisdiction. Appropriate steps
may be effectuated through “judicial, administrative, legislative or other
441
appropriate means.”
The Commentary elaborates the key points. The central focus is on the
intimate and direct connection between the duty of states to protect (Guiding
442
Principles 1 through 10) and the remedial principles of this section. It follows
conventional Western thinking by dividing the remedial provision into two
443
parts—a procedural and a substantive element. But the procedural and the
substantive elements produce a potential tension with the fundamental
proposition—that the remedial element is a core obligation encompassed within
the domestic legal orders of states and the more innovative intimations of the
Guiding Principles that suggest a conflation between the rule frameworks of the
domestic legal order and international hard and soft law approaches. The
objective is clear and laudable—to space as large a space as possible for the
development of transnational systems of procedural and substantive remedies—
but the form produces a conflation of irreconcilable systems (at least at a formal
law based level) that diminishes the system-forming value of this part of the
Guiding Principles. The confusion suggests a disjunction between the statefavoring thrust of the Principle and the more flexible and broad grievanceresolving structure of the Commentary.
Consider, for example, the procedural element. The overarching structure is
conventional enough—“Procedures for the provision of remedy should be
impartial, protected from corruption and free from political or other attempts to
444
influence the outcome.” This is consonant with the black letter of the principle,
elaborating a formal state-based process structure. But further generalized as
“grievance mechanisms,” the procedural element of access to remedy grounded
445
in the obligations of states takes a curious turn. First, it turns the focus of the
principle from the State (a limiting condition of the black letter of GP Principle
446
25) to corporations and other non-state actors. Second, it contemplates
439. Guiding Principles, supra note 64, at princ. 25.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. “Unless States take appropriate steps to investigate, punish and redress business-related human
rights abuses when they do occur, the State duty to protect can be rendered weak or even meaningless.” Id. at
princ. 25 cmt.
443. “Access to effective remedy has both procedural and substantive aspects.” Id.
444. Id.
445. Recall, for these purposes, the overarching general principle that must be read into Guiding
Principle 25 and its Commentary: “States’ existing obligations to respect, protect and fulfil [sic] human rights
and fundamental freedoms . . . .” Id. at 6.
446. “The term grievance mechanism is used to indicate any routinized, State-based or non-State-based,
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447

administration by a host of organs and use of a variety of methods, some of
which may not be legitimate within the particular domestic legal order of a state
448
(or at a minimum strictly restricted in jurisdiction), or be accorded no legal
449
effect within the domestic legal orders of states.
The substantive element discussion in the Commentary also elaborates this
450
curious tension. It prescribes a flexible range of remedies that, again, may
451
include choices unavailable under the laws of a state to which the duty applies.
More broadly, the definition of grievance, while in line with a foundational
remedial approach that recognizes the autonomy and legitimacy of both lawbased and social norm grievance mechanisms, spills out far beyond the limits
inherent in both the General Principles and the state-based structure of the black
452
letter of Guiding Principle 25 itself.
judicial or non-judicial process through which grievances concerning business-related human rights abuse can
be raised and remedy can be sought.” Id. at princ. 25 cmt.
447.
State-based grievance mechanisms may be administered by a branch or agency of the
State, or by an independent body on a statutory or constitutional basis. They may be
judicial or non-judicial . . . Examples include the courts, . . . labour tribunals,
[n]ational [h]uman [r]ights institutions, National Contact Points under the [OECD]
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, many ombudsperson offices, and
[g]overnment-run complaints offices.
Id.
448. In the United States, for example, the resort to indigenous courts and court systems is both highly
restricted and highly politicized. It has spawned a cottage industry of lawyers and policy activists on both sides
of the issue of the extent and power of Indian Court systems. See, e.g., Steven J. Gunn, Contemporary and
Comparative Perspectives on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 19 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 155, 161 (2005);
Ralph W. Johnson, Fragile Gains: Two Centuries of Canadian and United States Policy Toward Indians, 66
WASH. L. REV. 643, 644 (1991); Laurie Reynolds, Adjudication in Indian Country: The Confusing Parameters
of State, Federal, and Tribal Jurisdiction, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 539 (1997); Alex Tallchief Skibine, The
Dialogic of Federalism in Federal Indian Law and the Rehnquist Court: The Need for Coherence and
Integration, 8 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 1 (2003).
449. The reference to the National Contact Points under the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development provides a case in point. See, e.g., Backer, supra
note 25, at 258-307. The Commentary does acknowledge the limiting effects of reliance of State law-systems as
the foundation of remedial rights: “State-based grievance mechanisms may be administered by a branch or
agency of the State, or by an independent body on a statutory or constitutional basis.” Guiding Principles, supra
note 41, at princ. 25 cmt. But it then conflates what many domestic legal orders deploy separately—remedial
systems and soft law systems in which neither jurisdiction nor remedial authority is mandated.
450.
The remedies provided by the grievance mechanisms discussed in this section may
take a range of substantive forms the aim of which, generally speaking, will be to
counteract or make good any human rights harms that have occurred. Remedy may
include apologies, restitution, rehabilitation, financial or non-financial compensation
and punitive sanctions (whether criminal or administrative, such as fines), as well as
the prevention of harm through, for example, injunctions or guarantees of nonrepetition.
Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 25 cmt.
451. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Indigenous Law and Global Constraints: Bolivia, Decolonization of
Law, Constitutionalism and Human Rights, LCBACKERBLOG (June 27, 2010, 9:04 PM), http://l
cbackerblog.blogspot.com/2010/06/indigenous-law-and-global-constraints.html.
452. “For the purpose of these Guiding Principles, a grievance is understood to be a perceived injustice
evoking an individual’s or a group’s sense of entitlement, which may be based on law, contract, explicit or
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Of course, the Commentary to Principle 25 may be read, in this respect, as
purely descriptive, rather than proscriptive. One can then understand the
Commentary as merely describing the potential ranges of process and substantive
approaches, rather than prescribing the implementation of the full range of
processes and remedies described—the actual availability of any of the
suggestions remaining dependent on the domestic legal order of the state in
which the remedy is sought (or is available). But there is a sense that a
proscriptive approach is favored. Thus, for example, the Commentary presumes
453
the possibility of positive obligations with respect to remedies.
This proscriptive sense is deepened by a further oddity about Guiding
Principle 25. Having devoted a substantial amount of effort to constructing a
state-based remedial framework with perhaps a hint of supra-national bases for
the outer bounds of remedial authority, the Commentary then hints that the
system itself is part of a larger polycentric system of remediation in which the
state plays a role, but not necessarily the only role. While non-state based
remedies are nowhere to be found in the black letter of the principle itself, the
Commentary provides that “State-based judicial and non-judicial grievance
454
mechanisms should form the foundation of a wider system of remedy.” This
tension between what appears to be the privileging of the state in the remedial
pillar, with a nod toward non-state remedial regimes popping up at the margins,
provides a disconcerting dissonance in the exposition of the remedial power,
which is then mirrored in the development of the remaining principles of access
455
to remedy, meant to operationalize this foundational principle.
2. Access to Remedy: Operational Principles—State-Based Judicial
Mechanisms
Having laid the foundation in Guiding Principle 25, Guiding Principles 26
and 27 flesh out the parameters of state-based remedies, including the paramount
state obligation to oversee non-judicial remedial systems. Guiding Principle 26
(Draft Principle 24) considers state-based judicial remedies. It describes a
principle of effectiveness: “States should take appropriate steps to ensure the
456
effectiveness of domestic judicial mechanisms . . .” Effectiveness is measured
implicit promises, customary practice, or general notions of fairness of aggrieved communities.” Guiding
Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 25 cmt.
453. “Ensuring access to remedy for business-related human rights abuses requires also that States
facilitate public awareness and understanding of these mechanisms, how they can be accessed, and any support
(financial or expert) for doing so.” Id.
454. Id. “Within such a system, operational-level grievance mechanisms can provide early-stage
recourse and resolution. State-based and operational-level mechanisms, in turn, can be supplemented or
enhanced by the remedial functions of collaborative initiatives as well as those of international and regional
human rights mechanisms.” Id.
455. “Further guidance with regard to these mechanisms is provided in Guiding Principles 26 to 31.” Id.
456. Id. at princ. 26.
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in terms of reductions of barriers of access to remedy before the judicial organs
457
of a state. The Commentary emphasizes the centrality of the judicial functions
of states as the core of the access to remedy principles of the Guiding Principles
because these institutions are legitimating, effective, and, when they work well,
458
impartial. The Commentary then focuses on the obligations of states to protect
the legitimacy of the court system to render effective and impartial justice. In
459
particular, the judicial system should avoid erecting barriers to access to justice.
460
States should also guard against corruption. The Commentary also suggests the
461
hortatory element of the principle. These barriers also speak to the tension
between the principle fully applied, and the constraints of the domestic legal
462
orders of powerful, and powerfully influential, states.
The suggestions for legal and policy changes identified in the Commentary
are neither extraordinary nor unreasonable as matters of policy. They might be
understood as grounded in the legal and policy dimensions of the fundamental
463
obligations of the state in the context of their duty to protect. Because the
Guiding Principles place their greatest reliance on state-based, and especially
judicial, remedial organs, individuals affected by human rights abuses have a
smaller range of legitimate alternatives where states fail in their duty or remain
indifferent to the barriers identified in the Commentary. Worse, states can avoid
addressing these barriers by reference to the constraints of their constitutional
orders or the limitations of law or custom in accordance with the framework
Guiding Principles. Thus, while the Commentary suggests that Guiding Principle
26’s obligation is to provide effective domestic judicial mechanisms, it is not
clear that the principle incorporates a positive obligation—resident only in the

457. Id. (“considering ways to reduce legal, practical and other relevant barriers that could lead to a
denial of access to remedy”).
458. “Effective judicial mechanisms are at the core of ensuring access to remedy. Their ability to
address business-related human rights abuses depends on their impartiality, integrity and ability to accord due
process.” Id. at para. 26 cmt.
459. “States should ensure that they do not erect barriers to prevent legitimate cases from being brought
before the courts in situations where judicial recourse is an essential part of accessing remedy or alternative
sources of effective remedy are unavailable.” Id.
460. “They should also ensure that the provision of justice is not prevented by corruption of the judicial
process, that courts are independent of economic or political pressures from other State agents and from
business actors, and that the legitimate and peaceful activities of human rights defenders are not obstructed.” Id.
461. The Commentary speaks of legal and practical barriers, as well as barriers grounded in the
marginalizing of vulnerable groups, listing a number of specific forms of barriers to be avoided. Id.
462. This is particularly true, for example, with respect to the United States. Compare Medellín v.
Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (international obligations of the United States are not binding as a part of the U.S.
domestic legal order unless the treaty is self-executing or Congress has transposed the obligations; the decisions
of the International Court of Justice are not binding within the United States even if they bind the government
of the United States), with Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12
(March 31) (imprisoned Mexican nationals were entitled to review and reconsideration of their convictions and
sentences because the State of Texas violated the obligations of the United States under a Treaty to which it was
bound).
463. See Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 1-10; see also discussion supra Part IV.B.
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Commentary—to also reform judicial mechanisms to reduce barriers to access
grounded in the seven examples provided in the Commentary. The obligation to
reduce the barriers identified in Guiding Principle 26’s Commentary might have
more authority if it was deemed to reflect an expression of the legal obligations
of states under international law—the touchstone for state duty under the Guiding
Principles. It is possible to read an effectiveness principle into the human rights
obligations states are under a duty to protect, but to the extent that a state might
take the position that this amounts to the creation of new international law
obligations, it is unlikely that such obligations can be sourced in the Commentary
464
to Guiding Principle 26. There is a tension here, though, because the
fundamental principles of the access to remedy provisions speak, in the
Commentary, to the embeddedness of judicial mechanisms in a wider system of
465
remedy. Yet, within the context of the Guiding Principles, this can mean
nothing more than that; beyond judicial mechanisms, there are additional means
of grievance settlement that may be available beyond the purview of the state.
And thus one returns to the starting point—the hortatory nature of much of the
Commentary. Though hortatory instruments have played an enormously
important role in the development of international norms, they are more likely to
affect the approaches of business enterprises toward dispute resolution
mechanisms than states. Yet states, and not business corporations, are the object
of this provision. What remains then, is an elaboration of the best policy practices
that might prove useful to non-governmental organizations working toward legal
reform within a state.
3. Access to Remedy: Operational Principles—State Based Non-Judicial
Mechanisms
Though the bedrock of the remedial right is state-based judicial remedy,
Guiding Principle 27 recognizes that non-judicial state-based remedies “play an
466
essential role in complementing and supplementing judicial mechanisms.”
Guiding Principle 27 provides that “States should provide effective and
appropriate non-judicial grievance mechanisms, alongside judicial mechanisms,
as part of a comprehensive State-based system for the remedy of business-related
467
human rights abuse.” The role of non-judicial state-based remedies is
principally that of gap fillers, both in terms of the availability of remedy and to
468
make appropriate accommodation for the idiosyncrasies of culture. The
464. See supra notes 212-18 and accompanying text (Guiding Principles themselves are limited by a
commitment to avoid extending or creating international law.).
465. Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 27 cmt.
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Id. “Gaps in the provision of remedy for business-related human rights abuses could be filled,
where appropriate, by expanding the mandates of existing non-judicial mechanisms and/or by adding new

145

[6] BACKER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

9/10/2012 2:58 PM

2012 / From Institutional Misalignments to Socially Sustainable Governance
Commentary suggests a broad selection of mechanisms, many of which might be
compatible with the rules of the domestic legal orders of several states but all of
469
which are unlikely to be available in any one state. The effectiveness of nonjudicial, state-based mechanisms is the subject of its own principle, and is more
elaborately constructed than the effectiveness criteria of state-based judicial
470
remedies. The issue of imbalances between parties, which tend to be avoided in
471
the legal systems of states, is also discussed in the Commentary.
4. Access to Remedy: Operational Principles—Non-State Based Grievance
Mechanisms
Finally, Guiding Principles 28 through 30 turn from the state and its
organization of remediation mechanisms, to non-state based grievance
mechanisms. It is important to remember that, while these principles might have
been considered autonomous of state systems and grounded in the social norms
that are the foundation of the non-state governance norms of corporations
highlighted in the corporate responsibility to respect provisions (as crafted in the
access to remedy provision), it becomes clear that these mechanisms occupy a
472
dependent and secondary role. Guiding Principle 28 (Draft Principle 26
substantially unmodified) makes it clear that the state duty to protect human
rights in its remedial role extends to the oversight of non-state based grievance
mechanisms. “States should consider ways to facilitate access to effective nonstate based grievance mechanisms dealing with business-related human rights
473
harms.” The Commentary provides a listing of appropriate forms of such
grievance mechanisms. One category includes mechanisms originating or
474
controlled by the business entity at the center of the human rights harms. The
other includes mechanisms available through international organizations and
475
other public non-state actors.
mechanisms.” Id.
469. See id. “These may be mediation-based, adjudicative or follow other culturally-appropriate and
rights-compatible processes—or involve some combination of these—depending on the issues concerned, any
public interest involved, and the potential needs of the parties.” Id.
470. Id.
471. Id. “As with judicial mechanisms, States should consider ways to address any imbalances between
the parties to business-related human rights claims and any additional barriers to access faced by individuals
from groups or populations at heightened risk of vulnerability or marginalization.” Id.
472. See generally id. at princ. 29 cmt. “Operational-level grievance mechanisms can be important
complements to wider stakeholder engagement and collective bargaining processes, but cannot substitute for
either. They should not be used to undermine the role of legitimate trade unions in addressing labour-related
disputes, nor to preclude access to judicial or other non-judicial grievance mechanisms.” Id.
473. Id. at princ. 28.
474. Id. at princ. 28 cmt. “One category of non-State-based grievance mechanisms encompasses those
administered by a business enterprise alone or with stakeholders, by an industry association or a multistakeholder group.” Id.
475. Id. “Another category comprises regional and international human rights bodies.” Id.
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It is here for the first time that the Commentary confronts one of the largest
lacuna of the principles—the absence of remedial mechanisms for the human
rights harms of state actions, especially by failures to comply with the state duty
to protect. Regional and international human rights bodies “have dealt most often
with alleged violations by States of their obligations to respect human rights.
However, some have also dealt with the failure of a State to meet its duty to
476
protect against human rights abuse by business enterprises.” While the oblique
references to the necessity of moving beyond mechanisms that manage corporate
compliance to those that also manage state compliance under the principles, this
off-handed reminder might be insufficient to be effective. Moreover, the
construction of the Guiding Principles framework itself appears to reject the
notion that enforcement against states is an object of the framework.
The two Guiding Principles that follow turn to the obligations of companies
in the construction and operation of non-state-based, non-judicial mechanisms.
Guiding Principle 29 (Draft Principle 27 substantially unmodified) focuses on the
obligation of businesses to provide “effective operational-level grievance
477
mechanisms” to address grievances early and remediate directly. Specifically, it
speaks to the placement of the grievance mechanism within the corporate
478
structure and to the timing of access to the non-judicial remedy made available.
The Commentary describes these mechanisms as existing independent of the
remedies available by the State and can be quite flexibly constructed—the focus
479
is on functional effectiveness within the context of the company’s operations.
In addition, the Commentary suggests two important functions of these
mechanisms that tie remedies to the corporate responsibility to respect human
rights: the first is to support the monitoring function of human rights due
480
diligence, and the second is to provide for early remediation of grievances
481
before harms are compounded. These mechanisms are not bounded by either
482
rules of procedure or substantive constraints that frame judicial mechanisms.
476. Id.
477. Id. at princ. 29 cmt. “To make it possible for grievances to be addressed early and remediated
directly, business enterprises should establish or participate in effective operational-level grievance mechanisms
for individuals and communities who may be adversely impacted.” Id.
478. Id. at princ. 29. “Operational-level grievance mechanisms are accessible directly to individuals and
communities who may be adversely impacted by a business enterprise. They are typically administered by
enterprises, alone or in collaboration with others, including relevant stakeholders.” Id. at princ. 29 cmt.
479. Id. at princ. 29 cmt.
480. Id. “They do so by providing a channel for those directly impacted by the enterprise’s operations to
raise concerns when they believe they are being or will be adversely impacted. By analyzing trends and patterns
in complaints, business enterprises can also identify systemic problems and adapt their practices accordingly.”
Id.
481. Id. The Commentary suggests that “these mechanisms make it possible for grievances, once
identified, to be addressed and for adverse impacts to be remediated early and directly by the business
enterprise, thereby preventing harms from compounding and grievances from escalating.” Id.
482. Id. These grievance “mechanisms need not require that a complaint or grievance amount to an
alleged human rights abuse before it can be raised, but specifically aim to identify any legitimate concerns of
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Lastly, Guiding Principle 30 (Draft Principle 28) suggests the value of
industry or multi-stakeholder initiatives as a mechanism for effective grievance
483
mechanisms. This principle echoes the multilateral institution principles of a
484
state duty to protect. The focus is on the creation of substantive standards that
further respect for human rights. “Such collaborative initiatives should ensure the
availability of effective mechanisms through which affected parties or their
legitimate representatives can raise concerns when they believe the commitments
485
in question have not been met.” The issue is one of legitimacy—a theme that is
486
threaded throughout the access to remedy provision, though never consistently.
“These mechanisms should provide for accountability and help enable the
487
remediation of adverse human rights impacts.”
5. Access to Remedy: Operational Principles—Effectiveness Criteria for
Non-Judicial Grievance Mechanisms
The last of the Principles, Guiding Principle 31 (Draft Principle 29), ties all
of the non-judicial remedial provisions together under the criteria provisions for
effectiveness. It sets out a list of legitimating characteristics of non-judicial
grievance mechanisms, though it is not clear why these characteristics ought not
also apply to state-based judicial remedial mechanisms. The characteristics
488
489
490
491
492
include: legitimacy, accessibility, predictability, equity, transparency,
those who may be adversely impacted.” Id.
483. See id. at princ. 30 cmt. “Industry, multi-stakeholder and other collaborative initiatives that are
based on respect for human rights-related standards should ensure that effective grievance mechanisms are
available.” Id. at princ. 30.
484. See discussion supra Part IV.B.5. The Commentary suggests the parallel, though only indirectly:
“Human rights-related standards are increasingly reflected in commitments undertaken by industry bodies,
multi-stakeholder and other collaborative initiatives, through codes of conduct, performance standards, global
framework agreements between trade unions and transnational corporations, and similar undertakings.” Guiding
Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 30 cmt.
485. Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 30 cmt.
486.
The legitimacy of such initiatives may be put at risk if they do not provide for such
mechanisms. The mechanisms could be at the level of individual members, of the
collaborative initiative, or both. These mechanisms should provide for accountability
and help enable the remediation of adverse human rights impacts.
Id. The issue of mechanism legitimacy is treated more extensively in id. at princ. 31 cmts. (a), (e) and (h). The
focus on legitimate processes was cross linked to the corporate responsibility to respect. See id. at princ. 22.
Also, legitimacy was bound up in discussions of barriers to state supported remediation mechanisms. Id. at
princ. 26.
487. Id. at princ. 30 cmt.
488. Id. at princ. 31(a) (“enabling trust from the stakeholder groups for whose use they are intended, and
being accountable for the fair conduct of grievance processes”). The Commentary speaks to the elements of
trust and accountability as critical to legitimacy concerns. Id. at princ. 31 cmt.
489. Id. at princ. 31(b) (“being known to all stakeholder groups for whose use they are intended, and
providing adequate assistance for those who may face particular barriers to access”). The Commentary speaks
to barriers to access. Id. at princ. 31 cmt.; see also id. at princ. 26.
490. Id. at princ. 31(c) (“providing a clear and known procedure with an indicative timeframe for each
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494

and constant improvement.
A special additional
rights-compatibility,
characteristic is specified for operational-level mechanisms: dialogue and
495
engagement. “These criteria provide a benchmark for designing, revising or
assessing a non-judicial grievance mechanism to help ensure that it is effective in
496
practice.” The final criterion is specific to business-administered, operational497
level grievance mechanisms and focuses on engagement and dialogue.
Grievance mechanisms are defined as a term of art in the General
498
499
Principles. The term appears in the Commentary of Guiding Principle 20,
500
501
Guiding Principle 22, and Guiding Principles 25, and 27 through 28. “The
term itself may not always be appropriate or helpful when applied to a specific
502
mechanism, but the criteria for effectiveness remain the same.” Interestingly,
effectiveness is also measured by the willingness of corporations and affected
individuals to use grievance mechanisms, and their aggregate implementation as
a basis for political action. “Regular analysis of the frequency, patterns and
stage, and clarity on the types of process and outcome available and means of monitoring implementation”).
The Commentary conflates trust and predictability, suggesting that the mechanisms should “provide public
information about the procedure it offers. Timeframes for each stage should be respected wherever possible,
while allowing that flexibility may sometimes be needed.” Id. at princ. 31 cmt.
491. Id. at princ. 31(d) (“seeking to ensure that aggrieved parties have reasonable access to sources of
information, advice and expertise necessary to engage in a grievance process on fair, informed and respectful
terms”). The Commentary speaks to redressing the imbalance in resources between parties to improve
perceptions of fair process. Id. at princ. 31 cmt. This is an issue addressed in other principles as well. See, e.g.,
id. at princ. 26-27.
492. Id. at princ. 31(e) (“keeping parties to a grievance informed about its progress, and providing
sufficient information about the mechanism’s performance to build confidence in its effectiveness and meet any
public interest at stake”). The Commentary speaks to the balance between demonstrating legitimacy and gaining
trust through disclosure and protecting the confidentiality of information and parties according to the context of
the grievance. It also suggests the value of record and statistics keeping. Id. at princ. 31 cmt.
493. Id. at princ. 31(f) (“ensuring that outcomes and remedies accord with internationally recognized
human rights”). The Commentary speaks to reframing grievances appropriately. This extends the tensions
between the limited nature of state obligations to enforce anything but those legal obligations transposed into
the domestic legal order, social norms obligations of corporations that provide grievance mechanisms, and
international norms that may inform the scope and nature of both. Id. at princ. 31 cmt.
494. Id. at princ. 31(g) (“drawing on relevant measures to identify lessons for improving the mechanism
and preventing future grievances and harms”). The Commentary speaks to the utility of data analysis. Id. at
princ. 31 cmt.
495. Id. at princ. 31(h) (“focusing on processes of direct and/or mediated dialogue to seek agreed
solutions, and leaving adjudication to independent third-party mechanisms, whether judicial or non-judicial”).
496. Id. at princ. 31 cmt.
497. Id. at princ. 31(h) (“consulting the stakeholder groups for whose use they are intended on their
design and performance, and focusing on dialogue as the means to address and resolve grievances”).
498. Id. at princ. 31 cmt.
499. This relates to operational level grievance mechanisms as a means of feedback to verify human
rights impacts. See discussion supra Part IV.C.3.
500. This relates to the use of operational level grievance mechanisms as effective means of enabling
remediation. See discussion supra Part IV.C.4.
501. This relates to remediation mechanisms and grievance mechanisms. See discussion supra Parts
IV.D.1-4.
502. Guiding Principles, supra note 41, princ. 31 cmt.
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causes of grievances can enable the institution administering the mechanism to
identify and influence policies, procedures or practices that should be altered to
503
prevent future harm.” The possibility of using the Guiding Principles as the
basis for political action, as well as for constraining behavior, opens possibilities
that suggest an implicit limit on the General Principles’ prohibition on the use of
the Principles to create new international law. It appears that the Commentary
here suggests that while the Principles themselves may not create new law, they
may certainly serve as the basis for such creation through the traditional methods
504
of convention or the development of customary international law.
Taken together, the access to remedy provision presents a divided approach
to remediation. On the one hand, it approaches the issue of state-based remedies
cautiously and within the conventional perspective that states retain the ultimate
authority to build their remediation systems as they like. But at the edges, the
principles suggest subversion, either through the efforts to suggest the primacy of
international norms as the basis for framing domestic legal order remediation, or
by suggesting that grievance mechanisms themselves serve as a basis for political
action. On the other hand, corporations are treated as subsidiary elements of this
access to remedies framework. They serve two broad purposes—to institute
systems that avoid the need to access remedies and to detect and prevent harm in
the first place. International institutions serve a gap filler role as well, but also
become useful as a place where international norms (and perhaps social norms
affecting corporate behavior) may be developed with indirect effects on state
domestic law as applied by its judicial and non-judicial mechanisms.
Yet, there is a hierarchy built into this balance. Throughout, it is clear that the
state remains the focus of the access to remedy. And, while the corporation or
international bodies may serve supporting or preventative roles, legitimacy is still
very much tied to the courts of the states. But access to remedies is never
developed in its own right. It serves the state duty to protect and the corporate
responsibility to respect, but never finds its own normative justification for
existing apart from either. And it could have—in contrast to the state duty and
the corporate responsibility, access to remedy focuses on the third great
stakeholder in the human rights enterprise: the individual or community affected
by state or corporate activity having adverse human rights effects. It is to the
remedial rights of that individual that the remedial provisions might have better
focused—an object of discussion taken up in the concluding subsection of this
part.

503. Id.
504. See generally JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2005) (providing background and analysis of customary international law and international agreements).
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E. Principled Pragmatism and the Limits of Formal Innovation: A Preliminary
Assessment.
st

The great challenge of the 21 century is that of the institutionalization of the
th
system of globalization that emerged in the last decades of the 20 century. The
SRSG astutely explained that the issue of business and human rights is a
505
microcosm of that challenge. A number of those challenges remain pointed and
unresolved in the framing architecture of the Guiding Principles. This section
examines a number of the more significant issues that are either raised by, or
remain unresolved, in the Guiding Principles. This section also suggests the
potentially significant institutional effects of the framework on the relationships
between the state, the international community, and business in the context of
globalization.
1. The Dilemmas of the Law-State System in a Global Context
The SRSG’s Guiding Principles outline the extent of the state duty to protect
human rights, and raise a number of challenges that reflect both the difficulties of
moving forward, the contemporary culture of the law-state system, and the
conundrums of building a system on an acceptance of the basic assumptions on
which that law-state system is built.
Guiding Principle 1 nicely suggests the difficulties. On its face, it suggests
the obvious—that states are required to abide by their obligations under
international law, whether they are obligations specifically undertaken pursuant
to conventional law or treaty, or whether they are part of the complex of
obligations understood as customary international law. However, this creates
several problems. First, the state of customary international law remains
506
contested. Some believe that customary international law does not exist. Others
believe that some elements of customary international law are binding, even on
rejecting states, and that such binding customary norms, in the form of jus
507
508
cogens, can be the subject of international tribunals. Second, many states
apply the logic of their legal systems to substantially narrow the legal effect of
both customary and conventional laws within their territories. Many states take
the position that conventional law applies to them only to the extent that they
have agreed to be bound. In some jurisdictions, that agreement to be bound is

505. 2011 Report, supra note 40, at para. 2.
506. John H. Knox, The Human Rights Council Endorses “Guiding Principles” for Corporations,
INSIGHTS (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insight110801.pdf.
507. See, e.g., Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens,
and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82 (1992).
508. See Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, (Sept. 17, 2003), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/
seriea_18_ing.pdf.
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ineffective unless the legislative body actually incorporates the convention’s
509
obligations into the domestic legal order. Additionally, even when a state
agrees to be bound, it may condition that agreement on any number of
reservations, the legal effects of which are still a subject of lively academic
510
debate. Most importantly, as a matter of law, international instruments that are
neither treaties nor conventional law are not, strictly speaking, legally binding on
states. Lastly, in the absence of a legitimate interpretative body, it is sometimes
difficult to develop a consensus on the interpretation of treaties or conventions,
511
or their application in specific circumstances. The International Court of Justice
is sometimes of help, but its jurisdiction is also limited and to some extent
512
optional.
The limitations ultimately written into Guiding Principle 1 might be
understood by drawing a parallel to the governance framework of the European
Union. This tension is better understood in two parts. First, the tension can be
understood as one touching on the supremacy of international law over
incompatible domestic legal measures. The second, and more difficult tension,
can be understood as touching on the supremacy of international law (and its
human rights obligations) over incompatible provisions of domestic
constitutional law.
The issue of the supremacy of Community Law over incompatible domestic
law has, over a long period of time, tended to be accepted as a basic feature of
513
membership within the E.U. In many Member States, the principle of the
supremacy of Community Law is accepted as a matter of domestic constitutional
514
law as well—at least with respect to incompatible national legislation. In some
cases, the Member States have reconstructed their constitutional orders to
515
explicitly accommodate Community Law supremacy.
But, the issue of the nature and extent of the primacy of Community Law
within the European Union, especially where such primacy may contravene basic
principles of the constitutional order of a Member State, has proven to be a

509. This principle of non-self-executing treaties has been particularly well developed within the recent
jurisprudence of the United States. See, e.g., Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
510. See, e.g., Edward T. Swaine, Reserving, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 307 (2006); Laurence R. Helfer,
Response: Not Fully Committed? Reservations, Risk, and Treaty Design, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 367 (2006).
511. See Robert Y. Jennings, The International Court of Justice After Fifty Years, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 493
(1995).
512. See, e.g., Emilia Justyna Powell & Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, The International Court of Justice
and the World’s Three Legal Systems, 69 J. POL., May, 2007, at 397.
513. Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 593.
514. CE, Feb. 28, 1992, Rec. Lebon 81(Fr.); Counseil D’Etat [CE] [Council of State] Nov. 5, 1996,
Orfinger, No. 62.922, http://www.conseildetat.be/Arresten/62000/900/62922-vert.pdf#xml=http://www.
conseildetat.be/apps/dtsearch/getpdf.asp?DocId=31785&Index=c%3a\software\dtsearch\index\arrets_nl\&HitC
ount=2&hits=1e+1f+&032282012121 (Belg.).
515. See GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW],
May 23, 1949, BGBL. I, art. 23 (Ger.); 1958 CONST. art. 88-1(Fr.).
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difficult one in theory. Member States appear to reserve to themselves an
authority to judge the extent of that authority, especially where it might affect the
fundamental sovereign character of the state, or the basic human rights and
516
organizational provisions of its constitutional order. Perhaps the most famous
example involves the Irish Supreme Court, which noted, “[w]ith regard to the
issue of the balance of convenience, I am satisfied that where an injunction is
sought to protect a constitutional right, the only matter which could be properly
capable of being weighed in a balance against the granting of such protection
517
would be another competing constitutional right.” On the other hand, it has
proven to be possible to sidestep these conceptual questions through the adoption
of a functional approach to the issue, combined with amendments to Member
State constitutions or Treaty accommodations.
But it is not clear that—beyond the European Union and its deep system of
collaborative internationalism—states will be willing to read the state duty to
protect as importing an obligation to (at least in good faith) accept the supremacy
of international law generally, or more specifically, European law against an
incompatible provision of international law. Less likely is a willingness, as a
matter of constitutional policy, for states to commit to a policy of collaborative
constitutionalism requiring attempts at a constitutional revision or interpretation
to ensure conformity with applicable international standards.
Another difficulty avoided centers on the identification of the aggregate of
obligations that constitute applicable international human rights law. The Draft
Principles define “internationally recognized human rights” in a political or
sociological, or even cultural sense. But then the Guiding Principles appear to
518
hold only non-state actors—and principally corporations—to that definition.
They are binding in those senses too. That binding effect is most prominently
important in connection with the development of social norm systems that affect
the corporate responsibility to respect human rights. It is also possible to assume
that the documents that constitute the International Bill of Human Rights serve as
a consensus of state obligations in a policy sense. But the International Bill of
Rights does not constitute a legally binding set of documents equally applicable
519
to all states, or even to all of the developed states. As a legal rather than as a
policy matter, the International Bill of Rights may create some obligations, but

516. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 12, 1993, 89 BVerfGE
155, 1993 (Ger.) (Commonly referred to as the Maastricht decision); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE]
[Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 22, 1986, 73 BVerfGE 339, 1986 (Ger.) (Commonly referred to as Solange
II).
517. Soc’y for the Prot. of Unborn Children (Ir.) Ltd. v. Grogan, [1989] I.R. 753 (Ir.).
518. Draft Principles, supra note 64, at 27. That was a significant concession to states from the original
draft of the Guiding Principles in which the scope of the human rights instruments was included in a definitions
section.
519. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc A/RES/217(III) (Dec.
10, 1948).
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may not obligate all states in the same way or to the same extent. These
differences may serve as a basis for resistance by states to specific applications of
some or all parts of the International Bill of Rights. They can also serve as a
significant point of friction if State A seeks to effectively impose the requisites of
the International Bill of Rights on State B through the extraterritorial application
of the provisions on corporations hosted in State B. Where the extraterritorial
application can be contrary to the constitutional norms of State B, the application
of the Guiding Principles becomes more difficult. It is understandable, then, that
520
the Guiding Principle1 Commentary speaks of the state duty and has legal and
policy dimensions. Depending on the state, the balance between the legal and
policy pull of the International Bill of Rights which forms the core of the human
rights obligations of states will vary considerably, and the potentially different
regimes of rights to which a company is subject while operating in a host state
can be even more pronounced. Indeed, unevenness in the recognition and
application of the International Bill of Rights by states will likely be the norm, at
least initially.
More interesting still, perhaps, are what appear to be early efforts to expand
the list of human rights instruments that might fall within the corporate
521
responsibility to respect beyond that specified in the GP. The focus is on
522
vulnerable people, broadly defined. Vulnerability becomes a basis for the
extension of responsibility binding on the corporation through inclusion in its
human rights due diligence system irrespective of the obligation under the
domestic law of the state in which the corporation operates. Polycentricity here is
meant to effectively harmonize practices on the basis of international norms
through layers of corporate governance directives that effectively supersede
regulatory norms across territories. To the extent that these norms exceed the
requirements of domestic legal orders, the stratagem is plausible; to the extent
that such compliance might conflict with local law, corporations are put in that
conflict position where they must either lobby for local change, negotiate
tolerance or consider discontinuing operations.
523
The extraterritorial provisions, long supported by the SRSG, continue the
dilemma of managing the leakage of state power into the borders of other states
within a system in which all states are ostensibly objects of equal dignity and

520. Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 1 cmt.
521. Interpretive Guide, supra, at para. 1.4 (“Depending on the circumstances of their operations,
enterprises may need to consider additional standards beyond the International Bill of Human Rights and core
ILO Conventions, in order to ensure that they act with respect for human rights: for instance where their
activities might pose a risk to the human rights of individuals belonging to specific groups or populations that
require special attention.”)
522. Id. (“Examples of these groups can include children, women, indigenous peoples, people belonging
to ethnic or other minorities, or persons with disabilities.”)
523. See generally John G. Ruggie, Special Rep. of the Secretary-General for Business & Human
Rights, Opening Statement to United Nations Human Rights Council, Geneva (Sept. 25, 2006).
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treatment. Extraterritorial application is a reasonable response of high human
rights value states to deficiencies in the incorporation of the obligations of First
Pillar duties in other states. And it may be reasonably grounded in an extension
of legal duties to the conduct of national corporate citizens when they travel and
engage in activities abroad. The obligation is not for the benefit of the host state,
but rather is deemed to be essential to the internal ordering of the state and the
management of the conduct of its citizens. Yet to some extent, extraterritoriality
of this sort also smacks of “status” legislation that has tended to be disfavored in
the modern era within constitutional systems like that of the United States. The
SRSG suggests that extraterritorial projects of human rights duties “can provide
much-needed support to host States that lack the capacity to implement fully an
524
effective regulatory environment on their own.” However, the extraterritorial
application of home-state law can easily be mischaracterized as an indirect
projection of state power abroad. When such projections are directed at states
with a history of colonial rule, sensitivities may make such projections not
merely unpopular, but unlawful within the territory of the host state. Yet the neocolonialist argument has been used selectively. It is easily applied to former
colonial powers asserting extraterritorial powers, but tends to be overlooked
when the projecting power is a state that can style itself as still “developing.” The
SRSG has noted that the issue of the lawfulness of extraterritorial legislation
525
remains unsettled as a matter of international law. Where the state itself is
engaged in business abroad, the SRSG suggests that there are “strong policy
reasons for home states to encourage their companies to respect rights abroad . .
526
.” Indeed, one might suggest that in those cases the State duty to protect
necessarily embraces all state activities domestically and elsewhere and in
whatever form conducted.
One of the great markers of globalization is the change in the nature of the
power of the state—still powerful but now more ambiguous, both within its own
territory and projected onto the territory of other states. The Guiding Principles
look both forward and backward on the issue of state power. On the one hand,
the Guiding Principles continue to encourage the extraterritorial application of
527
state power. Though the encouragement is permissive, two distinct and not
necessarily positive actions are encouraged. The first is the encouragement of the
traditional system of subordination that marked the relationship (and the state

524. John G. Ruggie, Special Rep.of the Secretary-General for Business & Human Rights, Presentation
of Report to United Nations Human Rights Council (June 2, 2009).
525. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Promotion of All Human Rights, Civil, Political,
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development: Rep. of the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General, para. 15, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/13 (Apr. 2009), available at http://www2.ohchr.
org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/11session/A.HRC.11.13.pdf.
526. Id.
527. Guiding Principles, supra note 41.
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528

system itself) between states from the 19 century. Under Guiding Principle 2,
strong and rich states will be encouraged to project their power through the
529
businesses they control within the states in which those corporations operate.
Companies will be encouraged as well—not to look to compliance with the law
of the host state, but rather to look to compliance with the law of the home state.
One effect is positive in a sense; such encouragement will create incentives for
harmonization of law by encouraging host states to conform their domestic law to
that of home states with significant corporate activity in their territory. But the
other effect might be less positive—especially in weak governance zones—the
effect might be to encourage the transfer of the functions of the law state from
the host to the home state. Rather than encourage the development of stronger or
better government in the host state, the power of extraterritoriality might be to
transfer that power to the outside regulating states, whose values, laws, and
courts would substitute for that of the host state. This could deepen weak
governance rather than encourage the development of stronger government in
weak governance zones.
2. The Law-Policy Conundrum of the State Duty to Protect
The issue of the scope of human rights norms and the differences between
the first pillar’s legalism and the second pillar’s functionalist internationalism
highlight another tension within the state duty to protect pillar—that between
state legal and policy obligations. That tension mimics, to some extent, those
between the formal legal systems context of the state duty and the functionalist
social norm-based context of corporate governance rules. The Guiding Principles
distinguish between the narrow formalism of legal constraints and the openended possibilities of policy considerations. They serve, in the latter respect, to
provide suggestions and best practices as a means of helping shape the universe
of permissible responses to policy issues touching on the regulation of business
and human rights without appearing to mandate this approach. The idea appears

528. WESTEL W. WILLOUGHBY, THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC LAW 309 (1924).
529. The reverse is unlikely—for example the extraterritorial control of corporate activity from small
and less well off states into larger and richer states. The reasons are obvious. More interesting is the possibility
of clashes in business culture and values between values exporting states whose governance system values are
not compatible. The battle for values dominance under the model of Guiding Principle 2 would occur neither in
the halls of international institutions nor in the territories of the home states but would be fought in the
territories of host states where both extraterritorial rivals would be competing for business. The best examples
of that are the contests, already occurring, between Chinese, European, and American firms in Africa. See, e.g.,
Jon W. Walker, China, U.S. and Africa: Competition or Cooperation? (Mar. 31, 2008) (unpublished Strategy
Research Project, U.S. Army War College), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?
Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA481365. For an example of the reporting in the popular press,
see, e.g., Antoaneta Becker, China-EU Rivalry in Africa Sharpens, INTER-PRESS SERVICE NEWS AGENCY (June
15, 2010), http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=51831.
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to be to set the stage for an organic growth of rights conduct and policy without
appearing to manage that movement.
It follows that one of the great innovations of the Guiding Principles is their
recognition that states operate on two levels, both of which have some
governance effects. The first level is the most traditional and well understood—
the legal obligations of states both internally with respect to the organization and
application of its domestic legal order, and externally with respect to the
obligations of states under international law. The second is less well known and
its role in managing conduct much more disputed in the conventional literature—
the regulatory effects of state policy. While this second form of regulatory
regime is beginning to be better manifested, for example in the operation of large
530
sovereign wealth funds, it is not usually the object of operationalization
precisely because it is not law or regulation and thus is not usually considered a
legitimate source of state action that affects the conduct of the state and others.
But the recognition of the policy obligations of states produces issues which are
to some extent unavoidable.
3. Character of the Guidelines: Framework, Handbook, Roadmap or Law?
Soon after the Draft Principles were announced, Dr Peter Davis, who is the
Ethical Corporation’s politics editor, published an opinion piece that
531
characterized the Guiding Principles as a handbook. It is not clear that Dr.
Davis is correct, but the point he raises is critically important for the evolution of
the Guiding Principles as they move from acceptance toward implementation.
Unless individuals can agree on the manner in which the Guiding Principles are
to be read, the possibility of fragmentation in interpretation, even at the most
fundamental level, remains quite likely. Likewise, John Knox noted both the
underlying hope that the Guiding Principles would serve as the bridge between
soft and hard law either through customary international law or treaty, but
worried that “states would have to act consistently as if corporations were so
bound, and states would have to do so on the basis of their understanding of their
532
obligations under international law.”
This fractured Guiding Principles interpretation is most likely to mirror the
fractures in approaches to law and law interpretation between legal systems that
are still open to custom and organic growth through application, and those who
approach the Guiding Principles like a Code—a self contained and internally
530. See, e.g., Backer, supra note 114.
531. “The result is effectively a handbook for the implementation of a comprehensive system for the
management of business and human rights, with clear guidance for states and corporations.” Peter Davis, John
Ruggie: A Common Focus for Human Rights, ETHICAL CORP. (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.ethicalcorp.com/
stakeholder-engagement/john-ruggie-common-focus-human-rights.
532. John Knox, The Ruggie Rules: Applying Human Rights Law to Corporations 19 (Wake Forest
Univ. Legal Studies Paper No. 1916664, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1916664.
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self-referencing system that more or less defines the entire possible universe of
interpretive possibility within its provisions. The former would evolve through
deductive reasoning principles, grounded in the aggregation of application of the
Guiding Principles in state judicial and non-juridical business grievance
structures, to the extent they are reported, policy reactions, and the work of
international organs applying their related soft law frameworks which
incorporate the Guiding Principles. The latter would deepen the implications of
the formal construction of the Guiding Principles as Code—using its
hierarchically arranged principles structure as the basis through which it can be
applied in particular context, without thereby moving beyond the parameters of
the Guiding Principles themselves as the sole legitimate source of rules. The
former can tolerate a considerable degree of difference in result in
interpretation—certainly one of the permissible outcomes implicitly suggested in
the Guiding Principles Commentary. The latter will require something like the
533
institutionalized interpretive structure of the European Court of Justice system
to retain a stronger hand in the interpretive growth of the Guiding Principles.
The choice of the language of interpretation will have profound effects on the
534
culture of application. It is understood why the SRSG did not wade into those
institutionalizing waters. Yet, the manner of institutionalization and guidance
will be critical to the success of the Guiding Principles. One of the great projects
that await those who would move the Guiding Principles from document to
applied governance will be to gain a measure of control over the process of its
application. At some point it will be necessary to order this heterodox and
polycentric operation—not necessarily to unify it, but to ensure substantial
coordination with a necessary flexibility.
4. The Character of Corporate Law Making
The heart of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights is human
rights due diligence. In the hands of the SRSG and as memorialized in the
Guiding Principles, human rights due diligence is drafted into multiple services.
In one sense, human rights due diligence, as the regularization of policy, serves a
535
legislative function. This suggests an alternative to the decades long drift of
533. But cf. RENAUD DEHOUSSE, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
INTEGRATION (1999).
534. But cf. KWAI HANG NG, THE COMMON LAW IN TWO VOICES: LANGUAGE, LAW, AND THE
POSTCOLONIAL DILEMMA IN HONG KONG (2009) (discussing the complex relationship between juridical
formalism, language and legal norms in Hong Kong).
535. On the formalization issues of multinational policy, see, e.g., Anant R. Negandhi, External and
Internal Functioning of American, German, and Japanese Multinational Corporations: Decisionmaking and
Policy Issues, in GOVERNMENTS AND MULTINATIONALS: THE POLICY OF CONTROL VERSUS AUTONOMY 21
(Walter H. Goldberg & Ananti R. Negandhi eds., 1983); see also Larry Catá Backer, Multinational
Corporations as Objects and Sources of Transnational Regulation, 14 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 499, 508-09
(2008).
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536

corporate governance towards the use of contract for regulatory effect. Second,
human rights due diligence serves an executive function, providing the
information necessary for determining corporate action. Third, human rights due
diligence serves as a monitoring device—available for use by both internal and
external stakeholders—to make accountability more efficient. Lastly, human
rights due diligence serves a fact-finding and remediation function—providing
the basis for both the process and substantive content of resolving the
consequences of human rights affecting actions. The SRSG makes clear that the
principal audience for these efforts is not the state, but major corporate
stakeholders—customers, investors, local communities, labor, and others—who
537
might be affected by the human rights affecting activities of corporations. This
is a consent-based system which is, in its own way, a reflection of the more
formalized notions of legitimacy and consent that frame modern Western liberal
538
constitutionalism.
Human rights due diligence, then, organizes and
constitutes—in institutional form—a social norm system and makes it operative
in a way that is attached to, but not completely dependent on, the state and its
legal system. That system is grounded in the logic of the social norm system—
constituted through and enforced by the collective actions of those critical
539
stakeholders participating in the system itself, and based on disclosure. But
vesting so much into one process or product may well overwhelm it. The
regulation of self-regulation within a constraining international law normative
field will likely require further development as the effective realities of
540
globalized private governance continue to evolve. This evolution is consistent
with the facts-based principled pragmatism on which the system itself is based,
but one that suggests a dynamic, rather than a static, element to the enterprise.
Human rights due diligence will start off fairly well defined—but the logic of its
many purposes will tend to vastly expand, and to some extent, distort the
541
device. At some point, and likely soon, the legislative and administrative
agencies monitoring and remediating functions of human rights due diligence
will have to be reframed and redeveloped along the lines of the logic of each.
A related issue touches on the mechanics of human rights due diligence, and
specifically, the normative effects of data gathering—a subject left substantially
536. See, e.g., Backer, supra note 522.
537. See, e.g., Backer, supra note 361, at 1752.
538. See, e.g., HOWARD SCHWEBER, THE LANGUAGE OF LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 81-134 (2007).
539. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, From Moral Obligation to International Law: Disclosure Systems,
Markets and the Regulation of Multinational Corporations, 39 GEO. J. INT’L L. 591 (2008).
540. The Guiding Principles recognize that this evolution will occur within an imperative that looks “for
ways of co-coordinating public and private rulemaking in such a way as to preserve both social autonomy and
the public interest.” HARM SCHEPEL, THE CONSTITUTION OF PRIVATE GOVERNANCE: PRODUCT STANDARDS IN
THE REGULATION OF INTEGRATING MARKETS 32 (2005).
541. The SRSG recognized the difficulties of an all purpose approach, as well as the allure of its
simplicity for business and sought to road test the device. See Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at 3. More
field testing will likely produce additional sophistication in the development and deployment of the device.
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unexplored in the Guiding Principles. This issue is most dramatically drawn in
the context of the early focus on gender inequalities and the human rights
regulation project of the Guiding Principles. Data collection, however, is hardly a
ministerial act. The choice of data suggests a normative privilege that might
legitimate the emphasis of one area of human rights over others. I have suggested
that the regulatory aspects of data collection are, in its guise, a subset of
surveillance.
Surveillance is one of the critical mechanisms of this expansion of
private power into what had been an exclusively public sphere.
Increasingly, public bodies are requiring, or permitting, private entities to
monitor and report on the conduct and activities of a host of actors. It has
also come to serve public bodies as a substitute for lawmaking.
542
Surveillance is a flexible engine.
543

544

and transnational forms.
“Together,
Surveillance has both domestic
surveillance in its various forms provides a unifying technique with which
governance can be effected across the boundaries of power fractures without
545
challenging formal regulatory power or its limits.” As such, one could
understand this emphasis as suggesting a prioritization of gender issues in the
546
Second Pillar responsibility to respect.
But the SRSG points to a more benign function for data gathering.
Some have suggested that only with disaggregated data can
companies identify the relationship between gender and their human
rights impacts. It is not part of a company’s baseline responsibility to
respect human rights to address the social formation of gender biases.
However, human rights due diligence should identify differential impacts
542. Larry Catá Backer, The Surveillance State: Monitoring as Regulation, Information as Power,
LCBACKERBLOG (Dec. 21, 2007), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2007/12/surveillace-state-monitoringas.html; see Larry Catá Backer, Global Panopticism: States, Corporations, and the Governance Effects of
Monitoring Regimes, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 101 (2008). “It can be used to decide what sorts of facts
constitute information, to determine what sorts of information ought to be privileged and which do not matter,
to gather that information, to empower people or entities to gather information, to act on the information
gathered.” Id.
543. “In its domestic form it can be used to assign authority over certain types of information to private
enterprises and then hold those enterprises to account on the basis of the information gathered.” Backer, Global
Panopticism, supra note 542.
544. “In its transnational form it can be used to construct a set of privileged information that can be
gathered and distributed voluntarily by private entities on the basis of systems created and maintained by
international public or private organizations as an alternative to formal regulation and to provide a means of
harmonizing behavior without law.” Id.
545. Backer, The Surveillance State, supra note 529; see Backer, Global Panopticism, supra note 529.
546. For a discussion of prioritization, see, Larry Catá Backer, Business and Human Rights Part XVII—
Implementation: Prioritizing, LCBACKERBLOG (Feb. 18, 2010), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2010/02/
business-and-human-rights-part-xvii.html.
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based on gender and consequently help companies avoid creating or
547
exacerbating existing gender biases.
The subtle distinction might at first be startling—especially in an otherwise
positive values-based and behavior modifying approach to corporate behavior.
But closer reflection suggests the strong connection between these positions—
that data be gathered to mind the corporation’s behavior, but not that of the
society in which the corporation operates—and the foundational distinction
between the legal rights regimes peculiar to the First Pillar and the social rights
regimes at the heart of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights. This
is made clearer by the SRSG’s explanation of the meaning of a multidimensional
approach to gender data. The multidimensional approach means that human
rights due diligence should include examination of gender issues at multiple
levels—for example, the community (e.g. are women in a particular community
allowed or expected to work?); and the society (e.g. is there institutionalized
548
gender discrimination, whether by law or religion?).
Issues of social organization and communal mores, including those touching
549
on the status of women, are matters for the state—and the First Pillar. Issues of
corporate involvement in issues touching on the status of women—as realized
550
within corporate operations—are matters at the heart of the Second Pillar.
These issues, in this context, give rise to an autonomous set of responsibilities,
the touchstone of which is not necessarily dependent on the resolution of gender
status issues within a particular state. As such, data gathering and analysis is
547. Larry Catá Backer, Business and Human Rights Part XX—Issues: Gender, LCBACKERBLOG (Feb.
21, 2010), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2010/02/business-and-human-rights-part-xx.html (quoting John
Ruggie, Special Representative of the Secretary-General). This was a framework discussed in the SRSG’s
consultations with gender experts organized through the Ethical Globalization Initiative. See Integrating a
Gender Perspective into the UN “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework: Consultation Summary (June 29,
2009), http://www.valoresociale.it/detail.asp?c=1&p=0&id=307. But the perspective was dropped from the
online consultation materials by mid-2010; see, United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General
on Business & Human Rights: Gender, WAYBACK MACHINE http://www.srsgconsultation.org/ index.php/
main/discussion?discussion_id=17 (last visited Mar. 20, 2012). However, the idea survived in the construction
of the Guiding Principles themselves, principally through the heavy emphasis, in the principles applicable to the
state duty to protect, that reaffirmed the principle of non-interference and the responsibility to respect principles
that focus on impacts rather than on changing cultural or legal frameworks within which the corporation
operates. In effect, the SRSG transformed the notion into one of formal non-interference and functional nonparticipation. The corporation could not seek to change the culture in which it operated, but at the same time it
could not contribute to the norms—especially those that tended to marginalize on the basis of gender and other
categories—that might be incompatible with the also applicable strictures of the International Bill of Human
Rights. This transformation is nicely captured in the Commentary to Guiding Principle 20: “Tracking is
necessary in order for a business enterprise to know if its human rights policies are being implemented
optimally, whether it has responded effectively to the identified human rights impacts, and to drive continuous
improvement. . . . This could include performance contracts and reviews as well as surveys and audits, using
gender- disaggregated data where relevant.” Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 20 cmt.
548. Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 4 cmt.
549. Id. at 4.
550. Id.
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critical for the production of corporate action that may lead to treatment of
women—and responses to concerns touching on the status and treatment of
women—within the corporation in ways that are distinct from those presumed
satisfactory elsewhere within the state in which a corporation operates. The
object is to control the behavior of corporations, not to reform the social,
political, and legal structures of the states in which such corporations operate.
This is an especially important distinction in cases where multinational
corporations are operating within host states that have a long history of
colonialism and a strong sensitivity to interference with sovereign prerogatives.
But this bifurcated approach also produces a set of potentially necessary
tensions. First, at its limit, it may produce a situation where the corporate
responsibility to respect is inconsistent with the obligations imposed through host
551
state law. Second, the distinction between the “social formation of gender
biases” and “creating or exacerbating existing gender biases” through corporate
policy may be both artificial and difficult to keep separate. Indeed, one recalls
552
that the approach of the Sullivan Principles was to focus directly on corporate
behavior as a means of projecting social, cultural, and legal change into the host
states in which these principles were applied. “General Motors was the largest
employer of blacks in South Africa at that time, and Sullivan decided to use his
position on the Board of Directors to apply economic pressure to end the unjust
system. The result was the Sullivan Principles, which became the blueprint for
553
554
ending apartheid.” The successor, Global Sullivan Principles, makes these
connections explicit. The resulting political program inherent in the application
of corporate Second Pillar responsibilities may produce friction, especially if the
methodological focus is understood as containing a substantive element targeting
the host state. Lastly, the nature of gender rights remains highly contested. This
produces fracture, even in the approach to data gathering. Consider, in this
555
regard, the connection between the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
556
the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam. Their possible similarities (or
incompatibilities) may substantially direct both the methodological framework
within which gender issues are understood, and data harvested, as well as the
analytics produced therefrom.

551. SRSG 2008 Report, supra note 70.
552. The Sullivan Principles, MARSHALL U.,
http://muweb.marshall.edu/revleonsullivan/principled/principles.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2012).
553. Id.
554. See id.
555. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec.
10, 1948)
556. World Conference on Human Rights, July 31-Aug. 5, 1990, Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in
Islam, U.N. Doc A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.18 (Aug. 5, 1993) [English translation], available at http://www1.
umn.edu/humanrts/instree/cairodeclaration.html [hereinafter Cairo Dec.].
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5. The Problem of Double Character: State-Owned Enterprises and
Corporations in Conflict Zones
The Guiding Principles lend themselves well to the constrained complexity
of simple polycentricity—the coordination of law-state, social norm-corporate,
557
and international systems. Where each operates autonomously and within the
logic of its organization, coordination is possible and harmonization relatively
easy to conceptualize, if not to realize. But difficulties multiply when institutions
begin to act against type. The problems of state-owned enterprises and those of
corporations operating in the absence of an effective government test the Guiding
Principles as an integrated system. The Guiding Principles acknowledge the
problems, but offer little to the state. This comes as something of a surprise.
In the context of corporate activity in conflict-affected areas, the Guiding
558
Principles tend to treat these entities the way international law treated states
559
that were not members of the Family of Nations before 1945. In effect, in the
absence of a local government, the government of the host state can control the
activities of the corporation in the host state and thus control the effect of
560
corporate economic activity abroad. But it is hardly fitting for states in control
of great corporate actors to use those entities as the vehicle through which these
states can project regulatory and economic power outward. Multilateral action
would be more appropriate to avoid the appearance of domination and
561
incorporation. That the Guiding Principles do not suggest this as a baseline
represents a bow to reality (pragmatism)—states engage in these activities and
these regulatory projections with or without permission. That it suggests that
such national projections of power can be constrained by norms that have an
international component suggests a more subtle effort to manage national activity
within an international framework; but the tension remains.
In the context of state-owned enterprises, the Guiding Principles tend toward
562
a divide and manage principle. States are urged to take additional steps when
557. See generally Nick Green, Functional Polycentricity: A Formal Definition in Terms of Social
Network Analysis, 44 URB. STUD. 2077 (2007), available at http://usj.sagepub.com/content/44/11/2077.full.pdf.
558. See Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 7.
559. Department of Public Information, 60 Ways the UN Makes a Difference, UNITED NATIONS (2011),
www.un.org/un60/60ways/. For the classic explanation, see WILLOUGHBY, supra note 528, at 307-09 (“Such
States may be said to occupy in the international system much the same position as persons subject to the
disabilities of infancy or alienage occupy in municipal law, but their exact position is hard to define . . .”).
560. The corporation is directed merely to beware the dangers of complicity on conflict zones. See
Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 23 cmt.
561. Indeed, the current framework supports the charge made by some states that the present system of
globalization is meant to strengthen the hand of strong states to deal with weaker ones and reimpose the old
system of hierarchy in the relations among states as a formal matter, or that the system itself is meant to favor
the designs of global hegemons. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Economic Globalization Ascendant and the Crisis
of the State: Four Perspectives on the Emerging Ideology of the State in the New Global Order, 17 BERKELEY
LA RAZA L.J. 141, 154-62 (2006).
562. See Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 7.
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there is an ownership relationship between states and enterprises. States are
reminded that such enterprises are also subject to the obligations (including
human rights due diligence obligations) of the Second Pillar, but the formal
563
distinction between state and enterprise is preserved. This is an odd result,
particularly in the face of the functionalism at the core of the corporate
responsibility to respect human rights that specifically eschews legal
564
constructions in the application of the Guidelines to business entities. But that
difference in approach suggests a greater divergence—between the innate
formalism of the state duty to protect principles and the more functionalist
corporate responsibility to respect principles. That distinction, supported by the
reality of custom and behavior, produces tension when entities straddle the statecorporate divide. A different approach might have been more in accord with
European approaches to the issue of state involvement in economic activity, one
which starts from the position that state involvement in activity changes its
character from private to public. In this case, state-owned enterprises ought to be
treated as subject to both the direct duty obligations imposed on states and to the
565
respect obligations that derive from their organization as business enterprises.
That this imposes potentially greater obligations on state-owned enterprises
merely mirrors the advantages they can also derive from that relationship
unavailable to private enterprises.
6. Remedies
The access to remedies provisions present the least autonomous, and perhaps
the least robust, link of the tightly integrated system that the Guiding Principles
represent. Between the initial construction of the Third Pillar access to remedy of
566
the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, and the final version of the
Guiding Principles, the access to remedies prong of the Guiding Principles
became more an expression of the importance of the state as a legitimating
source of remediation. This is not surprising, of course. To some extent this
movement is bound up with important ideological foundations of Western
notions of rule of law and the legitimate constitutional order, both of which are
deeply tied to the idea of an independent judiciary as the critical component in
567
the protection of individual rights against others and against the state. But that

563. Id. at princ. 9 cmt.
564. See id. at princ. 14.
565. For the relevant discussion of the European approach in the context of the “golden share” cases, see
Larry Catá Backer, The Private Law of Public Law: Public Authorities as Shareholders, Golden Shares,
Sovereign Wealth Funds, and the Public Law Element in Private Choice of Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1801 (2008).
566. See SRSG 2009 Report, supra note 79; see also Guiding Principles, supra note 41.
567. See e.g., Louis Henkin, A New Birth of Constitutionalism: Genetic Influences and Genetic Defects,
in CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND LEGITIMACY: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 39, 40-42
(Michel Rosenfeld ed., 1994).
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concept has less of a place where remediation is also meant to embrace other
governance systems, providing individuals with a basis for complaint grounded
in norms other than the law of a particular state. There is a strong nod in that
568
direction in the General Principles, but these mechanisms are clearly meant to
serve a marginal role—either to prevent harm or to fill gaps. The remediation
workhorse remains the state and its judicial apparatus.
None of this is illogical; and it reinforces conventional notions that were
strong elements of the critique of important sectors of the non-governmental
569
organization community. But it tends to reduce the access to remedies to an
instrumental application of the consequences of the normative objectives of the
state duty to protect and the corporate responsibility to respect human rights. A
richer approach might have recast the Third Pillar access to remedies away from
the stakeholders at the center of the first two pillars—states, business enterprises,
non-governmental organizations, public international organizations—and toward
the critical object of this enterprise—individuals suffering adverse human rights
impacts. The remedial provisions assume a more autonomous role by centering
their provisions on the obligations and privileges of stakeholders who belong to
that class of individuals or groups affected by state or corporate activity with
human rights impacts. Thus, turned around, access to remedy becomes a more
useful vehicle for the elaboration of the obligations of actors to avoid and
remediate harm. That obligation, of course in accordance with the structure of the
Guiding Principles, is limited to law (legislation and dispute resolution
remediation) for states, and governance norm frameworks (social norms and
contract policies, including the policies at the heart of human rights due
diligence) for corporate actors. Within that framework, international
organizations and other collectives organized to fashion standards and
remediation that might also assume a greater place within the constellation of
remedial alternatives available to individuals. One could try to interpret the
current framework in that direction, but it is more likely that a consequentialist
structure will be used. The result is the loss of mechanics, inherent in the
development of the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, which might
have fleshed out the relationship within these complex and overlapping
governance structures of the rights bearers to those whose actions may adversely
affect their interests.

568. See Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 28-30.
569. See e.g., Amnesty Int’l, Comments in Response to the UN Special Representative of the Secretary
General on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises’ Guiding Principles—Proposed
Outline (October 2010), AI Index IOR 50/001/2010, at 18-21 (Nov. 4, 2010) (“The Guiding Principles must be
clear that there will be some corporate human rights impacts that must involve the State ensuring accountability
and remedy.”) Id. (emphasis added).
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7. Inter-systemic Issues
The great challenge of polycentric structuring is the approach chosen for the
ordering of the relationship between coordinating systems—that is, the challenge
570
of the effectiveness of its structural coupling. The issues of interactions among
state and corporate governance systems, along with that of international public
and private organizations that supplement and compete with both, present an
important unresolved issue that parallels that of the future of legitimate
interpretation of the Guiding Principles themselves. On the one hand, this process
can be understood as organic, subject to the sum of the combination of the logic
of the character of each of the actors. On the other hand, the strong
instrumentalist character of the Guiding Principles creates avenues for the
indulgence of temptations by states, especially, to either attempt to commandeer
the system, and in the process limit its application. It also opens the door, though
less widely, for non-state actors to develop governance systems that de-center the
state within governance systems with real effect in the ordinary lives of people.
In either case, strategic behavior is likely at both ends of the governance
571
spectrum.
Second, autonomy of the corporate responsibility is also built into the scope
of application rules of Draft Principle 12 (Guiding Principles 12 through 15). The
responsibility “[a]pplies across a business enterprise’s activities and through its
572
relationships with third parties associated with those activities.” The validity of
this scope is problematic at best under the rules of the domestic legal orders of
most states. It disregards the complex and deeply embedded legal protections
accorded to entities separately constituted as legal persons. It ignores principles
of segregated assets that are built into the legal regimes of corporate limited
liability. It ignores rules for piercing the corporate veil. It also converts contract
law into governance relationships, especially to the extent it seeks to impose
obligations to control behavior on the entity in the superior position within
supply or value chains. Activity, rather than legal relationships, forms the
573
touchstone of the scope of the responsibility to protect. None of this is

570. See generally Niklas Luhmann, Operational Closure and Structural Coupling: The Differentiation
of the Legal System, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1419 (1992).
571. This is what Bob Jessop has described in a related context as the tension between what is
sometimes derided as market anarchy and organizational hierarchy. See Bob Jessop, The Governance of
Complexity and the Complexity of Governance: Preliminary Remarks on Some Problems and Limits of
Economic Guidance, in BEYOND MARKET AND HIERARCHY: INTERACTIVE GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL
COMPLEXITY 95-96, 113 (Ash Amin & Jerzy Hausner eds., 10th ed. 2010) (“inter-systemic concertation must
be mediated through subjects who can engage in ex ante self-regulatory strategic coordination, monitor the
effects of that coordination on goal attainment and modify their strategies as appropriate. On the other hand,
such bodies can never fully represent the operational logic . . . of whole subsystems.”).
572. Draft Principles, supra note 64, at princ. 12(b).
573. The commentary emphasizes, “The scope of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights
extends across a business enterprise’s own activities and through its relationships with other parties, such as
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necessarily bad, but all of it suggests a basis in legitimacy well outside the
574
construct of the legal system rules of domestic legal orders. The essence of
corporate personality and the character of its relationships with others are
grounded in substantially different standards that are outside of the state legal
system, rather than within it. Guiding Principle 12 is built on the recognition of
this distinction.
Third, autonomy is also built into the construction of Guiding Principle 14’s
application to “all enterprises regardless of their size, sector, operational context,
575
ownership and structure.” This portion of the standard effectively ignores the
rules of legal personality on which the law of corporations in virtually every state
is based. The standard collapses corporate personality into single enterprises—
the legal consequences of any single enterprise action trigger the responsibility to
respect within the entire enterprise. This is impossible under the domestic law of
most states which, for example, would impose strict fiduciary duty rules on the
boards of distinct corporations making up an enterprise. The Guiding Principles
suggest that, while corporate obligations may be grounded on the basis of
particular standards according to the laws of the states in which they are
domiciled or operate, the responsibility to respect human rights is not limited by
those legal rules.
Fourth, the basis of the responsibility to respect appears to be functional
rather than formal. It is to some extent grounded in principles of power
relationships. If a corporation has power over another in the context of their
relationship, that corporation has a responsibility to respect human rights within
576
the context of that power. Importantly, protection from legal liability does not
follow from compliance with the autonomous obligations derived from the
577
Thus, compliance with corporate
corporate responsibility to respect.
business partners, entities in its value chain, other non- State actors and State agents. Particular country and
local contexts may affect the human rights risks of an enterprise’s activities and relationships.” Id. at princ. 12
cmt.
574. See, e.g., Backer, Multinational Corporations, supra note 522.
575. Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 14.
576. The idea is grounded in the concept of leverage. Id. at princ. 19(b)(ii); see supra notes 391-98 and
accompanying text. In the 2011 Draft Guiding Principles Commentary these ideas were grounded in notions of
influence. It explains:
“Influence”, where defined as “leverage”, is not a basis for attributing responsibility to
business enterprises for adverse human rights impacts. Rather, a business enterprise’s leverage
over third parties becomes relevant in identifying what it can reasonably do to prevent and
mitigate its potential human rights impacts or help remediate any actual impacts for which it is
responsible.
Draft Principles, supra note 64, at princ. 12 cmt.
577. Guiding Principle 17 commentary makes that point explicitly:
Conducting appropriate human rights due diligence should help business enterprises address
the risk of legal claims against them by showing that they took every reasonable step to avoid
involvement with an alleged human rights abuse. However, business enterprises conducting
such due diligence should not assume that, by itself, this will automatically and fully absolve
them from liability for causing or contributing to human rights abuses.
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responsibility rules does not insulate a corporation from liability under the lawbased rules of the states in which it is domiciled or operates.
Fifth, the functional element of the responsibility to respect and its autonomy
from law is emphasized in the description of the governance universe that makes
up the substantive element of the responsibility to respect. “Depending on
578
circumstances, companies may need to consider additional standards.” These
standards are sourced in international law rather than the domestic law of any
state, with specific reference to international humanitarian law and the universe
of U.N. instruments specific to vulnerable and/or marginalized groups, such as
579
indigenous peoples, women, ethnic and religious minorities, and children.
Lastly, the scope rules of the responsibility to respect human rights include a
strong caution against a conventional approach to its effectuation, grounded in
notions of risk assessment common to financial reporting. The Commentary
makes clear that a risk assessment approach should not be undertaken, especially
one in which the costs of compliance are balanced against the benefits accruing
580
to a failure to respect human rights. Likewise, companies may not balance the
benefits of respecting human rights in one instance against their failures to
581
respect human rights in others. With these caveats, though, some room for
incorporation within the risk management functions of corporate operations is
582
permitted.
But this systemic autonomy bumps up against reality as well. One in
particular is worth mentioning here—it is emblematic of the sort of tension that
might threaten the Guiding Principles construct—the actions required of an
enterprise where the laws of a domestic legal order conflict with the social or
international norms to which the corporation might also be bound. The Guiding
Principles do not focus on this issue directly, but the thrust of the approach is
583
clear—the rules of the domestic legal order preempt competing norms. But the
Principles in this case tend to inhibit rather than encourage bridging action in an
effort to bend to the hierarchy of law that frames the Principles.

Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 17 cmt.
578. Draft Principles, supra note 64, at princ. 12 cmt.
579. Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 12 cmt.
580. Id. at princ. 16-17.
581. “The responsibility to respect does not preclude business enterprises from undertaking additional
commitments or activities to support and promote human rights. But such desirable activities cannot offset an
enterprise’s failure to respect human rights throughout its operations and relationships.” Draft Principles, supra
note 64, at princ. 12 cmt.
582. “Human rights due diligence can be included within broader enterprise risk-management systems,
provided that it goes beyond simply identifying and managing material risks to the company itself, to include
risks to rights-holders.” Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 17 cmt.
583. Guiding Principle 23 seeks ways to honor principles of human rights when faced with conflicting
requirements. Id. at princ. 23(b); see supra notes 568-69 and accompanying text. This is consistent with the
overall framework of the Guiding Principles. See Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 1-3.
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For example, it might have been possible to suggest a more instrumental
balancing when corporations are faced with conflicting requirements based on
the sort of decision balancing procedures and proportionality principles already
584
well embedded in the Principles. This instrumental balancing could proceed
through four decision steps: (1) exploration of the possibility of reconciling the
585
conflict between standards through interpretation; (2) if reconciliation is not
586
possible, negotiation of an exception or solution with the state; (3) if mediation
or informal discussion with state officials is unsuccessful, then challenge the
587
law; and (4) where challenge is unsuccessful, consideration of the continued
feasibility of operating in the offending jurisdiction, assuming that the company
588
is now forced to choose between national and international standards.
Only when lawful challenge proves unsuccessful does a company actually
face the issue of reconciling inconsistent national and international obligations to
respect human rights. In that case, the company must make a decision based on
589
the greater good in terms of human rights. The example of Google’s well
584. E.g., Guiding Principles, supra note 41, at princ. 13-14.; see supra notes 568-70 and accompanying
text.
585. The exercise of reconciling standards can involve the efforts of a number of departments in the
corporation. Lawyers might be tasked to determine whether there are reasonable ways to avoid conflict, or
whether reasonable alternative interpretations of national or international law are feasible; industry standards or
local practice might be reviewed; officials might reach out to international bodies or local civil society elements
for interpretation. Additionally, the company might review its planned actions in light of its objectives. Many
times it may be possible to find alternative means to the same objective that avoids conflict. These processes are
usually informal but can also lead to a decision to invoke formal processes for definitive interpretation (and thus
lead to stage two).
586. In this stage, there is an assumption that reconciliation is impossible and alternative means of
avoiding conflict are not feasible. Now both formal and informal contacts must be made with the appropriate
State officials to seek top mediation of the conflict. This may involve a number of alternative approaches, from
negotiating an agreement with the State (with the object of reaching an agreement that avoids violation of
human rights norms), to seeking protection under bilateral investment treaties that incorporate international
standards, to seeking legislative change in an appropriate manner.
587. It is possible that discussions with State officials may not produce agreements that satisfy the
requirements of international standards. In that event, the company must determine whether it ought to
challenge the inconsistent national legislation. Challenge may take one of two forms in most cases. Usually this
course suggests a legal challenge to inconsistent state law. Sometimes it may suggest political challenge. In the
latter event, it may be important to solicit the help and counsel of local civil society elements. Special sensitivity
ought to be exercised when engaging in challenge in countries with weak government or in conflict zones.
588. A useful though not wholly satisfying example was provided by Google, Inc., in its highly
publicized dispute with the Chinese state. See Miguel Helft and David Barboza, Google Shuts China Site in
Dispute Over Censorship, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/23/technology/
23google.html. The move can be strategic. Two years after the strategic retreat, Google is seeking re-entry into
the Chinese market. See, Amir Efrati and Loretta, Google Softens Tone on China: Two Years After Censorship
Clash, Company Renews Push to Expand in World's Biggest Internet Market, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 12, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203436904577155003097277514.html.
589. The idea is well known in the business literature. See e.g., THOMAS N. GLADWIN & INGO WALTER,
MULTINATIONALS UNDER FIRE: LESSONS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICT 206-12 (1981) (withdrawal from
apartheid South Africa). These decisions are grounded in the application of social norm ideals. These are made
evident through social mobilization and action by consumers, shareholders, and nongovernmental organizations
that may affect public opinion and economic decision-making affecting corporate profitability. See, e g.,
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publicized initial determination to engage in business in China in the face of
national censorship requirements provides a good illustration of the nature of the
decision. In that case, Google decided that there were more human rights benefits
in providing some greater amount of information to Chinese customers than in
590
abandoning China altogether. It is important to remember that decisions made
in this context are dynamic. They require constant review as circumstances
change. When the human rights benefits diminish in the face of continued
inconsistency in legal requirements, the company must then reevaluate its
business decision in order to meet its “respect” requirements under the three
pillar mandate. Again, Google provides a good illustration. The Company
publicly sought to reevaluate its agreement to comply with Chinese censorship
591
rules in the aftermath of cyber attacks on its operations.
All of these steps could be more effective if taken in collaboration with peer
592
companies, nongovernmental allies, and, where applicable, in the home state.
This is especially useful where these collectives can develop models of decision
and analysis that are context specific—such as for labor issues or for issues
peculiar to a particular industrial sector. It might also be useful to stimulate
collaboration between industry and civil society groups. It is in this context that
the General Principles missed an opportunity to mirror the multilateral
governance provisions of the state duty to corporate responsibility, including the
incorporation of the General Principles themselves in the work of multilateral
593
corporate groups. That absence illustrates both the promise and the limits of the
General Principles in its initial iteration.
V. CONCLUSION
Innovation is never perfect—either in conception or implementation. Reality
always serves as the ultimate limiting principle for both theory and practice. All
innovative movements have confronted this reality. Those that have remained
unbending have failed; those that have sought to preserve what they could to

SUSANNE SOEDERBERG, CORPORATE POWER AND OWNERSHIP IN CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM: THE POLITICS
OF RESISTANCE AND DOMINATION 138-59 (2009) (speaking to what she labels the marketization of social
justice illustrated by the case of the Sudan divestment campaign).
590. Karen Wickre, Testimony: The Internet in China, GOOGLE BLOG (Feb. 15, 2006, 9:50 AM),
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2006/02/testimony-internet-in-china.html.
591. See David Drummond, A New Approach to China, GOOGLE BLOG (Jan. 12, 2010, 3:00 PM),
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html.
592. Compare Guiding Principles and discussion, supra note 41, at princ. 12.
593. The closest provision, Guiding Principle 30, sets a substantive constraint on multi-stakeholder and
other collaboration initiatives. It assumes such efforts without encouraging them or considering them important
instrumental elements in furthering the framework, nor does it provide a structure for collaborations between
them and business in the construction and implementation of their human rights due diligence programs. It does
recognize these possibilities, but gently. It does suggest the similarity in issues of implementation, but does not
focus on the connection with other related systems. Id. at princ. 30.
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advance their project in the face of the constraints that reality imposes tend to
survive, and sometimes flourish. The SRSG’s voyage of principled pragmatism
has served the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework well; its insights have
produced the shortfalls examined at length in the body of this work, but have also
marked the extraordinary success of the project itself. This is no small matter—
despite the pessimism of all stakeholders—states, corporations, nongovernmental, and public international—the SRSG was able to craft a coherent
system of governance and obtain official endorsement of states acting through an
international organization not known for its unity of vision or purpose. That
alone will be the object of study by political scientists, institutional theorists, and
sociologists for some time to come. The object of this article, however, was the
framework itself. Articled as a set of dense principles, and regardless of their
shortcomings, the Guiding Principles have opened a number of significant
pathways to the development of law and governance frameworks. They accept
that there are formal systems of governance beyond those of the state. They begin
to make a pragmatic case for the interlacing of international law and domestic
legal orders; they recognize the governance aspects of social norm systems and
seek a method of institutionalizing that role; they broaden the scope of
remediation in a systematic way and attempt to harmonize the principles that
serve as markets of legitimacy and accountability for each. The Guiding
Principles manage this within an overall framework that still grounds its
operation in and through states and which continues to treat corporations and
other actors as dependent on and subject to an exclusive (at least in the
aggregate) control of states through law in ways that even states now find
594
troublesome. It is likely to play a significant role in the development of
governance frameworks in this area for some time to come.

594. For a discussion, see Larry Catá Backer, Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond the State:
The Multinational Corporation, the Financial Stability Board, and the Global Governance Order, 18 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 751 (2011).
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